California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division
[255
Cal.Rptr.3d 241] Original consolidated proceedings in mandate
challenging order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Louis R. Hanoian, Judge. Petitions denied. (Super. Ct. No.
CR61365) (Super. Ct. No. CR105918)
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COUNSEL
Summer
Stephan, District Attorney, Mark A. Amador, Linh Lam and
Christine Bannon, Deputy District Attorneys, for Petitioner.
No
appearance for Respondent.
Angela
Bartosik, Randy Mize, Chief Deputy Public Defenders, Robert
Ford and Troy A. Britt, Deputy Public Defenders, for Real
Parties in Interest.
Xavier
Becerra, Attorney General, Thomas S. Patterson, Assistant
Attorney General, Tamar Pachter and Nelson R. Richards,
Deputy Attorneys General, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real
Parties in Interest, upon the request of the Court of Appeal.
OPINION
McCONNELL,
P.J.
Page 274
I
INTRODUCTION
In
2018, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed into law
Senate Bill No. 1437 (Senate Bill 1437), legislation that
prospectively amended the mens rea requirements for the
offense of murder and restricted the circumstances under
which a person can be liable for murder under the
felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015.) Senate Bill 1437 also
established a procedure permitting certain qualifying persons
who were previously convicted of felony murder or murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to
petition the courts that sentenced them to vacate their
murder convictions and obtain resentencing on any remaining
counts. (Id., � 3.)
Real
parties in interest were convicted of murder and petitioned
for vacatur of their convictions and resentencing under the
procedures established by Senate Bill 1437. The People moved
to dismiss the petitions on grounds that Senate Bill 1437,
which the voters did not approve, invalidly amended
Proposition 7 (Prop. 7, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec.
(Nov. 7, 1978); Proposition 7) and Proposition 115 (Prop.
115, as approved by voters, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990);
Proposition 115), voter initiatives that increased the
punishments for murder and augmented the list of predicate
offenses for first degree felony-murder liability,
respectively. The trial court rejected the People’s argument
and denied the motions to dismiss. The People filed petitions
for writs of mandate and/or prohibition in our court, asking
us to
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direct the trial court to vacate its order denying the
motions to dismiss and enter a new order granting the
motions.
[255
Cal.Rptr.3d 242] Like the trial court, we conclude Senate
Bill 1437 was not an invalid amendment to Proposition 7 or
Proposition 115 because it neither added to, nor took away
from, the initiatives. Therefore, we deny the People’s
petitions for writ relief.
II
BACKGROUND
A
In
2018, the Legislature enacted and the Governor signed Senate
Bill 1437, effective January 1, 2019. (Stats. 2018, ch.
1015.) An uncodified section of the law expressing the
Legislature’s findings and declarations states the law was
"necessary to amend the felony murder rule and the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to
murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a
person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the
intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to
human life." (Id., � 1, subd. (f).) It further
provides that the legislation was needed "to limit
convictions and subsequent sentencing so that the law of
California fairly addresses the culpability of the individual
and assists in the reduction of prison overcrowding, which
partially results from lengthy sentences that are not
commensurate with the culpability of the individual."
(Id., � 1, subd. (e).)
Under
the felony-murder rule as it existed prior to Senate Bill
1437, a defendant who intended to commit a specified felony
could be convicted of murder for a killing during the felony,
or attempted felony, without further examination of his or
her mental state. (People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th
1172, 1182, 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 106, 203 P.3d 425 (Chun
).) " ‘The felony-murder rule impute[d] the requisite
malice for a murder conviction to those who commit[ted] a 1
homicide during the perpetration of a felony inherently
dangerous to human life.’ "[1] (Id. at p. 1184, 91
Cal.Rptr.3d 106, 203 P.3d 425.) "The purpose of the
felony-murder rule [was] to deter those who commit[ted] the
enumerated felonies from killing by holding them strictly
responsible for any killing committed by a cofelon, whether
intentional, negligent, or accidental, during
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the perpetration or attempted perpetration of the
felony." (People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th
187, 197, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 281, 91 P.3d 222.)
Independent
of the felony-murder rule, the natural and probable
consequences doctrine rendered a defendant liable for murder
if he or she aided and abetted the commission of a criminal
act (a target offense), and a principal in the target offense
committed murder (a nontarget offense) that, even if
unintended, was a natural and probable consequence of the
target offense. (People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th
155, 161-162, 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 438, 325 P.3d 972.) "
‘Because the nontarget offense [was] unintended, the mens rea
of the aider and abettor with respect to that offense [was]
irrelevant and culpability [was] imposed simply because a
reasonable person could have foreseen the commission of the
nontarget crime.’ " (People v. Flores (2016) 2
Cal.App.5th 855, 867, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 732.)
Senate
Bill 1437 restricted the application of the felony murder
rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as
applied to murder, by amending [255 Cal.Rptr.3d 243] Penal 2
Code section 189,[2] which defines the degrees of murder.
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, � 3.) Section 189, subdivision (e),
as amended, provides that a participant in a specified felony
is liable for murder for a death during the commission of the
offense only if one of the following is proven: "(1) The
person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the
actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or
assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the
first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major participant in
the underlying felony and 3 acted with reckless indifference
to human life ...."[3]
Senate
Bill 1437 also "added a crucial limitation" to
section 188, the statutory provision that defines malice for
purposes of murder. (People v. Lopez (2019) 38
Cal.App.5th 1087, 1099, 252 Cal.Rptr.3d 33, review granted
(Nov. 13, 2019, S258175) __ Cal.5th __, 254 Cal.Rptr.3d 638,
451 P.3d 777, 2019 WL 5997422.) As amended, section 188
provides in pertinent part as follows: "Except as stated
in subdivision (e) of [s]ection 189, in order to be convicted
of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice
aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based
solely on his or her participation in a crime."
(Id., subd. (a)(3).)
Finally,
Senate Bill 1437 added section 1170.95 to the Penal Code.
Section 1170.95 permits a person convicted of felony murder
or murder under a
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natural and probable consequences theory to petition the
sentencing court to vacate the murder conviction and
resentence the person on any remaining counts if the
following conditions are met: "(1) A complaint,
information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner
that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of
felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted
of first degree or second degree murder following a trial or
accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the
petitioner could be convicted for first degree or second
degree murder. [¶] (3) The petitioner ...