United States District Court, N.D. California
KEITH M. HOPKINS, Plaintiff,
G. AHERN, et al., Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
GONZALEZ ROGERS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
filed this pro se civil rights action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the Alameda County
Sheriff's Department housed him in constitutionally
inappropriate conditions while he was held at Santa Rita Jail
(“Santa Rita”) from 2016 through 2018 as a
“pre-trial defendant under federal custody.” Dkt.
11 at 4. The operative complaint is Plaintiff's
amended complaint. See Dkt. 11. He was previously
granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Dkt. 8.
Venue is proper because the events giving rise to the claim
are alleged to have occurred in Santa Rita, which is located
in this judicial district. See 28 U.S.C. §
amended complaint, Plaintiff names the following Defendants:
Alameda County Sheriff's Office (“ACSO”)
Sheriff Gregory Ahern; Alameda County; California Forensic
Medical Group (“CFMG”); Nurse Magat; ACSO
Deputies Lincoln and Covingtonis; ACSO Sergeant Stuart; ACSO
Captain Skoldvist; and “Does 1-30, ” who are
unnamed ACSO jail officials. Dkt. 11 at 6-7. Plaintiff seeks
monetary damages. Id. at 3-4.
Court now conducts its initial review of the amended
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
alleges the following in his amended complaint about events
that occurred when he was a “pre-trial defendant under
federal custody” in Santa Rita from 2016-2018:
Plaintiff suffers from “chronic sleep apnea which is a
serious condition that requires the use of a
CPAPmachine, whenever he sleeps, to correct his
abnormal breathing.” Dkt. 11 at 8. Plaintiff claims
that during his three years of incarceration at Santa Rita,
he had to “sleep every night in the Out-Patient Housing
Unit (OPHU) because there are no electrical outlets in the
general population housing units.” Id.
Beginning in 2016, Plaintiff experienced denial/interruption
to his medical treatment, and thus he claims that he
“started experiencing daily headaches and extreme
daytime drowsiness.” Id. Plaintiff alleges
that “[t]here was no medical staff at [Santa Rita] that
could help [him] with his sleep apnea symptoms, thus [he] was
left to suffer . . . daily.” Id. at 9. Aside
from claims of deliberate indifference to his serious medical
needs based on a denial/interruption of medical treatment,
Plaintiff's 29-page amended complaint asserts multiple
claims for relief against a total of 23 defendants (including
numerous Doe defendants), from whom he seeks monetary
damages. As mentioned above, the allegations in the amended
complaint cover a span of time from 2016 through June 2018
and include a variety of claims, including due process
violations, retaliation, Eighth Amendment violations, and
negligence. See Dkt. 11 at 25-27.
reviewed the amended complaint, the Court finds various
pleading deficiencies exist that require the amended
complaint be DISMISSED with leave to amend.
Standard of Review
federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any
case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental
entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the
court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any
claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id.
§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must,
however, be liberally construed. See Balistreri v.
Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” To comport with Rule 8,
“[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement need
only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted).
Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does
not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a
plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds'
of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do . . . . Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A
complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id.
at 570. The United States Supreme Court has explained the
“plausible on its face” standard of
Twombly: “While legal conclusions can provide
the complaint's framework, they must be supported by
factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement
to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, a plaintiff must
allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated,
and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person
acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
supervisor may be liable under section 1983 upon a showing of
personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a
sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's
wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Redman
v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir.
1991) (en banc). A supervisor therefore generally “is
only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates
if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations,
or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent
them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045
(9th Cir. 1989). This includes evidence that a supervisor
implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy
itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the
moving force of the constitutional violation.”
Redman, 942 F.2d at 1446; see Jeffers v.
Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 917 (9th Cir. 2001).