United States District Court, C.D. California
Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Celine Cohan Matthew T.
Attorneys Present for Defendants: Melanie A. Ayerh, Anthony
Present: The Honorable GEORGE H. WU, UNITED STATES DISTRICT
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND 
hears oral argument. The Tentative circulated and attached
hereto, is adopted as the Court's Final Ruling. The Court
would GRANT the Motion to Remand and DENY the request for
Mocha Gunaratna sues Defendants Country Life, LLC
(“Country Life”) and Does 1-10, inclusive, on
behalf of a putative class for: (1) violation of the
California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Civil Code §
1750; (2) violation of the California False Advertising Law,
Business & Professions Code § 17500; and (3)
violation of the California Unfair Competition Law, Business
& Professions Code § 17200. See generally
Complaint, Docket No. 1-1. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief,
attorneys' fees, and costs of the suit. Id.
alleges the following: Country Life Activated Charcoal (the
“Product”) is a dietary supplement. Id.
¶ 1. Defendants advertise the Product as a
“digestive aid” that “promotes absorption
of intestinal gas.” Id. ¶ 2. Plaintiff
purchased the Product in reliance on these claims.
Id. ¶ 3. Plaintiff used the Product as directed
but did not receive the advertised benefits, and she would
not have purchased the Product if she had known it would not
deliver the advertised benefits. Id. Studies have
shown that activated charcoal does not absorb or reduce
intestinal gases. Id. ¶ 15.
brought suit in Los Angeles Superior Court; and Defendants
removed to this Court on the basis of the Class Action
Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (“CAFA”).
See Notice of Removal, Docket No. 1. Plaintiff filed
a Motion to Remand, seeking both remand and attorneys'
fees. See Motion to Remand (“MTR”),
Docket No. 15. Defendants oppose. See Opposition to
Motion to Remand (“Opp'n”), Docket No. 18.
Plaintiff replies. See Reply in Support of Motion to
Remand (“Reply”), Docket No. 20.
plaintiff seeks to have a case remanded to the state court
from which it was removed, the burden of establishing federal
jurisdiction is on the party seeking removal. See Valdez
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir.
2004); see also Abrego v. The Dow Chemical Co., 443
F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006) (same burden for cases under
CAFA. CAFA provides that district courts have original
jurisdiction over any class action in which: (1) the amount
in controversy exceeds five million dollars, (2) any
plaintiff class member is a citizen of a state different from
any defendant, (3) the primary defendants are not states,
state officials, or other government entities against whom
the district court may be foreclosed from ordering relief,
and (4) the number of plaintiffs in the class is at least
100. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2), (d)(5).
The amount-in-controversy requirement excludes only
“interest and costs, ” so attorneys' fees can
be included in the calculation. Guglielmino v. McKee
Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 700 (9th Cir. 2007).
the complaint alleges damages less than the jurisdictional
amount, the defendant must demonstrate to a “legal
certainty” that the amount in controversy requirement
is satisfied. Lowdermilk v. United States Bank Nat'l
Assoc., 479 F.3d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 2007). A court
measuring the amount in controversy must assume that the
allegations of the complaint are true and that a jury will
return a verdict for the plaintiff on all claims made in the
complaint. See Kenneth Rothschild Trust v. Morgan Stanley
Dean Witter, 199 F.Supp.2d 993, 1001 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
“The ultimate inquiry is what amount is put ‘in
controversy' by the plaintiff's complaint, not what a
defendant will actually owe.” Korn v. Polo Ralph
Lauren Corp., 536 F.Supp.2d 1199, 1205 (E.D. Cal. 2008);
Rippee v. Boston Market Corp., 408 F.Supp.2d 982,
986 (S.D. Cal. 2005). “Conclusory allegations as to the
amount in controversy are insufficient.” Matheson
v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089,
1090-91 (9th Cir. 2003). Rather, “a court may consider
the contents of the removal petition and
‘summary-judgment-type evidence' relevant to the
amount in controversy at the time of the removal.”
Valdez, 372 F.3d at 1117. A court may also consider
supplemental evidence later proffered by the removing
defendant, which was not originally included in the removal
notice. See Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837,
840 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2002). “Under this system, a
defendant cannot establish removal jurisdiction by mere
speculation and conjecture, with unreasonable
assumptions.” See Ibarra v. Manheim Invs.,
Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015).
normally there is a “strong presumption” against
removal jurisdiction, see, e.g., Gaus v. Miles.
Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992), and doubts as
to removability are resolved in favor of remanding the case
to state court, see Matheson, 319 F.3d at 1090,
“no antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking
CAFA, which Congress enacted to facilitate adjudication of
certain class actions in federal court, ” see Dart
Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81,