United States District Court, E.D. California
M. COTA, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court
is Plaintiff's third amended complaint (ECF No. 57,
docketed as plaintiff's second amended complaint).
Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his rights under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as well as his First
Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment rights
under the United States Constitution.
SCREENING REQUIREMENT AND STANDARD
Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or
portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2)
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or
(3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require complaints contain a
“…short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See
McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996)
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1)). Detailed factual allegations
are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
While a plaintiff's allegations are taken as true, courts
“are not required to indulge unwarranted
inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to
have their pleadings liberally construed and are afforded the
benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338,
342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). To survive
screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible,
which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court
to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quotation marks omitted); Moss v. United States Secret
Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer
possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not
sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short
of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572F.3d
names the following Defendants: (1) Joseph Bick (2) Nathaniel
K. Elam (3) Michael Felder (4) J. Lewis (5) J. Spaulding (6)
Lt. Lee (7) Balanon (8) Doss (9) Spada (10) D. Britton (11)
E. Spata (12) T. Camper (13) S. Perez (14) M. Hemenez (15)
Rabbon (16) S. Spaulding (17) C. Lacy (18) C. Burnett (19) F.
Enyeart (20) J. Vernon (21) M. Crum (22) J. Kelly (23) Baker
(24) D. Rodgers (25) Doe Defendant “Asian Nurse”.
See ECF No. 57, at 1-12. Plaintiff's complaint
is largely written in a narrative format and none of the
claims are clearly identified. In reviewing the complaint,
the Court has identified ten claims.
Plaintiff alleges Defendants Joseph Bick and Nathaniel K.
Elam violated his Eighth Amendment rights to adequate medical
care because both Defendants denied Plaintiff treatment for
his neurological and medical issues resulting from a prior
brain surgery. Id. at 1-2. Plaintiff alleges
Defendants Michael Felder and J. Lewis possessed the
authority to inform Warden R. Fox of the denied medical care,
but because they failed to do so, they too violated his
Eighth Amendment rights to adequate medical care.
Id. at 4.
Plaintiff alleges Defendants J. Spaulding and Lt. Lee did not
read him his Miranda Rights when he received a Rules
Violation Report (“RVR”). Id. at 5-6.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Balanon violated his Fourteenth
Amendment right to Due Process because Defendant Balanon did
not meet with Plaintiff before the RVR hearing and was not
present during the RVR hearing. Id. at 6. Plaintiff
alleges he is entitled to a staff assistant during
disciplinary hearings because he is developmentally disabled,
and his hearing, vision, and mobility is impaired.
Plaintiff alleges Defendants J. Spaulding, Doss, Spada, D.
Britton, and E. Spata violated the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by not using
“effective communication” because their
correspondence with Plaintiff was not in writing.
Id. at 7, 9, 12.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Lee retaliated against him, in
violation of his First Amendment rights, by issuing an RVR to
Plaintiff because he wanted his Miranda Rights read and an
attorney present before a disciplinary hearing commenced.
Id. at 7.
Plaintiff alleges Defendants T. Camper, S. Perez, M. Hemenez,
L. Rabbon, and S. Spaulding violated his Eighth Amendment
right against excessive force. Id. at 8. Plaintiff
alleges while he was sitting up on a gurney and “for no
just cause, ” the Defendants attacked and assaulted
Plaintiff. Id. at 8-9. Plaintiff also alleges
“Asian nurse doe defendant” violated his Eighth
Amendment right against excessive force when the Doe
Defendant dropped his left knee on Plaintiff's hand,
shoved his right knee into Plaintiff's abdomen, and
threatened to push Plaintiff off the gurney. Id. at
8. Plaintiff claims he was instructed by the Department of
Justice to contact the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
after completing an investigation, all
Defendants'employment with the California State Prison
were terminated. Id. at 10.
Plaintiff alleges Defendants C. Lacy, C. Burnett, F. Enyeart,
J. Vernon, M. Crum, and J. Kelly violated his Fourteenth
Amendment rights to due process when they did not respond to
his 602 grievance forms in a timely manner or provide
Plaintiff a notice of delay. Id. at 10.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Baker violated his Eighth
Amendment rights when he threatened to physically assault
Plaintiff with handcuffs if Plaintiff left his hospital bed
again. Id. at 11. Plaintiff alleges he left his
hospital bed in the first place to use the restroom.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant D. Rodgers violated his
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by falsifying an
RVR he issued to Plaintiff that stated he communicated with
Plaintiff in writing, although Defendant D. Rodgers is
“unable to produce the hand-written notes used at the
RVR hearing.” Id. at 12.
Plaintiff alleges his First Amendment rights were violated
because he was denied access to the law library, but does not
specifically name a ...