United States District Court, E.D. California
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENY PLAINTIFF'S
CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND DENY PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO STRIKE (DOCS. 43, 48, 53)
Jennifer L. Thurston UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The
plaintiff claims that when he was housed at Pleasant Valley
State Prison, J. Naftzger filed a false disciplinary chrono
against him which resulted in Plaintiff losing privileges
including property, day room activities, use of the
telephone, and credits. In his motion for summary judgment,
Officer Naftzgar demonstrates that Plaintiff has not suffered
a violation of Due Process. For this reason, the Court
recommends that Defendant's motion for summary judgment
be GRANTED, that Plaintiff's
cross-motion for summary judgment be DENIED,
and that Plaintiff's motion to strike be
DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Jack
Church was incarcerated at Pleasant Valley State Prison
(PVSP) in 2014. (Doc. 43-2 (“UMF”) ¶ 1.) In
March 2014, Defendant J. Naftzger, a correctional officer,
alleges that he issued Plaintiff a “disciplinary”
or “custodial counseling chrono” because
Plaintiff failed to report to work. (See Ex. B to
UMF, at 10.) Plaintiff alleges that he was never issued this
disciplinary chrono. (See Ex. F to UMF, at 54-55.)
On May
1, 2014, Plaintiff was assigned to work in PVSP's
Facility A Dining. (UMF ¶ 8.) Plaintiff reported to
Facility A, but informed Defendant that he would not perform
his assigned tasks because he was “not going to expose
[him]self to further injury.” (UMF ¶¶ 10,
11.) Defendant asked Plaintiff to provide him with a medical
“lay-in order” for May 1; but, Plaintiff did not
have one. (UMF ¶¶ 13, 14.) Plaintiff had previously
received a lay-in order for April 16-30. (UMF ¶ 7.)
Consequently, Defendant issued Plaintiff a rules violation
report (“RVR”) for refusing to work. (UMF ¶
9.) On May 18, 2014, Correctional Lieutenant N. Greene
conducted a hearing and upheld the RVR. (UMF ¶ 16.)
Plaintiff was penalized with a loss of 30 days of credits and
90 days of dayroom and telephone privileges. (Doc. 43-3
(“Lt. Greene Dec”) ¶ 4.)
Thereafter,
Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus against
Warden Scott Frauenhiem in Fresno County Superior Court (Case
No. 15CRWR682712). (UMF ¶ 18.) At the hearing held on
October 13, 2015, Judge W. Kent Hamlin found that Naftzger
fabricated Plaintiff's March 2014 disciplinary chrono and
that the chrono was the basis for the May 2014 RVR; and he
granted Plaintiff's writ. (UMF ¶ 22.) Judge Hamlin
ordered that Plaintiff's 30 days of credits be restored,
as well as an additional 5 days of lost credits. (UMF ¶
23.) In his order from the bench, Judge Hamlin specifically
stated that the 5 days lost were a “cognizable injury
that followed from a denial of [Plaintiff's] due process
rights through a flawed disciplinary procedure that included
fabricated evidence.” (Ex. F to UMF, at 116.) On
October 24, 2018, Plaintiff's RVR was expunged. (UMF
¶ 17; see also Ex. G to UMF, at 134.)
LEGAL
STANDARD
Summary
judgment is appropriate when the moving party “shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In summary judgment practice, the moving
party “initially bears the burden of proving the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” In re
Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir.
2010) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986)). The moving party may accomplish this by
“citing to particular parts of materials in the record,
including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations
(including those made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials,
” or by showing that such materials “do not
establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or
that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to
support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). When
the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, as
Plaintiff does here, “the moving party need only prove
that there is an absence of evidence to support the
non-moving party's case.” Oracle Corp.,
627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325);
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B).
Summary
judgment should be entered against a party who fails to make
a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex,
477 U.S. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's
case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”
Id. at 322-23. In such a circumstance, summary
judgment should be granted, “so long as whatever is
before the district court demonstrates that the standard for
the entry of summary judgment … is satisfied.”
Id. at 323.
If the
moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden
then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine
issue as to any material fact does exist. See Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence of a
factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the
allegations or denials of his pleadings but is required to
tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits
or admissible discovery material in support of its
contention. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1);
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11; Orr v. Bank of
Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“A trial court can only consider admissible evidence
in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”). The
opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention
is material, i.e., that it might affect the outcome of the
suit under governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv.,
Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626,
630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e.,
that the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the non-moving party, see Anderson,
477 U.S. at 250; Wool v. Tandem Computs. Inc., 818
F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).
In
attempting to show a factual dispute, the opposing party need
not prove a material fact conclusively in her favor. It is
sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown
to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties'
differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W.
Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose
of summary judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to
assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine
need for trial.'” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at
587 (citations omitted).
“In
evaluating the evidence to determine whether there is a
genuine issue of fact, ” the court draws “all
inferences supported by the evidence in favor of the
non-moving party.” Walls v. Cent. Contra Costa Cty.
Transit Auth., 653 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2011).
Though, it is still the opposing party's obligation to
produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be
drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602
F.Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd,
810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a
genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts…. Where the record taken as a whole
could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for
trial.'” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587
(citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
A.
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