United States District Court, C.D. California
GRACE E. F., [1] Plaintiff,
v.
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING DECISION OF
THE COMMISSIONER
ALEXANDER F. MACKINNON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff
filed this action seeking review of the Commissioner's
final decision denying her application for disability
insurance benefits. In accordance with the Court's case
management order, the parties have filed memorandum briefs
addressing the merits of the disputed issues. The matter is
now ready for decision.
BACKGROUND
In
January 2015, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance
benefits. Plaintiff originally alleged disability beginning
July 1, 2007, but subsequently amended her alleged onset date
to July 30, 2012. (Administrative Record [“AR”]
15, 61-62, 186-194.) Plaintiff's application was denied.
(AR 111-116.) Thereafter, a hearing took place before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Plaintiff, who
was represented by counsel, and a vocational expert
(“VE”) testified at the hearing. (AR 32-91.)
In a
decision dated February 13, 2018, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of
degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine and arthritis
of the left and right thumbs. (AR 18.) The ALJ assessed
Plaintiff's residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) as including the ability to: lift and
carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; stand
and walk for two hours in an eight-hour workday; sit for six
hours in an eight-hour workday; push and pull 20 pounds
occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; frequently operate
hand controls; frequently handle and finger bilaterally;
occasionally climb ramps and stairs; never climb ladders,
ropes or scaffolds; occasionally balance, stoop, kneel,
crouch, and crawl; occasionally be exposed to unprotected
heights, moving mechanical parts; and frequently be exposed
to extreme cold and vibration. (AR 22.) Relying on the
testimony of the VE, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could
perform her past relevant work. Accordingly, the ALJ found
Plaintiff not disabled. (AR 25-26.)
The
Appeals Council subsequently denied Plaintiff's request
for review (AR 1-6), rendering the ALJ's decision the
final decision of the Commissioner.
DISPUTED
ISSUES
1.
Whether the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff did not
suffer from a severe mental impairment prior to her last date
insured (June 30, 2015).
2.
Whether the ALJ properly rejected Plaintiff's subjective
complaints.
3.
Whether the ALJ properly rejected lay testimony.
4.
Whether the ALJ properly rejected the opinion of
Plaintiff's treating physician.
5.
Whether the ALJ erred in determining that Plaintiff could
perform her past relevant work.
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
Under
42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the
Commissioner's decision to determine whether the
Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial
evidence and whether the proper legal standards were applied.
See Treichler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775
F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014). Substantial evidence means
“more than a mere scintilla” but less than a
preponderance. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389, 401 (1971); Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d
1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. This Court must review
the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that
supports and the evidence that detracts from the
Commissioner's conclusion. Lingenfelter, 504
F.3d at 1035. Where evidence is susceptible of more than one
rational interpretation, the Commissioner's decision must
be upheld. See Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th
Cir. 2007).
DISCUSSION
I.
The ALJ's non-severity finding
Plaintiff
makes several arguments in support of her contention that the
ALJ erred by concluding that she did not have a severe mental
impairment prior to June 30, 2015. (ECF No. 25 at 5-9.) For
the following reasons, Plaintiff's contentions lack
merit.
A.
Relevant Law
At Step
Two of the sequential evaluation process, the claimant has
the burden to show that she has one or more
“severe” medically determinable impairments.
See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5, 148
(1987); Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th
Cir. 2005). An impairment is “not severe if it does not
significantly limit [a claimant's] physical or mental
ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. §
20 C.F.R. § 404.1522; see Webb, 433 F.3d at
686.
In
determining whether a claimant's mental impairment is
severe, an ALJ is required to evaluate the degree of mental
limitation in the following four areas: (1) understand,
remember, or apply information; (2) interact with others; (3)
concentrate, persist, or maintain pace; and (4) adapt or
manage oneself. If the degree of limitation in these four
areas is determined to be “mild, ” a
claimant's mental impairment is generally not severe,
unless there is evidence indicating a more than minimal
limitation in her ability to perform basic work activities.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)-(d).
B.
