United States District Court, S.D. California
1) GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS [ECF
NO. 2]; AND 2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO STATE A
CLAIM PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(E)(2) & 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(B) [ECF NO. 1]
CYNTHIA BASHANT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Gregory
Leon Spatcher (“Plaintiff”), currently
incarcerated at the California Institution for Men
(“CIM”) in Chino, California and proceeding pro
se, has filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff did
not prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. §
1914(a) when he filed his Complaint; instead, he filed a
Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”)
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF No. 2.)
I.
MOTION TO PROCEED IFP
All
parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a
district court of the United States, except an application
for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of
$400.[1] See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The
action may proceed despite a plaintiff's failure to
prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed
IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v.
Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007). However,
prisoners who are granted leave to proceed IFP remain
obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments”
or “installments, ” Williams v. Paramo,
775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of
whether their action is ultimately dismissed. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v.
Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).
Section
1915(a)(2) also requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed
IFP to submit a “certified copy of the trust fund
account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the
6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the
complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v.
King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the
certified trust account statement, the Court assesses an
initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in
the account for the past six months, or (b) the average
monthly balance in the account for the past six months,
whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. §
1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner
then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the
preceding month's income, in any month in which his
account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the Court
until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(2); Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136
S.Ct. 627, 629 (2016).
In
support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of
his CDCR Inmate Statement Report. See ECF No. 2 at
3; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2;
Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. This statement shows that
Plaintiff only had $0.07 in his account at the time he filed
this action. Because Plaintiff's available balance was
insufficient to impose an initial partial filing fee at the
time of filing, the Court will not direct the Secretary of
the CDCR, or his designee, to collect an initial partial
filing fee at this time. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a
prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or
appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason
that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay
the initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136
S.Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a
“safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a
prisoner's IFP case based solely on a “failure to
pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when
payment is ordered.”). However, the balance of the $350
total fee owed in this case must be collected by the agency
having custody of the prisoner and forwarded to the Clerk of
the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
II.
SCREENING PURUSANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)
AND 1915A(b)
A.
Standard of Review
Because
Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint
also requires a pre-answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes,
the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner's IFP
complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from
defendants who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203
F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621
F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to
ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need
not bear the expense of responding.'” Nordstrom
v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation
omitted).
“The
standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted under §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a
claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112
(9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680
F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that screening
pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar
standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). Rule
12(b)(6) requires that a complaint “contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.
Detailed
factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct”
or “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me
accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility
standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret
Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
B.
Plaintiff's Factual Allegations
While
his allegations are not altogether clear, Plaintiff claims
Defendant Baird made “all false statements slandering
[his] name” which purportedly led to his arrest.
(Compl. at 2.) It appears there was an interaction between
Plaintiff and Baird which led to Plaintiff being
“sentenced to 4 years” in prison for
“corporal injury to a spouse/roommate.”
(Id. at 3.) Plaintiff claims he “never put
hands on [Baird] and her whole police report is made
up.” (Id.)
Plaintiff
was arrested on May 7, 2019 “where cops came and
wouldn't let [him] know why.” (Id. at 5.)
Plaintiff was taken to the “Oceanside Police Department
where a female officer did a report and after the
report” took him to the Vista Detention Facility
(“VDF”). (Id.) It appears that Plaintiff
was, at some point on May 7, 2019, transported to Defendant
Tri City Medical Center but ...