United States District Court, E.D. California
RYAN P. DAVIDSON, Plaintiff,
v.
T. CHAVEZ, et al., Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DIMISS (DOC. 16) 14-DAY DEADLINE
SHEILA
K. OBERTO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff
Ryan P. Davidson is a state prisoner proceeding pro
se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights
action. Plaintiff alleges civil rights violations pursuant to
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First
Amendment. On August 21, 2019, Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss Plaintiff's RLUIPA claims. (Doc. 16). Defendants
motion should be GRANTED because Plaintiff's RLUIPA
claims for injunctive relief are moot, and his RLUIPA claims
for monetary relief are barred.
II.
DISCUSSION
On
November 20, 2018, the Court screened Plaintiff's
complaint and found that Plaintiff stated cognizable claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First Amendment, as well
under the RLUIPA, against Defendants Chavez, Cates, and
Voong, but that Plaintiff had failed to state cognizable
claims against any other defendants. (Doc. 9.) In his
complaint, Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated his
religious rights by denying him a kosher diet while he was
incarcerated at the California Correctional Institution (CCI)
in Tehachapi, California. (Doc. 1.) On May 21, 2019, the
assigned District Judge issued an order allowing this action
to proceed on Plaintiff's First Amendment and RLUIPA
claims against the defendants named above, but dismissing all
other claims and defendants. (Doc. 12.)
On
August 21, 2019, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc.
16). The defendants contend that Plaintiff's claims for
injunctive relief under the RLUIPA are moot because Plaintiff
was transferred from CCI, where the alleged violations took
place, to another facility. (Doc. 16-1 at 3.) Plaintiff did
not file an opposition or a statement of non-opposition to
Defendants' motion within the 21 days allowed by Local
Rules. See Local Rule 230(1). The Court deems the
motion submitted.
The
Court finds that Defendants' motion to dismiss on the
grounds of mootness should have been brought under Rule
12(b)(1), since it invokes the Court's subject-matter
jurisdiction and the limits of its jurisdiction under Article
III of the U.S. Constitution. See Genesis Healthcare
Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 79, (2013); Lujan v.
Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). The Court
thus construes Defendants' motion as brought under Rule
12(b)(1).
In his
complaint, Plaintiff requests injunctive relief, compensatory
damages, and punitive damages. (Doc. 1 at 13.) His sole
request for injunctive relief is a demand that Defendants
provide him a kosher diet. (Id.). Since filing his
complaint, Plaintiff has been transferred from CCI, and he is
currently housed at the California Institution for Men in
Chino, California.[1]Because Plaintiff is no longer housed at
the facility at which Defendants allegedly denied him a
kosher diet, Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief is
moot. See Shilling v. Crawford, 377 Fed.Appx. 702,
704 (9th Cir. 2010); Darring v. Kincheloe, 783 F.2d
874, 876 (9th Cir. 1986). Thus, Plaintiff's claim for
injunctive relief should be dismissed.
To the
extent that Plaintiff's claims for monetary relief are
brought pursuant to the RLUIPA, these claims should also be
dismissed. Monetary damages are not available under the
RLUIPA against state officials either in their official
capacities or in their individual capacities. Sossamon v.
Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 288 (2011) (holding that RLUIPA
does not abrogate state's sovereign immunity); Wood
v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 904 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding
that RLUIPA only allows suits against officials in their
governmental or official capacities). Since Plaintiff's
claims for injunctive relief are moot, and his RLUIPA claims
for monetary relief are barred, all of Plaintiff's RLUIPA
claims should be dismissed.
The
only claims remaining are Plaintiff's claims for monetary
relief under Section 1983 and the First Amendment. The
defendants do not raise these claims in their motion to
dismiss, and the Court need not address them here.
III.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Based
on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
1. Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's RLUIPA
claims, (Doc. 16), be GRANTED; and
2. Plaintiff's claims under the RLUIPA against Defendants
Chavez, Cates, and ...