The ALJ's decision
The ALJ
found that Plaintiff's medically determinable impairment
of depression caused no limitations in understanding,
remembering, or applying information; no limitations in
interacting with others; no limitations in concentrating,
persisting, or maintaining pace; and a mild limitation in
adapting or managing herself. (AR 20). Because he found that
Plaintiff's mental impairment caused no more than minimal
limitation in her ability to perform basic mental work
activities, the ALJ concluded that it was not severe. (AR
18-20.) In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ considered the
following evidence.
In
September 2010, Plaintiff underwent a consultative
psychiatric evaluation by Stephan Simonian, M.D. (AR 19,
citing AR 344-348.) Plaintiff told Dr. Simonian that she was
laid off in September 2009 and was later diagnosed with
hepatitis and diabetes. She had recently completed treatment
with Interferon, and she was “feeling tired and rather
anxious.” (AR 344.) Plaintiff indicated that she had no
past psychiatric history and had never seen a psychiatrist.
(AR 345.) She reported a history of alcohol abuse, but had
stopped drinking in January 2010. (AR 345.)
Dr.
Simonian's mental status examination revealed normal
speech, thought process, affect, thought content,
intellectual functioning, memory, comprehension, abstract
thinking, and calculations. (AR 346-347.) Plaintiff's
mood “was somewhat anxious.” (AR 346.) Dr.
Simonian diagnosed Plaintiff with generalized anxiety
disorder with avoidant personality features. In Dr.
Simonian's opinion, Plaintiff was able to perform both
simple and complex job instructions, maintain concentration
and attention on a consistent basis, maintain attendance and
perform work activities on a consistent basis, and perform
work without special supervision. However, he opined that
Plaintiff was moderately limited in her ability to interact
with supervisors, co-workers, and the public and moderately
limited in her ability to adapt to the stresses common to a
normal work environment. (AR 347-348.)
In
October 2010, State Agency medical consultant F. L. Williams,
M.D., reviewed the medical evidence and opined that
Plaintiff's mental impairment moderately limited her
ability to understand, remember, and carry out detailed
instructions, but did not result in limitations in any other
functional ability, including her ability to interact with
coworkers, supervisors, or the general public. (AR 362-365.)
In July
2015, Plaintiff underwent a consultative psychiatric
examination by Raymond Yee, M.D. Plaintiff reported feeling
anxious and depressed. She told Dr. Yee that she took a
“low dose” of Ativan (.5 mg) to help with
anxiety. (AR 505-506, 508.) Plaintiff denied ever seeing any
outpatient mental health professional and denied any
psychiatric hospitalization. (AR 508.) Dr. Yee's mental
status examination revealed that Plaintiff had good eye
contact; a polite, cooperative, and friendly presentation;
normal speech, mannerisms, and expressions; appropriate mood
and affect; and no abnormalities in thought content.
Plaintiff's fund of knowledge, ability to perform
calculations, concentration, abstract thinking, and judgment
were all intact. Plaintiff's memory was largely intact.
(AR 19, 509-510.) Dr. Yee diagnosed Plaintiff with adjustment
disorder with anxiety and depressive features, and alcohol
abuse. (AR 510.) Dr. Yee opined that Plaintiff is able to
perform simple as well as detailed, complex tasks; accept
instructions from supervisors; interact with coworkers and
the public; perform work activities on a consistent basis
without special attention or supervision; maintain regular
attendance in the workplace; and deal with the usual stress
that can be encountered in a competitive workplace
environment. (AR 511.)
In
August 2015, the State Agency medical consultant reviewed the
record and opined that Plaintiff had no severe mental
impairment. (AR 98-103.)
On
January 13, 2017, Plaintiff was placed on a psychiatric hold.
Plaintiff reported feeling destitute and suicidal. She
explained that her father had died, she had no income, and
her stepmother wanted her out of her home. (AR 545, 603.)
Thereafter, Plaintiff received psychiatric treatment from
April 2017 to August 2017. (AR 532, 538, 758-829.)
In
making his Step Two finding, the ALJ afforded great weight to
Dr. Yee's opinion. The ALJ reasoned that Dr. Yee's
finding that Plaintiff had no mental limitations was
consistent both with the record as a whole and with Dr.
Yee's clinical examination results. (AR 19.) The ALJ also
attributed great weight to the State Agency medical
consultant's opinion that Plaintiff's mental
impairment was not severe, reasoning that the opinion was
consistent with the record and the consultant ...