United States District Court, S.D. California
MERIDA MANIPOUN a.k.a. ANOMA SENGVIXAY, Plaintiff,
LOU DIBELLA; CHRIS KELLY; LINDA CARR; JAMES COX; SAN DIEGO EUROPEAN MOTORCARS, LTD. d/b/a ASTON MARTIN OF SAN DIEGO; and DOES 1-20, Defendants.
ORDER: (1) GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT; (2) DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO POST AN UNDERTAKING; AND (3)
DIRECTING THE CLERK OF COURT TO CLOSE THIS CASE (DOC. NOS.
ANTHONY J. BATTAGLIA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
before the Court are Defendants James Cox and Aston Martin of
San Diego's motion for summary judgment and motion for
order requiring Plaintiff to post an undertaking. (Doc. Nos.
56, 72.) Plaintiff filed oppositions to both of
Defendants' motions. (Doc. Nos. 59, 65, 70.) Plaintiff
filed replies. (Doc. Nos. 60, 66, 73.) For the reasons set
forth more fully below, the Court GRANTS
Defendants' motion for summary judgment and
DENIES Defendants' motion for order
requiring Plaintiff to post an undertaking.
7, 2016, Merida Manipoun (“Plaintiff”)
participated in the “Dream Machine, ” a
promotional event held at Viejas Casino and Resort
(“Casino”). (Doc. No. 50-1 at 4; Doc. No. 62-1 at
2-3.) Plaintiff was issued a “V Club Card” that
garnered entries into a drawing each time the V Club Card was
used on the slot machine. (Id.) Plaintiff
“earned the opportunity” to participate in the
drawing and was called on stage to select a single envelope
from various envelopes available. (Doc. No. 50-1 at 5.)
Plaintiff picked an envelope containing a certificate for an
Aston Martin V8 Vantage (the “Car”).
(Id.) Casino issued Plaintiff a Form 1099 indicating
a $134, 000 income, the suggested retail value of the Car.
(Id. at 6.)
12, 2016, Mr. Dibella, the Casino's manager, called
Plaintiff to inform her she would not be receiving the Car.
(Doc. No. 1 ¶ 26.) Defendants assert the Casino
disqualified Plaintiff from the contest because she allowed
her companion to use her V Club Card to improperly gain
entries into the drawing, which constituted a violation of
the contest rules. (Doc. No. 62-1 at 2.)
November 16, 2017, Plaintiff sued Defendants and three other
defendants for fraud, conspiracy to defraud, breach of unfair
competition, and breach of unilateral contract. (Doc. No. 1.)
Other defendants to this action were Lou Dibella, Chris
Kelly, and Linda Carr. (Id.) On May 10, 2018,
Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Defendants Dibella and Carr
from this litigation. (Doc. No. 31.) On August 1, 2019, at
the hearing on this present motion, Plaintiff stated that
claims against Defendant Kelly were also dropped. (Doc. No.
88 at 6.)
November 7, 2018, Defendants James Cox and Aston Martin of
San Diego (“Defendants”) filed a motion for an
order requiring Plaintiff to post an undertaking. (Doc. No.
56.) On February 6, 2019, Defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment. (Doc. No. 62.) On February 20, 2019,
Plaintiff filed a motion to strike Defendants' motion for
summary judgment as her response to Defendants' motion.
(Doc. No. 65.) While this Court's briefing schedule on
the Defendants' summary judgment motion did not permit
sur-replies, (Doc. No. 63), the Court granted Plaintiff's
motion to file a sur-reply. (Doc. No. 69.)
judgment is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56 if the moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a
matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986). A fact is material when, under the governing
substantive law, it could affect the outcome of the case.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of
establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party can
satisfy this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence
that negates an essential element of the nonmoving
party's case; or (2) by demonstrating the nonmoving party
failed to establish an essential element of the nonmoving
party's case on which the nonmoving party bears the
burden of proving at trial. Id. at 322-23.
“Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not
preclude a grant of summary judgment.” T.W. Elec.
Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809
F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).
the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to
set forth facts showing a genuine issue of a disputed fact
remains. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 330. When ruling
on a summary judgment motion, a court must view all
inferences drawn from the underlying facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
bring two separate motions. Defendants seek summary judgment
as well as an order requiring Plaintiff to post an
Motion for Summary Judgment
seek summary judgment, or partial summary judgment, as to the
following causes of action: (1) fraud; (2) conspiracy to
defraud; (3) breach of unfair competition law; and (4) breach
of unilateral contract. (Doc. No. 62.) However, the Court
notes that at the hearing on August 1, 2019, Plaintiff
abandoned her claims of fraud, conspiracy, and unfair
competition against Defendants. Plaintiff solely argued that
her breach of contract claim survives Defendants' motion.
However, since the briefing addressed all four claims, the
Court will briefly address each claim on the merits.
Plaintiff argued that Defendants' motion was untimely as
Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend her complaint and
reopen discovery was pending. Plaintiff moved to strike
Defendants' motion on this basis. However, the Court
previously denied Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend
her complaint. (Doc. No. 76.) Accordingly, the Court denies
Plaintiff's request to strike Defendants' motion as
prevail on a fraud claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the
defendant made a false representation as to a past or
existing material fact; (2) the defendant knew the
representation was false at the time it was made; (3) in
making the representation, the defendant intended to deceive
the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff justifiably and reasonably
relied on the representation; ...