United States District Court, N.D. California
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
a state prisoner, proceeds with a pro se civil rights
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has been granted
leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in
which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any
cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims which are
frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1), (2).
Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri
v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not
necessary; the statement need only '"give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests."'" Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted).
Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does
not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a
plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds'
of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A
complaint must proffer "enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at
570. The United States Supreme Court has recently explained
the “plausible on its face” standard of
Twombly: “While legal conclusions can provide
the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by
factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement
to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated,
and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a
person acting under the color of state law. West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
presents many allegations regarding the conditions of his
to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), a plaintiff must provide “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief....” Rule 8 requires
“sufficient allegations to put defendants fairly on
notice of the claims against them.” McKeever v.
Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir.1991)). Accord
Richmond v. Nationwide Cassel L.P., 52 F.3d 640, 645
(7th Cir.1995) (amended complaint with vague and scanty
allegations fails to satisfy the notice requirement of Rule
8.) “The propriety of dismissal for failure to comply
with Rule 8 does not depend on whether the complaint is
wholly without merit, ” McHenry v. Renne, 84
F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir.1996).
“[M]ultiple claims against a single party are fine, but
Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with
unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2.” George v.
Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).
“Unrelated claims against different defendants belong
in different suits, ” not only to prevent the sort of
“morass” that a multi-claim, multi-defendant suit
can produce, “but also to ensure that prisoners pay the
required filing fees - for the Prison Litigation Reform Act
limits to 3 the number of frivolous suits or appeals that any
prisoner may file without prepayment of required fees.”
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)).
indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth
Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104
(1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th
Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Technologies,
Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en
banc). A determination of “deliberate
indifference” involves an examination of two elements:
the seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the
nature of the defendant's response to that need.
Id. at 1059.
“serious” medical need exists if the failure to
treat a prisoner's condition could result in further
significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain.” Id. The existence of an
injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find
important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of
a medical condition that significantly affects an
individual's daily activities; or the existence of
chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that
a prisoner has a “serious” need for medical
treatment. Id. at 1059-60.
prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she
knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious
harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable
steps to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
837 (1994). The prison official must not only “be aware
of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, ” but he
“must also draw the inference.” Id. If a
prison official should have been aware of the risk, but was
not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment,
no matter how severe the risk. Gibson v. County of
Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). “A
difference of ...