United States District Court, N.D. California
JOHN L. DAVIS, Plaintiff,
GREG SUHR, et al., Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL RE: DKT. NOS. 35, 36, 37
DONATO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
a prisoner, filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. This action was stayed pending the
outcome of plaintiff's criminal proceeding. The stay was
lifted, and the second amended complaint was dismissed with
leave to amend. Plaintiff has submitted a filing (Docket No.
33) that the Court construes as a third amended complaint.
Plaintiff has also filed several motions for injunctive
courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in
which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). In its review, the Court must identify any
cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims which are
frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1), (2).
Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri
v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Although a complaint “does
not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a
plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds'
of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A
complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id.
at 570. The United States Supreme Court has explained the
“plausible on its face” standard of
Twombly: “While legal conclusions can provide
the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by
factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement
to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States was violated, and (2) the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color
of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
alleges that he was the victim of a false arrest due to a
conspiracy of local and federal law enforcement. He seeks
money damages. In order to recover damages for an allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other
harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a
conviction or sentence invalid, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been
reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal
court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-487 (1994). A claim for
damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence
that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under
§ 1983. Id. at 487.
of unlawful arrest is cognizable under § 1983 for
violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable search and seizure if the allegation is that the
arrest was without probable cause or other justification.
See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-558 (1967);
Yousefian v. City of Glendale, 779 F.3d 1010, 1014,
n.1. (9th Cir. 2015) (absence of probable cause is essential
element of § 1983 false arrest claim); see, e.g.,
Fortson v. Los Angles City Atty's Office, 852 F.3d
1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2017) (existence of probable cause is
complete defense to § 1983 claim alleging false arrest).
A claim of bad faith in making an arrest may also be a cause
of action under § 1983 as an illegal and
unconstitutional arrest. See Bretz v. Kelman, 773
F.2d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). Where officers
have no lawful basis for stopping an individual, they have no
lawful basis for pursuing an arrest for resisting, impeding,
or obstructing a peace officer when that individual does not
accede to the investigatory stop. Velazquez v. City of
Long Beach, 793 F.3d 1010, 1019 (9th Cir. 2015).
states that various San Francisco Police Officers and federal
officials conspired to have him arrested and they were trying
to kill him. However, in the prior screening order the Court
noted that plaintiff pled no contest to criminal charges
related to the domestic violence allegations, therefore his
request to obtain damages was barred by Heck, unless
the conviction was later reversed or overturned. To the
extent plaintiff sought relief regarding a conspiracy to
investigate and arrest him that would not be barred by
Heck, he had failed to state a claim for relief. He
was informed that simply stating that the local and federal
officials were conspiring against him was insufficient.
Plaintiff has filed a third amended complaint but has failed
to cure the deficiencies noted by the Court.
has not addressed Heck and why this action for
damages should continue even though he pled no contest.
Because his claims are barred by Heck, this case is
dismissed. To the extent plaintiff presents claims that are
not Heck barred, he has failed to state a cognizable
claim. Plaintiff presents general claims of a conspiracy and
false arrest, but his allegations are not plausible on their
face. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. This action is
dismissed without leave to amend because plaintiff has
already been provided multiple opportunities to amend and
allowing further amendment would be futile.
has also filed motions for injunctive relief related to the
conditions of his confinement, but these claims are not
related to the content of the underlying complaint. The
motions for injunctive relief are denied. If plaintiff seeks
relief regarding the conditions of his ...