United States District Court, S.D. California
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT LEAVE TO
AMEND (ECF NO. 41)
Janis L. Sammartino United States District Judge.
before the Court is Defendants the County of San Diego and
Carlos Olmeda's (together, the "Moving
Defendants") Motion to Dismiss ("Mot., " ECF
No. 41). Plaintiff Daniel Acedo filed a Response in
Opposition to ("Opp'n, " ECF No. 44) and the
Moving Defendants filed a Reply in Support of ("Reply,
" ECF No. 53) the Motion. After considering the
Parties' arguments and the law, the Court
GRANTS the Moving Defendants' Motion.
Daniel Acedo, proceeding pro se, is currently an
inmate at California Men's Colony. See generally
First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), ECF No. 40;
see also Mot. at 6. Defendant Carlos Olmeda is a
social worker who worked for Defendant the County of San
Diego during the events in question. See generally
claims stem from two hearings held in April and May of 2000
before the California Superior Court, Juvenile Division
("Juvenile Court") regarding a petition to
terminate Plaintiffs biological parents' parental rights.
FAC at 6-7, 12. Plaintiff alleges that during those hearings,
Defendant Olmeda falsely stated that his mother had
relinquished her parental rights even though Defendant Olmeda
possessed letters from Plaintiffs mother in which she
requested custody of Plaintiff. Id. at 6-7, 12-13.
Plaintiff alleges that the Juvenile Court treated Defendant
Olmeda's statements as an equivalent to his mother
abandoning custody, causing him damages for which he now
seeks recovery. Id. at 13. Plaintiff also alleges
that Defendant Paul Richards,  his court appointed legal counsel
during the hearings, provided ineffective legal services that
denied him a chance at family reunification, causing him
emotional distress when he was "lost in the
system." Id. at 7, 10. Plaintiff contends that
the County is vicariously liable for the actions of both
Defendants Olmeda and Richards. Id.
to filing his original complaint, Plaintiff presented several
claims to the County. On September 20, 2016, Plaintiff
presented a claim to the County alleging negligence, fraud,
and due process violations against the Moving Defendants.
FAC, Ex. 3(A) at 92-95 ("First County
Claim"). On October 11, 2016, the County formally
rejected Plaintiffs First County Claim on the grounds that it
was untimely filed. FAC at 96. Plaintiff filed a second claim
with the County against Defendant Richards on September 24,
2018. FAC, Ex. 3 at 69 ("Second County
Claim"). On November 8, 2018, the County denied
Plaintiffs Second County Claim as untimely. Id. at
76. Plaintiff alleges that the Board of Supervisors of the
County of San Diego abused its discretion when it rejected his
claims. Id. at 18, 20-21.
the County dismissed Plaintiffs First County Claim, Plaintiff
filed suit in the Superior Court of the County of San Diego.
Defendants removed the case to this Court on December 29,
2017. See generally Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.
Defendants then moved to dismiss, ECF No. 4, and, on July 16,
2018, the Court granted Defendants' motion with leave to
amend. ECF No. 29 at 23. After several extensions of time,
Plaintiff filed his FAC, see generally FAC, and the
Moving Defendants filed the Motion now before the Court.
See generally Mot.
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by
motion the defense that the complaint "fail[s] to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, " generally
referred to as a motion to dismiss. The Court evaluates
whether a complaint states a cognizable legal theory and
sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a), which requires a "short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
survive a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'"
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009)
(quotingBellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim
is facially plausible when the facts pled "allow the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
this case comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the
Court must accept as true all material allegations in the
complaint and must construe the complaint and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff. See Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895
(9th Cir. 2002). When a plaintiff appears pro se, the court
must be careful to construe the pleadings liberally and to
afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. See id.;
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007);
complaint does not survive 12(b)(6) analysis, the Court will
grant leave to amend unless it determines that no modified
contention "consistent with the challenged pleading . .
. [will] cure the deficiency." DeSoto v. Yellow
Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992)
(quoting Schriber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture
Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)).
Moving Defendants contend that the Court must dismiss all of
Plaintiff s claims against them. See generally Mot.
The Court addresses Plaintiffs claim against Defendant Olmeda