United States District Court, E.D. California
DEBORAH BARNES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
is a county inmate proceeding pro se with a civil rights
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action was
transferred from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California on July 19, 2019. (ECF No.
7.) Plaintiff claims that officers used excessive force
against him, denied him medical treatment, and threatened
him. Presently before the court is plaintiff’s motion
to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) and his complaint
for screening (ECF No. 1). For the reasons set forth below
the court will grant the motion to proceed in forma pauperis
and dismiss the complaint with leave to amend.
has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required
by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF No. 2.) Accordingly, the
request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.
is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for
this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By
this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial
filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct
the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing
fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to
the Clerk of the court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be
obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the
preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s
prison trust account. These payments will be forwarded by the
appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the
amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the
filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or
employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or
portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are
legally “frivolous or malicious, ” that fail to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).
is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221,
1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a
claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The
critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however
inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis.
See Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. Rule 8(a)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only
‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief, ’ in order to
‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a
complaint must contain more than “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it
must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell
Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint
under this standard, the court must accept as true the
allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg.
Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976),
construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s
favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421
Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides
Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States .
. . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Here, the defendants must act under
color of federal law. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. The
statute requires that there be an actual connection or link
between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation
alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v.
Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo
v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A person
‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a
constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if
he does an affirmative act, participates in another's
affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is
legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which
complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d
740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
supervisory personnel are generally not liable under §
1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of
respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant
holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him
and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically
alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862
(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438,
441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations
concerning the ...