United States District Court, C.D. California
RANDY PITRE ET AL.
WAL-MART STORES, INC. ET AL.
PRESENT: THE HONORABLE DAVID O. CARTER, JUDGE
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DECERTIFY , REMANDING THE
ACTION, AND DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT  AND PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
the Court are three motions (the “Motions”):
Defendant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.'s
(“Defendant” or “Wal-Mart”) Motion
for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, for Summary
Adjudication (“MSJ”) (Dkt. 62); Defendant's
Motion to Decertify (Dkt. 63); and Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Adjudication of First Cause of Action
(“MSA”) (Dkt. 72). Having reviewed the papers
submitted by Plaintiffs and Defendant, the Court finds that
it must GRANT Defendant's Motion to Decertify and REMAND
the action to the Superior Court of California, County of
Orange. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Adjudication
are both DENIED AS MOOT.
case arises from Defendant's job application process, and
whether its background check procedures complied with the
Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681 et seq., and the Investigative Consumer
Reporting Agency Act (“ICRAA”), Cal. Civ. Code
§ 1786 et seq. (West 2019).
following facts are drawn from Plaintiffs' First Amended
Complaint (“FAC”) (Dkt. 51), the Responses and
Supplemental Responses of Named Plaintiffs to Defendant's
Interrogatories (“Pitre Interrog., ”
“Wilson Interrog., ” and “Walters
Interrog.”) (Dkt. 63-3, Exhibits 4, 5, and 6,
respectively), and Defendant's Supplemental Responses to
Plaintiffs' Special Interrogatories (“Wal-Mart
Interrog.”) (Dkt. 72-13, Ex. 10).
the Named Plaintiffs applied for a job at Wal-Mart, and each
was subsequently hired: Pitre in November 2015, Wilson in
December 2017, and Walters in February 2014. FAC ¶¶
4-6. Defendant is a Delaware corporation doing business in
the State of California. Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiffs
allege that, while evaluating Plaintiffs for employment,
Defendant procured credit and background reports about
Plaintiffs in violation of the FCRA and ICRAA. Id.
¶ 29. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant ran
afoul of the FCRA's disclosure requirements by willfully
including extraneous information in disclosure forms,
id. ¶¶ 34-35, and by inadequately
informing Plaintiffs of their rights under the FCRA,
id. ¶¶ 44-49. This same conduct, according
to Plaintiffs, also violated the analogous provisions of the
ICRAA. Id. ¶¶ 56-64. Based on
Defendant's discovery responses, Plaintiffs claim that
Wal-Mart procured background checks on approximately 6, 547,
400 job applicants using deficient disclosure forms in the
relevant time period (between June 2012 and March 2019).
Wal-Mart Interrog., Dkt. 72-13, Ex. 10 at 3-4.
Pitre filed his original Complaint in the Orange County
Superior Court on June 20, 2017. The case was then removed to
this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Defendant
filed a Motion to Dismiss as to certain state law claims
(Dkt. 13), which this Court granted on November 8, 2017 (Dkt.
26). On October 15, 2018, Plaintiff Pitre filed a Motion for
Class Certification (Dkt. 34), and, in light of his health
problems, also moved to add Plaintiffs Wilson and Walters as
additional class representatives (Dkt. 33). The Court granted
both motions on January 17, 2019 (Dkt. 47). The Class was
defined as follows:
All of DEFENDANTS' current, former and prospective
applicants for employment in the United States who applied
for a job with DEFENDANTS at any time during the period for
which a background check was performed beginning five years
prior to the filing of this action and ending on the date
that final judgment is entered in this action.
Dkt. 47 at 3. Named Plaintiffs filed their FAC on March 6,
2019, in which they brought the following three claims on
behalf of themselves and the Class:
(1) failure to make proper disclosure in violation of the
FCRA (15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A));
(2) failure to give proper summary of rights in violation of
the FCRA (15 U.S.C. §§ 1681d(a)(1), 1681g(c)); and
(3) failure to make proper disclosure in violation of the
ICRAA (Cal. Civ. Code § 1786 et seq.).
See generally FAC.
24, 2019, Defendant filed the instant MSJ and Motion to
Decertify. Plaintiffs filed the instant MSA on July 25, 2019.
Each of the three Motions was followed by Opposition and
Reply briefs, the last of which was submitted on October 1,
judgment is proper if “the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a). Summary judgment is to be granted cautiously, with due
respect for a party's right to have its factually
grounded claims and defenses tried to a jury. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986); Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). A
court must view the facts and draw inferences in the manner
most favorable to the non-moving party. United States v.
Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1992); Chevron
Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir.
1992). The moving party bears the initial burden of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact
for trial, but it need not disprove the other party's
case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. When the non-moving
party bears the burden of proving the claim or defense, the
moving party can meet its burden by pointing out that the
non-moving party has failed to present any genuine issue of
material fact as to an essential element of its case. See
Musick v. Burke, 913 F.2d 1390, 1394 (9th Cir.
the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the
opposing party to set out specific material facts showing a
genuine issue for trial. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S.
at 248-49. A “material fact” is one which
“might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law.” Id. at 248. A party cannot
create a genuine issue of material fact simply by making
assertions in its legal papers. S.A. Empresa de Viacao
Aerea Rio Grandense v. Walter Kidde & Co., Inc., 690
F.2d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, there must be
specific, admissible evidence identifying the basis for the
dispute. See Id. The Court need not “comb the
record” looking for other evidence; it is only required
to consider evidence set forth in the moving and opposing
papers and the portions of the record cited therein.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch.
Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001). The Supreme
Court has held that “[t]he mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence . . . will be insufficient; there must
be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for [the
opposing party].” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at
Article III of the Constitution, the judicial power of the
United States, vested in the federal courts, extends only to
“Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S.
Const. art. III, §§ 1-2. Because the Constitution
does not precisely define the reach of this judicial power,
courts have developed the doctrine of standing. While some
aspects of standing doctrine are “merely prudential
considerations, ” it also contains a “core
component, ” the case-or-controversy requirement.
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
(1992). To prevent “federal courts [from] exceed[ing]
their authority, ” the law of Article III standing
“confines the federal courts to a properly judicial
role” by “limit[ing] the category of litigants
empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court.”
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016)
“irreducible constitutional minimum” has three
requirements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered a
concrete and particularized injury in fact, which must be
actual or imminent, rather than speculative. Second, the
injury must be fairly traceable to the defendant's
alleged conduct. Third, the injury must be likely redressable
by a favorable decision by the court. Lujan, 504
U.S. at 560-61 (1992). These requirements must be met for
each claim the plaintiff brings, and ...