United States District Court, E.D. California
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDING DISMISSING
COMPLAINT WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
(ECF NO. 1) OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS
Ortiz (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner, is
appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in
this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Currently before the Court is Plaintiff's complaint,
filed on October 8, 2019.
Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the
prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous
or malicious, ” that “fail to state a claim on
which relief may be granted, ” or that “seek
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . .
.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations
are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant
personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff's
rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th
proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to
have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any
doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman,
680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To
survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially
plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow
the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d
962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and
“facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a
defendant's liability” falls short of satisfying
the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;
Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
Court accepts Plaintiff's allegations in the complaint as
true only for the purpose of the sua sponte
screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
married Fanny Ortiz in October 1993, and they were divorced
in December 2000. In 2002, Plaintiff bought a Ford
Expedition. Plaintiff had been sent to prison based on Ms.
Ortiz' false testimony and gave the vehicle to his
mother. He also had a notarized letter and signed the pink
slip over to his mother.
2011, Ms. Ortiz transferred the vehicle into her own name
although Plaintiff had not signed the pink slip. The
paperwork that Ms. Ortiz presented to the Department of Motor
Vehicles was not genuine. On August 16, 2011, Ms. Ortiz
reported the vehicle stolen. Ms. Ortiz went to Los Angeles
and tried to have his mother arrested. Plaintiff contends
that the Los Angeles police department should have taken a
report and the matter should have gone to civil court.
November 2012, Ms. Ortiz sold the vehicle to a private party
in Bell Gardens, California. Plaintiff has been aware of this
situation since late December 2015. He has reported it to
correctional officers at the prison who just laughed at him
and said, “so.”
August 16, 2019, Plaintiff contacted the Lindsay Police
Department and got a response from Lt. Nave. Plaintiff asks
the Court to find that the statute of limitations has been
tolled until August 16, 2019 because that is when he had full
knowledge of the facts sufficient to put a reasonable person
brings this action against Fanny Ortiz, the Los Angeles
Police Department, Officer Perez, and the Lindsey Police
Department alleging violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, Bills of Attainer and Ex Post Facto. He is
seeking to be compensated for the full value of his vehicle
and for ...