United States District Court, E.D. California
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS THAT DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE GRANTED; PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE DENIED; PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR SANCTIONS BE DENIED; AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER BE DENIED ECF NOS. 55, 62, 59,
is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in this civil
rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This
action proceeds on plaintiff's claims against defendant
Mansour for medical deliberate indifference and against
California State Prison, Corcoran (“CSPC”) for
damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”). This case is before the court on the
parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, ECF Nos. 55,
62, and on plaintiff's motions for (1) a temporary
restraining order, ECF Nos. 59, 70, and (2) sanctions, ECF
No. 64. For the reasons set forth below, I
recommend that the court grant defendants' motion and
deny plaintiff's motions.
LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
judgment is appropriate where there is “no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). An
issue of fact is genuine only if there is sufficient evidence
for a reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving
party, while a fact is material if it “might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
party's position must be supported by (1) citing to
particular portions of materials in the record, including but
not limited to depositions, documents, declarations, or
discovery; or (2) showing that the materials cited do not
establish the presence or absence of a genuine dispute or
that the opposing party cannot produce admissible evidence to
support the fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)
(quotation marks omitted). The court may consider other
materials in the record not cited to by the parties, but it
is not required to do so. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(3); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School
Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001); see also
Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017
(9th Cir. 2010).
moving party initially bears the burden of proving the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
To meet its burden, “the moving party must either
produce evidence negating an essential element of the
nonmoving party's claim or defense or show that the
nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential
element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at
trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v.
Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000).
If the moving party meets this initial burden, the burden
then shifts to the non-moving party “to designate
specific facts demonstrating the existence of genuine issues
for trial.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig.,
627 F.3d 376, 387 (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
323). The non-moving party must “show more than the
mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.”
Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).
However, the non-moving party is not required to establish a
material issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is
sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown
to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties'
differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W.
Electrical Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors
Assoc., 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).
court must apply standards consistent with Rule 56 to
determine whether the moving party has demonstrated there to
be no genuine issue of material fact and that judgment is
appropriate as a matter of law. See Henry v. Gill Indus.,
Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). “[A]
court ruling on a motion for summary judgment may not engage
in credibility determinations or the weighing of
evidence.” Manley v. Rowley, 847 F.3d 705, 711
(9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). The evidence must be
viewed “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party” and “all justifiable inferences”
must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Orr v.
Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 772 (9th
Cir. 2002); accord Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198
F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
is an inmate at CSPC. Defendant Dr. Mansour saw plaintiff and
provided him with medical care from November 2015 to May
2016. See ECF No. 55-4 at 2-4, 7.
had a laminectomy surgery on April 21, 2015, to address his
diagnosis of right foot drop. Plaintiff reported a fall to
his primary care physician on July 7, 2015, indicating that
he fell while trying to climb bus steps. Plaintiff had
follow-up medical visits on July 16, August 19, and October
27, 2015. Plaintiff had a follow-up MRI exam on July 13,
2015. During plaintiff's October 27, 2015 visit,
plaintiff asked to exchange his walker for a cane, and his
request was granted.
has had various accommodations at CSPC, including a bottom
bunk, lower tier, lifting restrictions, a walker or cane, a
back brace, and waist chain chronos. See, e.g., ECF
No. 79 at 2. Plaintiff sought additional accommodation in the
form of transportation other than the bus to his medical
appointments because he has had painful falls while
attempting to climb the steps up to the bus. See Id.
Plaintiff submitted his grievance to CSPC and appealed it
through the administrative process, and he was denied the
transport accommodation at every level.
Mansour first saw plaintiff on November 20, 2015, for a
first-level appeal interview regarding transportation other
than a bus. Defendant Mansour reviewed plaintiff's
medical charts and noted that plaintiff's mobility was
improving. Defendant Mansour noted that plaintiff had
existing mobility accommodations. For these reasons,
defendant Mansour felt additional accommodations were not
needed at that time. ECF No. 55-4 at 2, 7.
has been transported by means other than the bus to some of
his medical appointments, including by medical van,
wheelchair, and golf cart. ECF No. 55-5 at 21. However,
because plaintiff was in the Security Housing Unit
(“SHU”), officers did not always have access to a
medical van for transport. See Id. Plaintiff was
always able to get to his medical appointments.
Deliberate Indifference to ...