United States District Court, E.D. California
SCREENING ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO FILE AN
AMENDED COMPLAINT [ECF NO. 1]
Jeffrey Franklin is appearing pro se in this civil rights
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter was
referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.
filed the instant action in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California on July 26, 2019. On
August 28, 2019, the action was transferred to this Court.
Therefore, Plaintiff's complaint, filed on July 26, 2019,
is before the Court for screening.
Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the
prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous
or malicious, ” that “fail to state a claim on
which relief may be granted, ” or that “seek
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . .
.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations
are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant
personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff's
rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th
proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to
have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any
doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman,
680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To
survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially
plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow
the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d
962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and
“facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a
defendant's liability” falls short of satisfying
the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;
Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
Court accepts Plaintiff's allegations in the first
amended complaint as true only for the purpose of
the sua sponte screening requirement under 28 U.S.C.
names Doctor Harold Tate, Chief Physician Surgeon U. Baniga,
Chief Medical Executive S. Shiesha, and Deputy Director J.
Lewis, as Defendants.
about July 29, 2015 to August 7, 2015, Plaintiff's cancer
mediation was aborted by Dr. Tate because Plaintiff was
attending a court orders settlement conference on July 29-30,
2015. Dr. Tate falsely alleged that Plaintiff no longer
wished to receive the remaining radiation treatments. Dr.
Tate had previously discontinued other prescribed medications
based on false pretenses.
filed medical grievances to obtain the medications, and Dr.
Tate “would take on an attitude and do something else
towards [Plaintiff's] medical care - treatment as a
result of my exercising the right to seek redress from his
non-medically warranted actions regarding my serious medical
condition or needs.” (Compl. at 5, ECF No. 1.)
Baniga addressed the numerous medical appeals, had a duty to
rectify the mistreatment by Dr. Tate, but simply turned a
blind eye and refused to take corrective action.
S. Shiesha and J. Lewis failed to properly train and/or
supervise Defendants Tate and Baniga and refused to take
corrective actions against them.