United States District Court, N.D. California
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS,
MOTION FOR DISCLOSURE OF FINANCIAL INTERESTS, MOTION TO
RELATE CASES, AND MOTION FOR PERMISSION FOR ELECTRONIC CASE
FILING RE: DKT. NOS. 2, 3, 4, 5
HAYWOOD S GILLIAM, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
before the Court are Plaintiff's motion to proceed in
forma pauperis, motion for disclosure of financial interests,
motion to relate cases, and motion for permission for
electronic case filing (“e-filing”). Dkt. Nos. 2,
3, 4, 5. Plaintiff Mohammad Haider Agha Hasan brings this
action against the Honorable Jon S. Tigar and the Honorable
Jeffrey S. White of the United States District Court,
Northern District of California. Dkt. No. 1
(“Compl.”). Plaintiff's motion to proceed in
forma pauperis is DENIED and the Court
DISMISSES the Complaint with leave to amend.
The Court further DENIES Plaintiff's
motion for disclosure of financial interests, motion to
relate cases, and motion for permission for e-filing.
Court may authorize the commencement of a civil action in
forma pauperis if it is satisfied that the would-be litigants
cannot pay the filing fees necessary to pursue the action and
that the action is not frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(1); Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d
1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
mandates that the Court review an in forma pauperis complaint
before directing the United States Marshal to serve the
complaint. Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234 & n.7. The
Court must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. Barren v.
Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998).
standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted under §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a
claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112
(9th Cir. 2012) (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d
1122, 1127-31 (9th Cir. 2000)). The complaint must include a
“short and plain statement, ” Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2), and “sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quotation omitted). A plaintiff must provide the
grounds that entitles a plaintiff to relief. Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
Plaintiff is pro se, the Court construes his pleadings
liberally and affords him the benefit of any doubt.
Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621,
623 (9th Cir. 1988); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)
(“Pleadings must be construed so as to do
justice.”). The Court is not, however, required to
accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory,
unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.
Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988
(9th Cir. 2001).
construing the Complaint liberally and affording Plaintiff
the benefit of the doubt, the Court finds that
Plaintiff's Complaint does not state any cognizable
claims. Plaintiff merely alleges, without any factual
support, that Judge White and Judge Tigar
“injured” Plaintiff, and that Plaintiff
“suffered from the injuries inflicted by” Judge
White and Judge Tigar. Compl. at 8. He purportedly brings
this action under the “United States Constitution,
” “United States Code, ” and “Common
Law.” Id. at 9. These bare, conclusory
allegations are clearly insufficient to state a claim for
relief, as the Complaint is devoid of even a single
allegation as to what Judge White and Judge Tigar purportedly
did to “injure” Plaintiff.
a pro se litigant . . . may be entitled to great leeway when
the court construes his pleadings, those pleadings
nonetheless must meet some minimum threshold in providing a
defendant with notice of what it is that it allegedly did
wrong.” Brazil v. U.S. Dep't of Navy, 66
F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995). The Court finds that Plaintiff
has failed to meet that minimum threshold and accordingly
DENIES his request for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis and DISMISSES his Complaint.
the Court is doubtful that Plaintiff can successfully amend
his claims, the Court cannot say at this stage that amending
the complaint would be entirely futile. See Lucas v.
Dep't of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995)
(“[A] pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the
complaint's deficiencies and an opportunity to amend
prior to dismissal of the action.”). However, to the
extent Plaintiff's amended complaint rests on allegations
of actions taken by Judge White and Judge Tigar in their
roles as judicial officers, Plaintiff's case will be
subject to dismissal with prejudice. Judges are absolutely
immune from civil liability for damages for acts performed in
their judicial capacities. See Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967) (judges immune from liability for
damages for acts committed within their judicial discretion;
immunity extends to suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983);
see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57
(1978) (judge is not “deprived of immunity because the
action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or in
excess of his authority”) (quotations and citation
omitted); Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991)
(judicial immunity not overcome by allegations of bad faith
or malice). Plaintiff's assertion that he does not have
to “explain his legal theory for overcoming a
‘possible' defense of judicial immunity” is
clearly contrary to well-established law.
also moves for the Court to order “its judicial
officer” to provide financial disclosure documents.
Dkt. No. 3. The Court lacks authority to grant the requested
relief and DENIES the motion. The Court also
finds no basis for relating the other pending cases and
DENIES Plaintiff's motion to relate.
Dkt. No. 4. The further Court DENIES AS MOOT
Plaintiff's motion for permission for e-filing. Dkt. No.
Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion to
proceed in forma pauperis and DISMISSES his
complaint. See Dkt. No. 2. The Court further
DENIES Plaintiff's motion for disclosure
of financial interests, motion to relate cases, and motion
for permission for e-filing. See Dkt. Nos. 3, 4, 5.
Plaintiff shall file any amended complaint by no later than
September 30, 2019. Failure to file an amended complaint by
the deadline may result in the dismissal of the action in its
entirety without further leave to amend. In addition,
Plaintiffs amended complaint will be dismissed with prejudice
if it only alleges judicial actions by Judge White and Judge
Tigar. Alternatively, Plaintiff may pay the required filing
fee by the September 30, 2019 deadline.