California Court of Appeals, First District, Second Division
Court: Alameda County Superior Court, No. 17CR008001, Hon.
Jon R. Rolefson Judge.
Reyner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Becerra, Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant
Attorney General, René A. Chacón, Nanette
Winaker, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
William Antonio Yanez, sentenced to nearly six years in
prison, challenges the trial court's refusal to grant him
conduct credits for the time he spent in an electronic
monitoring program on home detention prior to his sentencing.
No statute provides for such credits. However, he contends
that because recent amendments to Penal Code section 4019
have made conduct credits available to individuals who are
placed on electronic home detention after imposition
of sentence (see id., subd. (a)(7)), denying him
eligibility for conduct credits for the time he spent on
in-home detention before he was sentenced
violates equal protection. We agree.
that this disparity in eligibility for conduct credits
between pretrial and post-judgment electronic monitoring home
detainees violates equal protection, and therefore that the
pre-sentencing time Yanez spent on home detention is eligible
for conduct credits notwithstanding the Legislature's
failure to provide for them in section 4019.
Statutory Background: Home Detention
for context, two statutes governing home detention are
relevant here. Penal Code section 1203.018 authorizes
counties to offer a program under which pretrial detainees
being held in a county jail or correctional facility may
participate in a home detention program under specified
conditions. (People v. Raygoza (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th
593, 599; § 1203.018, subd. (b).) The statute applies to
“inmates being held in lieu of bail.” (§
1203.018, subd. (a).) It has been construed to apply when a
pretrial detainee is required to submit to home confinement
in a local electronic monitoring program as a condition of a
reduction in bail. (See Raygoza, at pp. 599-601.)
Code section 1203.016, by contrast, governs home detention
post-sentencing. It authorizes counties to create electronic
home detention programs in which certain inmates may be
placed “during their sentence, ” under specified
conditions, “in lieu of confinement in a county jail or
other county correctional facility or program.” Those
conditions are substantially similar to the conditions
applicable to pretrial detainees released on home detention
under section 1203.018, including that the participant
“remain within the interior premises of his or her
residence during the hours designated by the correctional
administrator”; “admit any person or agent
designated by the correctional administrator into his or her
residence at any time” for purposes of verifying
compliance with the conditions of detention; and allow the
correctional administrator, without further court order, to
immediately retake the participant into custody to serve the
balance of his or her sentence if the electronic monitoring
devices are unable for any reason to properly perform their
function or if the person fails to remain within the place of
detention, willfully fails to pay fees to the provider of the
electronic home detention services or for any other reason no
longer meets the statutory criteria for home detention.
(Compare § 1203.016, subd. (b)(1)-(4) with §
1203.018, subd. (d)(1)-(4).)
in connection with an incident in March 2017, Yanez pled no
contest to possessing more than one kilogram of
methamphetamine for sale (Health & Safety Code,
§§ 11378; 11370.4, subd. (b)(1)) and admitted a
prior strike conviction.
court had imposed home detention subject to electronic
monitoring as a condition of reducing Yanez's bail from
$480, 000 to $100, 000. By the time of his sentencing
hearing, Yanez had spent 555 days on electronic home
detention, in a program authorized by Alameda County.
trial court sentenced Yanez to serve five years and eight
months in state prison. Although the court granted him
custody credits for his 555 days of home confinement (see
§ 2900.5, subd. (a)), it deemed him ineligible for
conduct credits. It rejected Yanez's argument that
denying him eligibility for conduct credits violated the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection ...