United States District Court, S.D. California
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING CROSS-MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF NOS. 17, 21)
ROBERT
N. BLOCK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
On
September 12, 2018, plaintiff filed a Complaint pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of a decision
by the Commissioner of Social Security denying her
application for a period of disability and disability
insurance benefits. Now pending before the Court and ready
for decision are the parties' cross-motions for summary
judgment.[2]For the reasons set forth herein,
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED and the Commissioner's
cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
On
October 8, 2015, plaintiff filed an application for a period
of disability and disability insurance benefits, alleging
disability commencing January 1, 2015. (Certified
Administrative Record ["AR"]) 500-06.) Plaintiff
claimed that she was unable to work due to urinary cancer,
high blood pressure, and anxiety. (AR 532.) Her application
was denied initially and upon reconsideration. (AR 424-27,
429-33.)
On June
30, 2016, plaintiff requested a hearing before an
administrative law judge ("ALJ'). (AR 434-35.) The
hearing was held on October 17, 2016, with plaintiff electing
to proceed without counsel. Testimony was taken from her and
a vocational expert ("VE"). (See AR
345-82.)[3] The ALJ issued a decision on December 27,
2016, finding that plaintiff was not disabled for purposes of
her benefits application. (AR 406-14.) Thereafter, plaintiff
requested a review of the decision by the Appeals Council.
(AR 464.) On February 27, 2017, the Appeals Council granted
review, vacated the ALJ's decision, and remanded for
further proceedings. (AR 419-23.)
Pursuant
to the order of remand, a supplemental hearing was held by
the same ALJ on August 8, 2017. Plaintiff again elected to
proceed without counsel. Testimony was taken from her and a
VE. (See AR 37-93.) The ALJ issued a decision on
October 25, 2017, again finding that plaintiff was not
disabled for purposes of her benefits application. (AR
21-31.) Thereafter, plaintiff (now represented by counsel)
requested a review of the decision by the Appeals Council.
(AR 498-99.) The ALJ's decision became the final decision
of the Commissioner on July 25, 2018, when the Appeals
Council denied plaintiffs request for review. (AR 1-6.) This
timely civil action followed.
SUMMARY
OF THE ALJ'S FINDINGS
In
rendering his decision, the ALJ followed the
Commissioner's five-step sequential evaluation process.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. At step one, the ALJ
found that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since March 11, 2014, the amended alleged onset
date. (AR23.)
At step
two, the ALJ found that plaintiff had the following severe
impairments: "residual effects from treatment of a
malignant neoplasm of the ovary and uterine adnexa."
(AR24.)[4]
At step
three, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that met or
medically equaled the severity of one of the impairments
listed in the Commissioner's Listing of Impairments. (AR
26.)
Next,
the ALJ determined that plaintiff had the residual functional
capacity ("RFC") to perform "the full range of
skilled, sedentary work" as defined in the
Commissioner's regulations, "but such work must have
been safe, in that it could not have required more than
occasional stooping, bending, twisting or squatting; working
on the floor (e.g., no kneeling, crawling or crouching);
ascending or descending full flights of stairs (but a few
steps up or down not precluded); and working around dangerous
unprotected heights, machinery, or chemicals." (AR 26.)
For
purposes of his step four determination, the ALJ adduced and
accepted the VE's testimony that a hypothetical person
with plaintiffs vocational profile and RFC would be able to
perform the requirements of plaintiffs past relevant work as
a bookkeeper, as customarily performed in the national
economy (but in reduced numbers). (AR 30.)
Accordingly,
the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not disabled. (AR 31.)
PLAINTIFF'S
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