United States District Court, S.D. California
ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION FOR LACK OF PROPER
VENUE PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1391(B) AND 28 U.S.C.
§ 1406(A) AND FOR FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEES REQUIRED BY
28 U.S.C. § 1914(A)
GONZALO P. CURIEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Doyle Young (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated
at the U.S. Penitentiary Max ADX in Florence, Colorado, and
proceeding pro se, has filed a civil complaint in this Court
against the United States. See Compl., ECF No. 1.
claims the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”),
unidentified BOP employees at USP Max ADX, the Department of
Justice, United States Judges and Magistrate Judges in the
District of Colorado, the Tenth and D.C. Circuit Courts of
Appeals, Chief Justice John Roberts, and the General Counsel
and Clerk of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts,
have all prevented his access to court as the result of a
criminal conspiracy against him. See Compl., ECF No.
1 at 1, 3-9.
has not paid the $400 civil and administrative filing fee
required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), nor has he filed a
Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (IFP) pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
Failure to Pay Filing Fee or Request IFP
parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a
district court of the United States, except an application
for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $400.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may
proceed despite a plaintiff's failure to prepay the
entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v.
Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007);
Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir.
has not prepaid the $400 in filing and administrative fees
required to commence this civil action and he has not filed a
Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)
and (2). In fact, Plaintiff is no longer entitled to IFP
status due to his abusive litigation history in federal
district courts across the country. See Young v. United
States, 88 Fed.Cl. 283, 290-291, 293 (2009) (reviewing
Plaintiff's “repetitive, ”
“frivolous” and “malicious” filings
and directing the Clerk of Court to screen future submissions
because “Mr. Young has made himself an example of the
type of plaintiff Congress was trying to address when it
enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1915[(g)].”); see also Young v. U.S. Attorney
Gen., No. 19-CV-03373-WHO (PR), 2019 WL 2996382, at *1
(N.D. Cal. July 9, 2019) (“Plaintiff also maliciously
and purposely has filed actions in other federal courts
knowing, as demonstrated in the cited cases below, that venue
is not proper.”) (citations omitted). Therefore, his
case cannot yet proceed. See 28 U.S.C. §
1914(a); Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1051.
initial review, this Court, like many others, also finds
Plaintiff's case lacks proper venue. Venue may be raised
by a court sua sponte where the defendant has not yet filed a
responsive pleading and the time for doing so has not run.
Costlow v. Weeks, 790 F.2d 1486, 1488 (9th Cir.
1391(b) of Title 28 of the U.S. Code provides, in pertinent
part, that a “civil action may be brought in-(1) a
judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all
defendants are residents of the State in which the district
is located; [or] (2) a judicial district in which a
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to
the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is
the subject of the action is situated[.]” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b); Costlow, 790 F.2d at 1488;
Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d
834, 842 (9th Cir. 1986). “The district court of a
district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong
division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the
interests of justice, transfer such case to any district or
division in which it could have been brought.” 28
U.S.C. § 1406(a).
alleges constitutional violations committed by various
federal actors and entities based on allegations that they
have criminally conspired to block his access to courts from
USP Florence ADMAX, an administrative security federal
penitentiary, located in Colorado. See Compl., ECF
No. 1 at 1-2; 28 U.S.C. § 85 (“Colorado
constitutes one judicial district.”). No defendants are
alleged to reside in, and no act or omission giving rise to
Plaintiff's injuries is alleged to have occurred in
either San Diego or Imperial County. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 84(d) (“The Southern District of California
comprises the counties of Imperial and San Diego.”).
venue properly lies in the District of Colorado pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 85, but not in the Southern
District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 84(d).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); Costlow, 790
F.2d at 1488.
Conclusion and Order
the Court DISMISSES this action sua sponte
without prejudice based on Plaintiffs failure to pay the $400
filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), his failure
to file a Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a), and for ...