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Adriana H. v. Saul

United States District Court, C.D. California

October 31, 2019

ADRIANA H., [1]Plaintiff,
ANDREW SAUL, [2] Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.



         I. SUMMARY

         On December 10, 2018, plaintiff Adriana H. filed a complaint seeking review of the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of plaintiff's application for benefits. The parties have consented to proceed before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge.

         This matter is before the Court on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, respectively (“Plaintiff's Motion”) and (“Defendant's Motion”) (collectively “Motions”). The Court has taken the Motions under submission without oral argument. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78; L.R. 7-15; December 19, 2018 Case Management Order ¶ 5.

         Based on the record as a whole and the applicable law, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. The findings of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) are supported by substantial evidence and are free from material error.


         On July 31, 2014, plaintiff protectively filed an application for Supplemental Security Income, alleging disability beginning on March 20, 2008, due to fibromyalgia, major depressive disorder, chronic pain disorder, an inability to concentrate, and numbness in both feet. (Administrative Record (“AR”) 31, 193-98, 211). The ALJ examined the medical record and heard testimony from plaintiff (who was represented by counsel) and a vocational expert. (AR 50-86).

         On November 2, 2017, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled from July 31, 2014 (the protective filing date), through the date of the decision. (AR 31-43). Specifically, the ALJ found: (1) plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: agoraphobia with panic disorder, a depressive disorder (not otherwise specified), a conversion disorder, myalgic and arthralgic symptoms of unclear etiology, and obesity (AR 33); (2) plaintiff's impairments, considered individually or in combination, did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment (AR 35); (3) plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to perform light work (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b)) with additional limitations (i.e., she can engage in occasional postural activity except she can frequently climb and balance, she must avoid moderate exposure to odor dust, fumes, dust and gases, and she is limited to performing simple routine tasks) (AR 35-42; (4) plaintiff has no past relevant work (AR 42); and (5) there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that plaintiff could perform, specifically booth cashier (DOT 211.462-010), counter clerk (DOT 249.366-010, with 35, 000 jobs nationally), and folding machine operator (DOT 208.685-014, with 50, 000 jobs nationally) (AR 42-43).

         On October 16, 2018, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's application for review. (AR 1-5).


         A. Administrative Evaluation of Disability Claims

         To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must show that she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)) (internal quotation marks omitted); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905. To be considered disabled, a claimant must have an impairment of such severity that she is incapable of performing work the claimant previously performed (“past relevant work”) as well as any other “work which exists in the national economy.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)).

         To assess whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ is required to use the five-step sequential evaluation process set forth in Social Security regulations. See Stout v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006) (describing five-step sequential evaluation process) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920). The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through four - i.e., determination of whether the claimant was engaging in substantial gainful activity (step 1), has a sufficiently severe impairment (step 2), has an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the conditions listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (“Listings”) (step 3), and retains the residual functional capacity to perform past relevant work (step 4). Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). The Commissioner has the burden of proof at step five - i.e., establishing that the claimant could perform other work in the national economy. Id.

         B. Federal Court Review of Social Security Disability Decisions

         A federal court may set aside a denial of benefits only when the Commissioner's “final decision” was “based on legal error or not supported by substantial evidence in the record.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 674 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The standard of review in disability cases is “highly deferential.” Rounds v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 807 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Thus, an ALJ's decision must be upheld if the evidence could reasonably support either affirming or reversing the decision. Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 674-75 (citations omitted). Even when an ALJ's decision contains error, it must be affirmed if the error was harmless. See Treichler v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014) (ALJ error harmless if (1) inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination; or (2) ALJ's path may reasonably be discerned despite the error) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

         Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 674 (defining “substantial evidence” as “more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). When determining whether substantial evidence supports an ALJ's finding, a court “must consider the entire record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion[.]” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

         Federal courts review only the reasoning the ALJ provided, and may not affirm the ALJ's decision “on a ground upon which [the ALJ] did not rely.” Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 675 (citations omitted). Hence, while an ALJ's decision need not be drafted with “ideal clarity, ” it must, at a minimum, set forth the ALJ's reasoning “in a way that allows for meaningful review.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1099).

         A reviewing court may not conclude that an error was harmless based on independent findings gleaned from the administrative record. Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492 (citations omitted). When a reviewing court cannot confidently conclude that an error was harmless, a remand for additional investigation or explanation is generally appropriate. See Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).


         Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ's summary or assessment of her physical impairments. (Plaintiff's Motion at 5). Plaintiff contends that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's mental residual functional capacity assessment and step five determination. (Plaintiff's Motion at 12-22). Neither contention merits reversal or remand.

         A. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ's Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment

         Plaintiff contends that the ALJ's mental residual functional capacity assessment is not supported by substantial evidence because no doctor considered how plaintiff's conversion disorder, in combination with her agoraphobia and depressive disorder, would impact her abilities and limitations. (Plaintiff's Motion at 12-13). As detailed below, the record belies plaintiff's contention - the State agency review physician considered these diagnoses in opining that plaintiff is a capable of simple work. Plaintiff has not shown that a reversal or remand is required on this basis.

         1. Summary of the ...

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