United States District Court, N.D. California, San Jose Division
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION [RE: ECF 18]
LABSON FREEMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court is pro se Plaintiff, Mazen Arakji's
Objections to the Court's Order on Motion to Remand. ECF
18. The Court construes Plaintiff's submission as a
motion requesting leave to file a motion for reconsideration
of the Court's Order Denying Remand pursuant to Civil
Local Rule 7-9. MFL, ECF 18. For the reasons stated below,
the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion.
brought this action against Defendant, Microchip Technology,
Inc., alleging violations of California Fair Employment and
Housing Act, in the Superior Court of California for the
County of Santa Clara. ECF 1-1. Defendant removed the case to
United States District Court for the Northern District of
California based on diversity of citizenship. ECF 1 at 1;
see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1332. Plaintiff
moved to remand the case back to the Superior Court of
California. ECF 8. The Court denied Plaintiff's motion to
remand. Order, ECF 16. Plaintiff did not dispute that
diversity of citizenship exists among the parties and
therefore, the only issue was the amount in controversy.
Id. at 4. The Court concluded that the value of
Plaintiff's requested “pain, suffering, and
inconvenience” damages ($74, 000) in combination with
the injunctive relief he seeks in the form of an “offer
for employment in the same position interviewed for”
exceeded the jurisdictional minimum. Id. 6-7. The
present motion followed.
courts have the inherent power to reconsider, set aside, or
amend interlocutory orders at any time prior to entry of a
final judgment. Meas v. City & Cty. of San
Francisco, 681 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1143 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(citing Sch. Dist. No. 5 v. Lundgren, 259 F.2d 101,
105 (9th Cir. 1958)). “In this judicial district, Civil
Local Rule 7-9 provides a procedure whereby a litigant
dissatisfied with an interlocutory ruling may seek leave to
file a motion for reconsideration in this court.”
Microsoft Corp. v. FIFAVIP Co., No. 17-CV-02887-LHK,
2017 WL 4517060, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2017) (citation
Local Rule 7-9 specifies the requirements for such a motion.
The moving party must show “reasonable diligence in
bringing the motion” as well as one of the following:
(1) That at the time of the motion for leave, a material
difference in fact or law exists from that which was
presented to the Court before entry of the interlocutory
order for which reconsideration is sought. The party also
must show that in the exercise of reasonable diligence the
party applying for reconsideration did not know such fact or
law at the time of the interlocutory order; or
(2) The emergence of new material facts or a change of law
occurring after the time of such order; or
(3) A manifest failure by the Court to consider material
facts or dispositive legal arguments which were presented to
the Court before such interlocutory order.
L.R. 7-9(b). Motions for reconsideration are generally
disfavored and are not the place for parties to make new
arguments not raised in their original briefs. Whalen v.
Ford Motor Co., No. 13-CV-03072-EMC, 2018 WL 6069812, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2018). “Nor is reconsideration
to be used to ask the Court to rethink what it has already
thought.” Garcia v. City of Napa, No.
C-13-03886 EDL, 2014 WL 342085, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28,
2014) (citing United States v. Rezzonico, 32
F.Supp.2d 1112, 1116 (D. Ariz. 1998)).
disagrees with the Court's Order for three reasons (1)
the Court mischaracterized one of the factual allegations in
his Complaint (MFL ¶ 2), (2) Plaintiff's
modification of the relief he seeks (in the form of Statement
of Damages) was not post-removal (id. ¶
and (3) the Court's valuation of the injunctive relief he
seeks is incorrect because he seeks an “employment
offer” and not actual employment “for some period
of time” (id. ¶ 5).
has failed to make the required showing under Local Rule
7-9(b) to obtain reconsideration. He has not pointed to a
“material difference in fact or law” that exists
from that which was presented to the Court before entry of
the Court's Order. He has not pointed to “the
emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring
after the time of the Court's Order, nor has he shown a
“manifest failure by the Court to ...