United States District Court, E.D. California
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED
COMPLAINT (ECF NO. 1)
Reymundo Leal (“Plaintiff”), a pretrial detainee
proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,
filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Currently before the Court is Plaintiff's
complaint, filed September 11, 2019.
Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the
prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous
or malicious, ” that “fail to state a claim on
which relief may be granted, ” or that “seek
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . .
.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations
are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant
personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff's
rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th
proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to
have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any
doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman,
680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To
survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially
plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow
the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d
962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and
“facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a
defendant's liability” falls short of satisfying
the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;
Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
brings this action seeking damages for his girlfriends
emotional distress and injunctive relief to gain custody of
her child. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff has
failed to state a cognizable claim. The Court shall provide
Plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint
and provides that legal standards that appear to apply to his
Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of
a plaintiff's constitutional or other federal rights by
persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v.
Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long
v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir.
2006); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th
Cir. 2002). To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff
is required to show that (1) each defendant acted under color
of state law and (2) each defendant deprived him of rights
secured by the Constitution or federal law. Long,
442 F.3d at 1185. There is no respondeat superior
liability under section 1983, and therefore, each defendant
is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 677. Therefore, to state a claim, Plaintiff must
demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in
the deprivation of his rights. Jones, 297 F.3d at
Plaintiff brings his claims against an unidentified
supervisory Child Protective Services Officer. “Under
Section 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for
actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious
liability.” Crowley v. Bannister, 734
F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
“A supervisor may be liable only if (1) he or she is
personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, or (2)
there is ‘a sufficient causal connection between the
supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional
violation.'” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Under
the latter theory, supervisory liability exists even without
overt personal participation in the offensive act if
supervisory officials implement a policy so deficient that
the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights
and is the moving force of a constitutional violation.”
complaint does not contain any factual allegations that the
supervisory Child Protective Services worker personally
participated in removing the child or that the child was
removed due to a policy that violated his constitutional
rights. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the
unidentified supervisory employee.
Plaintiff brings this action against Malia Vang, a social
worker. However, the complaint is devoid of allegations as to
Ms. Vang. To state a claim, Plaintiff must link each named to
defendant to some act or failure to act that violated his
federal rights. Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable
claim in this action.
brings his claims alleging violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Plaintiff states that he is seeking to get his child back.
“A parent's desire for and right to ‘the
companionship, care, custody and management of his or her
children' is an important interest that ‘undeniably
warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing
interest, protection. ” Lassiter v. Dep't of
Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., N. C., 452 U.S. 18, 27
(1981) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
651 (1972)); accord Kelson v. City of Springfield,
767 F.2d 651, 655 (9th Cir. 1985). “[F]reedom of
personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental
liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
753 (1982). The Supreme Court held long ago that an unwed
father's interest in having custody of his children is
cognizable and substantial. Stanley, 405 U.S. at
652. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees ...