United States District Court, C.D. California
PRESENT: HONORABLE JOHN F. WALTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGE
CIVIL MINUTES--GENERAL
PROCEEDINGS
(IN CHAMBERS): ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
REMAND TO LOS ANGELES COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT [filed 9/24/19;
Docket No. 11]
On
September 24, 2019, Plaintiff Robert Avellanet
(“Plaintiff”) filed a Motion for Remand to Los
Angeles County Superior Court (“Motion”). On
October 7, 2019, Defendant FCA U.S. LLC (“FCA”)
filed its Opposition. Plaintiff did not file a Reply.
Pursuant to Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and Local Rule 7-15, the Court finds that this matter is
appropriate for decision without oral argument. The hearing
calendared for October 28, 2019 is hereby vacated and the
matter taken off calendar. After considering the moving,
opposing, and reply papers, and the arguments therein, the
Court rules as follows:
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July
31, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against FCA in Los
Angeles County Superior Court, alleging violations of the
Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code §
1790, et seq. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that
he purchased a 2016 Fiat 500x (the “Vehicle”) on
October 14, 2015, and that the vehicle contained or developed
defects, including a defective engine. Plaintiff claims that
FCA, the manufacturer of the Vehicle, and its representatives
failed to repair the vehicle after a reasonable number of
attempts.
On
August 28, 2019, FCA filed its Answer to Plaintiff's
Complaint. On September 3, 2019, FCA filed a Notice of
Removal, alleging that this Court has diversity jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
On
September 6, 2019, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint,
adding a non-diverse defendant, Fiat of Glendale
(“Fiat”). Fiat is the dealership which sold the
Vehicle to Plaintiff on October 14, 2015. Plaintiff alleges
only one claim for relief against Fiat -- breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability pursuant to California
Civil Code § 1794.
On
September 24, 2019, Plaintiff filed this Motion, arguing in
relevant part that the parties are no longer diverse and,
thus, that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
this action. FCA argues that the Court should ignore
Fiat's citizenship because Fiat was fraudulently joined.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
“If
after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional
defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter
jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder
and remand the action to the State court.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(e). The Court's decision to deny or permit
joinder is discretionary. See Newcombe v. Adolf Coors
Co., 157 F.3d 686, 691 (9th Cir.1998).
In
considering whether to permit joinder, the Court considers
the following factors: (1) whether the party sought to be
joined is needed for adjudication and could be joined under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a); (2) whether the
statute of limitations would prevent the filing of a new
action against the new defendant if the court denies joinder;
(3) whether there has been an unexplained delay in seeking
joinder; (4) whether the joinder is solely for the purpose of
defeating federal jurisdiction; (5) whether the claim against
the new party appears valid; and (6) whether denying joinder
will prejudice the plaintiff. Forward-Rossi v. Jaguar
Land Rover N.A., LLC, 2016 WL 3396925, at *3 (C.D. June
13, 2016); Sandhu v. Volvo Cars of N. America, LLC,
2017 WL 403495, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2017). “A
court need not consider all the issues, as any factor can be
decisive, and no one of them is a necessary condition for
joinder.” Negrete v. Meadowbrook Meat Co.,
2012 WL 254039 at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2012);.
FCA
bases its opposition on the doctrine of “fraudulent
joinder.” “Although an action may removed to
federal court only where there is complete diversity of
citizenship, . . . one exception to the requirement for
complete diversity is where a non-diverse defendant has been
‘fraudulently joined.'” Hunter v. Philip
Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2009)
(quotations and citations omitted). If a plaintiff
“fails to state a cause of action against a resident
defendant, and the failure is obvious according to the
settled rules of the state, the joinder of the
resident defendant is fraudulent.” McCabe v. Gen.
Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987)
(emphasis added). If the Court finds that the joinder of a
non-diverse defendant is fraudulent, that defendant's
presence in the lawsuit is ignored for the purposes of
determining diversity. See, e.g., Morris v. Princess
Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001).
“There
is a presumption against finding fraudulent joinder, and
defendants who assert that plaintiff has fraudulently joined
a party carry a heavy burden of persuasion.” Plute
v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 141 F.Supp.2d 1005, 1008
(N.D. Cal. 2001). A claim of fraudulent joinder should be
denied if there is any possibility that a plaintiff
may prevail on the cause of action against an in-state
defendant. See Id. at 1008, 1012. “The
standard is not whether [a] plaintiff will actually or even
probably prevail on the merits, but whether there is a
possibility that [she] may do so.”
Lieberman v. Meshkin, Mazandarani, 1996 WL 732506,
at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 1996) (emphasis added). “In
determining whether a defendant was joined fraudulently, the
court must resolve ‘all disputed questions of fact and
all ambiguities in the controlling state law in favor of the
non-removing party.'” Plute, 141 F.Supp.2d
at 1008 (quoting Dodson v. Spiliada Maritime Corp.,
951 F.2d 40, 42-43 (5th Cir. 1992)). Moreover, any doubts
concerning the sufficiency of a cause of action due to
inartful, ambiguous, or technically defective pleading must
be resolved in favor of remand. See Id. “[A]
removing defendant alleging fraudulent joinder must do more
than show that the complaint at the time of removal fails to
state a claim against the non-diverse defendant. Rather, the
defendant must establish that plaintiff could not amend his
complaint to add additional allegations correcting any
deficiencies.” Martinez v. Michaels, 2015 WL
4337059, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2015) (quotations and
citations omitted).
Where
the plaintiff seeks to join a non-diverse party after
removal, as is the case here, the request to amend is
governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e), rather than the
doctrine of fraudulent joinder. “That notwithstanding,
the Court notes that the core inquiry in a fraudulent joinder
analysis, i.e., whether there is any possibility of recovery
against the non-diverse defendant, is subsumed in the
consideration in a section 1447(e) analysis of whether
plaintiff can state a valid claim against the party sought to
be joined.” Taylor v. Honeywell Corp., 2010 WL
1881459, at *2 ...