United States District Court, C.D. California
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER 
D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
October 1, 2019, Plaintiff Arroyo Escondido, LLC filed suit
against Defendants Balmoral Farms, Inc.
(“Balmoral”), Traci Brooks, and Carleton Brooks.
(See Compl., ECF No. 1.) Presently before the Court
is Plaintiff's Request for a Temporary Restraining Order
(“TRO”) to take measurements of the sport horse
(“New Moon”). (TRO 1, ECF No. 16.) For the
reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES the TRO.
about April 15, 2018, Plaintiff through its managing member
Dr. Christi Payan (“Payan”) purchased New Moon
from Defendant Balmoral for $190, 000 for high-level
equestrian competition. (Compl. ¶ 9.) Payan involved
Peter Pletcher (“Pletcher”) his trainer in
negotiating the terms of the agreement with Defendants.
(Compl. ¶ 10.) Pletcher informed Defendants that
Plaintiff sought all medical records, competition records,
and other information relevant to New Moon's quality and
stability for its intended purpose. (Compl. ¶ 10.)
Defendants failed to disclose all the relevant information
but represented to Plaintiff that New Moon was fit and
suitable for its intended purpose as a competitive sport
horse. (Compl. ¶¶ 10, 11.)
alleges that once Payan took possession of New Moon, Payan
entered New Moon in jumping competitions but New Moon refused
jumps and bucked the rider after going over jumps. (Compl.
¶ 13.) Plaintiff alleges that such behavior is highly
unusual for sport horses and New Moon had a history of
refusing jumps and bucking prior to the sale. (Compl.
¶¶ 13, 14.) Plaintiff files suit on the grounds
that Defendants sold New Moon without disclosing this defect
and falsely advertising that New Moon was younger and
smaller. (Compl. ¶ 14.)
Plaintiff files a TRO to inspect and examine New Moon and an
order restraining Defendants from harming or relocating the
horse in any way pending trial. (TRO 4.) Plaintiff argues
that New Moon could die of starvation causing it to lose key
evidence of horse measurements to substantiate its claim.
application for a temporary restraining order involves the
invocation of a drastic remedy which a court of equity
ordinarily does not grant, unless a very strong showing is
made of a necessity and desirability of such action.”
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103
F.Supp. 978, 980 (D.D.C. 1952). The standard for issuing a
temporary restraining order is “substantially
identical” to that for issuing a preliminary
injunction. Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D.
Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, a court may
grant preliminary injunctive relief to prevent
“immediate and irreparable injury.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
65(b). To obtain this relief, a plaintiff must make a clear
showing that (1) “he is likely to succeed on the
merits”; (2) “he is likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief”; (3)
“the balance of equities tips in his favor”; and
(4) “an injunction is in the public interest.”
Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. City of Los
Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S.
7, 20 (2008)). The “clear showing” requirement is
particularly strong when a party seeks a TRO. See Mazurek
v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997).
where there is a strong likelihood of success on the merits,
plaintiffs must demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely
in the absence of an injunction. Winters, 555 U.S.
at 22. Here, Plaintiff alleges seven claims in the Complaint
all premised on the assertion that Defendants engaged in
fraud by misrepresenting New Moon's abilities and size.
(TRO 6.) However, Plaintiff fails to cite any case law
indicating its likelihood of success on the merits and thus,
fails to meet its burden. However, even if Plaintiff had met
its burden and could demonstrate a likelihood of success on
the merits, the Court does not find immediate or irreparable
context of evaluating whether to grant a temporary
restraining order, harm is irreparable where it extends
beyond pecuniary injury. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 747 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1984)
(“[A] party is not entitled to a preliminary injunction
unless he or she can demonstrate more than simply damages of
a pecuniary nature.”); but see Herb Reed
Enters., LLC v. Florida Entm't Mgmt.,
Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1250 (9th Cir. 2013)
(“Evidence of loss of control over business reputation
and damage to goodwill could constitute irreparable
harm.”). “[P]laintiff must demonstrate potential
harm which cannot be redressed by a legal or an equitable
remedy following a trial. The [temporary restraining order]
must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff
from the harm.” Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra,
Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1992).
Plaintiff requests the Court grant its request for a
temporary restraining order on two grounds; First, Plaintiff
asserts that it needs to immediately inspect and measure the
horse to prevent destruction of valuable measurements in the
event that New Moon's musculoskeletal system is impacted
or in the event New Moon dies. (TRO 7.) Second, Plaintiff
claims that it cannot renew its mortality insurance on New
Moon without current measurements and if New Moon were to die
before it renewed its insurance, Plaintiff would suffer a
loss. (Decl. of Dr. Christi Payan (“Payan Decl.”)
¶ 11, ECF No. 16-3.)
declares that Balmoral has “threatened to mistreat this
horse by starving the horse unless Plaintiff relents in this
case by taking the horse back from Balmoral.” (Payan
Decl. ¶ 11.) However, the Court finds suspect the
instant request as Defendants have been in possession of New
Moon since March of 2019, Plaintiff lost coverage of its life
insurance on New Moon in August 2019, and Plaintiff filed
this case in October 2019. (TRO 2-3; Payan Decl. Ex. B
(“Life Insurance Coverage”), ECF No. 16-5.) Since
eight months have passed since Defendants repossessed New
Moon and no harm has occurred to it, and given that Plaintiff
fails to articulate any specific or current reason why New
Moon will become sick or die, the Court finds no immediate or
irreparable harm. Furthermore, from the email exchange
between counsel for Plaintiff and ...