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Daws v. Superior Court (People)

California Court of Appeals, First District, Fourth Division

November 14, 2019

Brandon DAWS, Petitioner,
v.
The SUPERIOR COURT OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, Respondent; The People, Real Party in Interest.

         [255 Cal.Rptr.3d 38] Contra Costa County Superior Court, Honorable Judy Johnson, Trial Judge. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. Nos. 41949429, 51907492)

Page 82

         COUNSEL

         Robin Lipetzky, Galen Currens, Maya Nordberg, and Anthony Gedeon, Public Defenders, for petitioner.

         Diana Becton, District Attorney, Ryan Wagner, Deputy District Attorney, and Amber White, Certified Law Clerk, for real party in interest.

          OPINION

         STREETER, J.

Page 83

          Penal Code section 1382 requires a defendant to provide "proper notice" to all parties before withdrawing a time waiver in open court, but does not specify the type of notice that is "proper" under the statute. (Pen. Code, � 1382, subd. (a)(3)(A).)[1] Faced with this undefined notice provision, the trial court required defendant Brandon Daws to provide two days’ written notice before withdrawing his time waiver in open court. Daws seeks writ relief, arguing the oral notice he provided shortly before the calling of his case was "proper notice" under section 1382.

         Seeing no error, we shall deny the writ. We conclude that trial courts have inherent authority to determine by local rule or as a matter of courtroom practice what [255 Cal.Rptr.3d 39] "proper notice" under section 1382 means, so long as the required notice is consonant with the defendant’s right to a speedy trial under article I, section 15 of the California Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as implemented by section 1382. We hold that two days’ written notice meets that standard.

Page 84

          BACKGROUND

         In November 2018, the prosecution filed a misdemeanor complaint charging Daws with violating Health and Safety Code sections 11359, 11360, subdivision (a), and 11377; and Vehicle Code section 14601.5, subdivision (a). At the arraignment hearing, Daws waived his statutory right to be brought to trial within 45 days. (See � 1382, subd. (a)(3).)

          On the morning of February 22, 2019, during an off-the-record conversation in the judge’s chambers, Daws’s counsel provided oral notice to the court and the prosecutor that his client intended to withdraw his time waiver and invoke his right to a speedy trial on the record when the case was called. During the court hearing that followed shortly afterward, counsel announced Daws was pulling his time waiver and requested a trial date within 30 days. The trial court rejected this request, explaining that Daws must provide two days’ written notice to the prosecution before withdrawing his time waiver.

          The court scheduled trial for 80 days later, but invited Daws’s counsel to provide two days’ written notice to the prosecution if his client wished to insist upon withdrawing his time waiver and having an earlier trial date. Daws declined to do so, made no further attempt to withdraw his time waiver, waited for 30 days to elapse, and then filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the prosecution failed to bring him to ...


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