United States District Court, S.D. California
ORDER DENYING EMERGENCY MOTION FOR EXPEDITED ORDER
FOR CHANGE OF VENUE [ECF NO. 133.]
Gonzalo P. Curiel, United States District Judge
August 27, 2019, pro se Plaintiff Sara Elizabeth Siegler
filed an ‘emergency' motion for a change of venue,
requesting a ruling by August 30, 2019. (ECF No. 133.) Upon
review of the motion, and in light of applicable law, the
motion is DENIED for the reasons articulated
24, 2018, Plaintiff filed the instant action in the Southern
District of California. After extensive motions practice, the
Court on August 2, 2019, granted dismissal with prejudice on
all of the claims in Plaintiff's second amended
complaint. (ECF No. 126.)
August 26, 2019, the Court denied Plaintiff's sixth
omnibus motion which requested (1) an extension on statutory
deadline to file her Rule 59(e) motion against the dismissal
order entered August 2, 2019, and (2) leave to file a motion
for reconsideration which would exceed the 25 page limit
prescribed by the local civil rules. The Court denied the
first request and reaffirmed the statutory August 30, 2019,
deadline because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6 expressly
forbids the Court to provide the extension requested.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2) (“A court must not
extend the time to act under Rules 50(b) and (d), 52(b),
59(b), (d), and (e), and 60(b).”). The Court granted
the request to depart from the 25 page limit; in the absence
of a requested brief length, the Court permitted a filing of
up to 35 pages.
instant motion for change of venue is predicated on her
disagreement with the August 26, 2019 Order. She seeks a
venue change out of this district because she believes the
Court has not afforded her adequate accommodations under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, and because she insists that
the Court and Court staff have conspired to retaliate against
her, or subject her to biased and prejudicial treatment on
account of her pro se status. Plaintiff does not specify
where she would like the case to be transferred to, or where
believes venue is proper, stating only that the case could be
transferred to any federal district, and should be directed
to a court that would be able to accommodate her.
Transfer of Venue
motion fails as a request for a change of venue. At worst,
the request is a dilatory tactic to avoid the effects of the
Court's August 2, 2019 order dismissing the entirety of
the action. See Silver Valley Partners, LLC v. De
Motte, No. C05-5590 RBL, 2006 WL 2711764, at *5 (W.D.
Wash. Sept. 21, 2006) (warning against late-blooming requests
for transfer brought merely as dilatory practice). According
to Plaintiff, she seeks a transfer venue so that she can set
her yet-to-be filed motion for reconsideration before a
different Court. (ECF No. 133-1, at 8.) That is no basis for
best, Plaintiff's request for a venue change is waived as
inadequately briefed. Most critically, Plaintiff has not
requested transfer to any specific venue.
support a motion for transfer of venue, the moving party must
establish “that venue is proper in the transferor
district; that the transferee district is one where the
action might have originally been brought; and that transfer
will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and
will promote the interests of justice.” Vu v.
Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc., 602 F.Supp.2d 1151, 1155-56
(N.D. Cal.2009) (quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 820 F.Supp. 503, 506 (C.D.
venue is determined to be proper in both districts,
“[t]he Court must consider public factors relating to
‘the interest of justice' and private factors
relating to ‘the convenience of the parties and
witnesses.'” Decker Coal Co. v. Commonw. Edison
Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986). Such factors
include: (1) plaintiff's choice of forum; (2) convenience
of the parties; (3) convenience of the witnesses; (4) ease of
access to the evidence; (5) familiarity of each forum with an
applicable law; (6) feasibility of consolidation with other
claims; (7) any local interest in the controversy; and (8)
the relative court congestion and time of trial in each
forum. Vu, 602 F.Supp.2d at 1156.
Plaintiff has provided no justification for element three.
Significantly, it was Plaintiff herself who brought the case
in the Southern District of California; in other words, this
was Plaintiff's own choice of forum. As master of her
case, Plaintiff does not stand in the position of the usual
transfer of venue movant, who is presumed to be a defendant.
See Decker Coal Co., 805 F.2d at 843
(“The defendant must make a strong showing of
inconvenience to warrant upsetting the plaintiff's choice
of forum.”). Plaintiff cannot show transfer is in the
interest of justice merely because she hopes another court
would reach a different conclusion on a dispositive motion
after it has been decided.
the defending parties have invested considerable resources in
responding to her suit in the instant district, filing pro
hac vice requests and litigating the issues in
Plaintiff's chosen forum. Plaintiff has offered no
explanation of the prejudice or convenience that would befall
the defendants if venue was transferred, nor could she
without specifying which venue she prefers.
addition, the Court has spent considerable time familiarizing
itself with Plaintiff's allegations. It has considerable
institutional knowledge of the facts and procedural history
of this litigation. It has issued an abundance of orders
accommodating Plaintiff's filing requests (for extensions
of time, for leave to file oversize briefs) and permitted her
access to the CM/ECF system so that she might directly file.
It has gone to considerable lengths to comprehend and
construe liberally Plaintiff's prolix, perplexing, and
often procedurally-deficient filings in light of her pro se
status. And when it has ruled on dispositive motions, the
Court has painstakingly enumerated, at a level of guidance
and specificity not ordinarily accorded to counseled parties,