Franklin v. Tate

          SCREENING ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT [ECF NO. 1]

         Plaintiff Jeffrey Franklin is appearing pro se in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.

         Plaintiff filed the instant action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California on July 26, 2019. On August 28, 2019, the action was transferred to this Court. Therefore, Plaintiff's complaint, filed on July 26, 2019, is before the Court for screening.

         I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

         The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious, ” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted, ” or that “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

         A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff's rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

         Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

         II. COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

         The Court accepts Plaintiff's allegations in the first amended complaint as true only for the purpose of the sua sponte screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

         Plaintiff names Doctor Harold Tate, Chief Physician Surgeon U. Baniga, Chief Medical Executive S. Shiesha, and Deputy Director J. Lewis, as Defendants.

         On or about July 29, 2015 to August 7, 2015, Plaintiff's cancer mediation was aborted by Dr. Tate because Plaintiff was attending a court orders settlement conference on July 29-30, 2015. Dr. Tate falsely alleged that Plaintiff no longer wished to receive the remaining radiation treatments. Dr. Tate had previously discontinued other prescribed medications based on false pretenses.

         Plaintiff filed medical grievances to obtain the medications, and Dr. Tate “would take on an attitude and do something else towards [Plaintiff's] medical care - treatment as a result of my exercising the right to seek redress from his non-medically warranted actions regarding my serious medical condition or needs.” (Compl. at 5, ECF No. 1.)

         Dr. U. Baniga addressed the numerous medical appeals, had a duty to rectify the mistreatment by Dr. Tate, but simply turned a blind eye and refused to take corrective action.

         Defendants S. Shiesha and J. Lewis failed to properly train and/or supervise Defendants Tate and Baniga and refused to take corrective actions against them.

         III. ...