United States District Court, E.D. California
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
DEBORAH BARNES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff
is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis
with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff claims defendants violated his rights when officers
used excessive force, filed false disciplinary reports
against him, and failed to provide him with adequate medical
and mental health treatment. Presently before the court is
plaintiff's third amended complaint for screening. For
the reasons set forth below, the court will recommend that
the complaint be dismissed without leave to amend.
SCREENING
I.
Legal Standards
The
court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or
employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or
portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are
legally “frivolous or malicious, ” that fail to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).
A claim
is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221,
1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a
claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The
critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however
inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis.
See Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. Rule 8(a)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only
‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to
‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
However,
in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a
complaint must contain more than “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it
must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell
Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint
under this standard, the court must accept as true the
allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg.
Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976),
construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's
favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421
(1969).
The
Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides
as follows:
Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States .
. . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an
actual connection or link between the actions of the
defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered
by plaintiff. See Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
(1976). “A person ‘subjects' another to the
deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of
§ 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in
another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act
which he is legally required to do that causes the
deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v.
Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
Moreover,
supervisory personnel are generally not liable under §
1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of
respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant
holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him
and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically
alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862
(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438,
441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations
concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil
rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board
of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
II.
Allegations in the Fourth Amended Complaint
Plaintiff
states the events giving rise to the claim occurred at
California State Prison, Corcoran (“CSP-COR”),
California State Prison, Sacramento (“CSP-SAC”),
and California Correctional Institution (“CCI”).
(ECF No. 54 at 1.) Plaintiff names as defendants: (1)
Governor Gavin Newsom; (2) California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) Secretary
Ralph Diaz; (3) “Federal Monitor” J. Clark Kelso;
and (4) the “Warden's Association.”
(Id. at 1-2.)
Plaintiff
claims there have been “numerous incidents of employee
unnecessary excessive force, willful code of conduct of
silent green wall tactics directed primarily at plaintiff . .
. .” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff appears to allege
CDCR employees have falsified documents and denied or
prevented him from receiving medical care. Plaintiff states
defendants were the legal officials in charge of his
imprisonment and therefore are responsible for his health and
welfare at all times. (I ...