United States District Court, C.D. California
Julia G. Durward
One Technologies LLC, et al .
Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Ju-In Daniel Jung Thomas V.
Attorneys Present for Defendants: Witt W. Chang Ari N.
Present: The Honorable GEORGE H. WU, UNITED STATES DISTRICT
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND ; DEFENDANT ONE
TECHNOLOGIES, LLC'S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT FOR LACK
OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2)
 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE
Court's Tentative Ruling is circulated and attached
hereto. Court hears oral argument. For reasons stated on the
record, the Motions are TAKEN UNDER SUBMISSION. Court to
scheduling conference is taken off-calendar.
Julia Durward sues Defendants One Technologies LLC
(“OneTech”) and Does 1-50 inclusive for
violations of the California Business and Professions Code
§§ 17529.5(a)(1) and 17529.5(a)(2) arising from
unsolicited emails. See generally Complaint, Docket
No. 1-1. Plaintiff seeks statutory damages of $1, 000 per
email, attorneys' fees, and costs. Id. ¶ 5.
alleges the following: Plaintiff is an individual residing in
Los Angeles County, in California. Id. ¶ 7.
OneTech is a Delaware limited liability company headquartered
in Dallas, Texas. Id. ¶ 8. OneTech, which owns
and operates several websites, engages numerous third party
affiliates (the “advertising affiliates”) to
advertise for OneTech. Id. ¶ 3-4. Defendants or
their agents sent at least 90 allegedly unlawful Unsolicited
Commercial Emails (“spams”) to Plaintiff.
Id. ¶ 1. OneTech's agents used
self-destructing emails to hide both their and OneTech's
identities in order to avoid liability for their illegal
activities. Id. ¶ 2. The advertising affiliates
send millions of unlawful commercial emails to recipients
that did not give consent to receive them. Id.
¶ 4. Many of the emails include false and/or
misrepresented headers, such as “from” names and
email addresses that misrepresent or hide the identity of the
sender. Id. ¶ 4. Defendants' emails were
designed to trick recipients into opening them. Id.
¶ 23. Many of the emails contain remote-hosted images,
which Defendants' agents used to “essentially
self-destruct the emails after a short period of time, so as
to prevent people from making complaints about Defendants and
their agents.” Id. ¶ 26-28. At least 15
of the emails contain third-party domain names belonging to
Walmart, Netflix, Ebay, Aliexpress, and Craigslist.
Id. ¶ 30. The domain names were used without
the permission of those entities. Id. ¶ 30.
Plaintiff received the complained-of emails in a computer
located within Los Angeles County. Id. ¶ 9.
brought suit in Los Angeles Superior Court, and Defendants
removed to this Court. See generally Notice of
Removal, Docket No. 1. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(2). See generally Motion to Dismiss
(“MTD”), Docket No. 9. Plaintiff opposed,
see Opposition to Motion to Dismiss (“MTD
Opp'n”), Docket No. 19, and Defendant replied,
see Reply in support of Motion to Dismiss
(“MTD Reply”), Docket No. 21. Plaintiff filed a
Motion to Remand for “lack of Article III
standing.” See Motion to Remand
(“MTR”), Docket No. 17. Defendant opposed,
see Opposition to Motion to Remand (“MTR
Opp'n”), Docket No. 18, and Plaintiff replied,
see Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Notice to
Remand (“MTR Reply”), Docket No. 25.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)
Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(2) allows
a court to dismiss a matter for “lack of jurisdiction
over the person.” When a defendant moves to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to establish the court's personal jurisdiction
over the defendant. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy,
453 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); Harris Rutsky &
Co. Ins. Servs. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d
1122, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2003). The plaintiff may meet this
burden by making a “prima facie showing of
jurisdictional facts.” Pebble Beach, 453 F.3d
at 1154. “Where not directly controverted,
plaintiff's version of the facts is taken as true for the
purposes of a 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss.” Doe v.
Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001).
“[C]onflicts between the facts contained in the
parties' affidavits must be resolved in [the
defendant's] favor for purposes of deciding whether a
prima facie case for personal jurisdiction exists.”
AT&T v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d
586, 588 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting WNS, Inc. v.
Farrow, 884 F.2d 200, 203 (5th Cir. 1989)).
there is no applicable federal statute governing personal
jurisdiction, the district court applies the law of the state
in which the district court sits. SEC v. Ross, 504
F.3d 1130, 1138 (9th Cir. 2007). California permits
“[a] court of [the] state [to] exercise jurisdiction on
any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this
state or of the United States.” Cal. Civ. Proc. C.
§ 410.10; Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. National
Bank of Cooperatives, 103 F.3d 888, 893 (9th Cir. 1996)
see also Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th
Cir. 1990) (California's statutory limitation is
“coextensive with the outer limits of due process under
the state and federal constitutions, as those limits have
been defined by the United States Supreme Court”). A
court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant consistently with due process only so long as there
exist “minimum contacts” between the defendant
and the forum, such that maintenance of the suit “does
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.” Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citations and quotations omitted).
jurisdiction may be either general or specific. See
Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408, 41, nn. 8 & 9 (1984). A defendant is present
“generally” in the forum when its activities in
the state are “substantial” or “continuous
and systematic.” Sher 911 F.2d at 1361. Where
general jurisdiction does not exist, the Ninth Circuit has
established a three-factor test to evaluate whether the court
may exercise specific jurisdiction over a defendant:
(1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate
some transaction with the forum state or perform some act by
which it purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities in the forum state, thereby invoking
the benefits and protections of its laws;
(2) the claim must arise out of or result from the
defendant's forum-related activity; and/or
(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.
Ochoa v. J.B. Martin & Sons Farms, Inc., 287
F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002) (footnote omitted). The first
prong of the test may be satisfied by showing that a
defendant either purposefully availed itself of the privilege
of conducting activities in California, or purposefully
directed its activities toward California. See
Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797,
802 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit further explained this
standard in Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int'l,
Inc., 874 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2017):
“The inquiry whether a forum State may assert specific
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant ‘focuses on
the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation.'” Walden, 134 S.Ct. at 1121
(quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S.
770, 775, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Specifically, “the
defendant's suit-related conduct must create a
substantial connection with the forum State.”
Id. Our “primary concern” is “the
burden on the defendant.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.
v. Superior Court, 1 ...