United States District Court, E.D. California
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS THAT PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION BE DENIED, AND THAT PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT BE
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE ECF NOS. 1 AND 3 OBJECTIONS OR
AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS ORDER ASSIGNING CASE
TO A DISTRICT JUDGE
Jose Rodriguez is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel
in this civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. On August 15, 2019, Rodriguez filed a complaint
alleging that a California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation policy to merge the general and special-needs
populations at Avenal State Prison placed him at risk of
violence. See ECF No. 1. The same day, Rodriguez
filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction to halt the policy. ECF No. 2.
recommend denying Rodriguez’s motion for a temporary
restraining order and dismissing his complaint without
prejudice, if Rodriguez fails to file an amended complaint
that corrects the numerous pleading deficiencies.
Rodriguez’s motion for an injunction does not meet the
standard to grant this extraordinary form of relief. Indeed,
the motion appears copied from near-identical motions that
have recently been filed in other cases-motions that have
been denied. See, e.g., Perez v. Diaz, No.
19-1295, 2019 WL 3229622, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 18, 2019);
Montalvo v. Diaz, No. 19-00363, 2019 WL 1242445, at
*6 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2019). Rodriguez’s complaint,
meanwhile, contains no specific or plausible theory for how a
merger policy at a different prison from the one in which he
is now housed deprives him of rights. His complaint also
appears largely identical to ones that have been filed in
similar cases, and dismissal has been recommended in at least
one such case. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 1 and 8 in
Perez, No. 19-1295. Because other recent orders and
recommendations and have dealt with these near-identical,
boilerplate claims, an exhaustive re-treatment of these
issues would not be an efficient use of judicial resources.
The federal rules contain mechanisms for collective
litigation precisely to avoid the inefficiencies that attend
to piecemeal litigation of identical claims.
plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order “must establish that he is likely to
succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that
the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an
injunction is in the public interest.” Glossip v.
Gross, 135 S.Ct. 2726, 2736-37 (2015) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff does not
meet this standard. Plaintiff’s motion and supporting
declarations contain only broad allegations that merging
special-needs and general populations will lead to a general
increase in violence. These predictions may have policy
merit, but they fail to establish that plaintiff
“currently faces the type of immediate and credible
threat of irreparable harm necessary to justify extraordinary
injunctive relief at this stage of the case.”
Montalvo, 2019 WL 1242445, at *6.
complaint contains similar defects. Plaintiff currently
appears to be housed at the Pleasant Valley State Prison,
see ECF No. 1 at 1, but the complaint concerns a
merger policy at Avenal State Prison, see id. at 3.
Even if Rodriguez were housed at Avenal, the complaint does
not explain how the merger policy would affect him
personally. The allegations concern a policy
“scheduled” to take place in January 2019, but
Rodriguez’s complaint was not filed until August 2019,
leaving the state of the controversy ambiguous at best. And
Rodriguez’s lone, boilerplate paragraph of supporting
facts contains no theory or details that otherwise plausibly
link the actions of defendants to a violation of his rights.
complaint must contain a short and plain statement that
plaintiff is entitled to relief, Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), and
provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face, ” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). If the allegations
“do not permit the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct, ” the complaint states no
claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
And, while a court must construe a pro se litigant’s
complaint liberally, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972), a court may dismiss a pro se
litigant’s complaint “if it appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
her claim which would entitle him to relief, ”
Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th
Cir. 2017) (quoting Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903,
908 (9th Cir. 2014)). Here, it is beyond doubt that
Rodriguez’s complaint does not contain allegations that
would entitle him to relief.
28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), all parties named in a civil
action must consent to a magistrate judge’s
jurisdiction before that jurisdiction vests for
“dispositive decisions.” Williams v.
King, 875 F.3d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 2017). Here, any
dismissal of a claim or ruling on a motion for injunctive
relief requires an order from a district judge. Thus, I
submit the following findings and recommendations under 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1):
1. Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction should be denied.
2. Plaintiff’s remaining claims should be dismissed
thirty days of service of these findings and recommendations,
plaintiff may file written objections with the court or an
amended complaint that attempts to correct the pleading
deficiencies. If plaintiff files objections, he should do so
in a document captioned “Objections to Magistrate
Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.”
clerk of court is ordered to assign this case to a ...