California Court of Appeals, First District, Fourth Division
Cal.Rptr.3d 38] Contra Costa County Superior Court, Honorable
Judy Johnson, Trial Judge. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct.
Nos. 41949429, 51907492)
Lipetzky, Galen Currens, Maya Nordberg, and Anthony Gedeon,
Public Defenders, for petitioner.
Becton, District Attorney, Ryan Wagner, Deputy District
Attorney, and Amber White, Certified Law Clerk, for real
party in interest.
Code section 1382 requires a defendant to provide
"proper notice" to all parties before withdrawing a
time waiver in open court, but does not specify the type of
notice that is "proper" under the statute. (Pen.
Code, � 1382, subd. (a)(3)(A).) Faced with this undefined
notice provision, the trial court required defendant Brandon
Daws to provide two days’ written notice before withdrawing
his time waiver in open court. Daws seeks writ relief,
arguing the oral notice he provided shortly before the
calling of his case was "proper notice" under
no error, we shall deny the writ. We conclude that trial
courts have inherent authority to determine by local rule or
as a matter of courtroom practice what [255 Cal.Rptr.3d 39]
"proper notice" under section 1382 means, so long
as the required notice is consonant with the defendant’s
right to a speedy trial under article I, section 15 of the
California Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, as implemented by section 1382. We hold
that two days’ written notice meets that standard.
November 2018, the prosecution filed a misdemeanor complaint
charging Daws with violating Health and Safety Code sections
11359, 11360, subdivision (a), and 11377; and Vehicle Code
section 14601.5, subdivision (a). At the arraignment hearing,
Daws waived his statutory right to be brought to trial within
45 days. (See � 1382, subd. (a)(3).)
morning of February 22, 2019, during an off-the-record
conversation in the judge’s chambers, Daws’s counsel provided
oral notice to the court and the prosecutor that his client
intended to withdraw his time waiver and invoke his right to
a speedy trial on the record when the case was called. During
the court hearing that followed shortly afterward, counsel
announced Daws was pulling his time waiver and requested a
trial date within 30 days. The trial court rejected this
request, explaining that Daws must provide two days’ written
notice to the prosecution before withdrawing his time waiver.
court scheduled trial for 80 days later, but invited Daws’s
counsel to provide two days’ written notice to the
prosecution if his client wished to insist upon withdrawing
his time waiver and having an earlier trial date. Daws
declined to do so, made no further attempt to withdraw his
time waiver, waited for 30 days to elapse, and then filed a
motion to dismiss, arguing that the prosecution failed to
bring him to ...