United States District Court, N.D. California
WALTER A. TORMASI, Plaintiff,
v.
WESTERN DIGITAL CORP., Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS RE:
DKT. NOS. 19, 27, 24, 29
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Pending
before the Court is Defendant Western Digital
Corporation's motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 19. Defendant
argues that Plaintiff Walter A. Tormasi lacks standing to
bring suit because he does not hold title to United States
Patent Nos. 7, 324, 301 (“the '301 Patent”)
and lacks capacity to sue because he is an inmate prohibited
from conducting business. Defendant also argues that
Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege willful patent
infringement. For the reasons explained below, the Court
GRANTS the motion.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
filed this action on February 12, 2019, alleging infringement
of the '301 Patent. Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.). The
'301 Patent is titled “Striping Data Simultaneously
Across Multiple Platter Surfaces” and “pertains
to the field of magnetic storage and retrieval of digital
information.” Id. ¶ 1, Ex. C.
Independent
claim 41 describes:
41. An actuator mechanism, said mechanism
comprising at least two arms, said arms assigned to different
circular carrier surfaces within an information storage and
retrieval apparatus; and means for moving said arms
simultaneously and independently across corresponding carrier
surfaces with a component of movement in a radial direction
with respect to said carrier surfaces.
Id. Ex. C. at 12:5-11. Numerous claims depend from
Claim 41, including, as relevant here Claim 61:
61. The mechanism of claim 41 wherein said actuator mechanism
comprises a primary actuator and at least two secondary
actuators, wherein the primary actuator comprises at least
two primary arms, said primary arms being only unitarily
movable; and the secondary actuators are subdevices that are
individually affixed to the tip of each primary arm, with
each said secondary actuator supporting one read/write
member, wherein in its operative mode, said primary actuator
executes means for providing initial general positioning by
unitarily moving said secondary actuators to an approximate
radial positions; and in its operative mode, said secondary
actuators execute means for providing precise independent
secondary position by independently moving said read/write
members to specific radial positions corresponding to
particular concentric circular tracks on the respective
carrier surfaces.
Id. Ex. C. at 12:61-13:9. Nine claims depend from
Claim 61 and add further limitations such as (1)
“wherein said secondary actuators are
microactuators” (Claim 62) and (2) “wherein
secondary actuators are microelectromechanisms” (Claim
63). Id. Ex. C. at 13:10-13. Plaintiff alleges that
“Defendant manufactures, markets, sells, distributes
and/or imports hard disk drives . . . containing dual-stage
actuator systems comprising primary and secondary actuation
devices, ” which “feature every structural
element and limitation of claims 41, 61, 62, and 63” of
the '301 Patent. Id. ¶ 21, 26.
On
April 25, 2019, Defendant filed the pending motion to
dismiss, for which briefing is complete. Dkt. No. 19
(“Mot.”), 23 (“Opp.”), and 26
(“Reply”). Plaintiff filed a related
administrative motion for nunc pro tunc objection to evidence
in Defendant's Reply, Dkt. No. 27, and a motion to strike
Defendant's response to Plaintiff's administrative
motion, Dkt. No. 29.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). A defendant may move to dismiss a
complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
“Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only
where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or
sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.”
Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d
1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). A claim is facially plausible when a plaintiff pleads
“factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In
reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts
“accept factual allegations in the complaint as true
and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).
Nonetheless, Courts do not “accept as true allegations
that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact,
or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis.
Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d
979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)). Even if the court concludes that a
12(b)(6) motion should be granted, the “court should
grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading
was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not
possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.”
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000)
(en banc) (quotation omitted).
III.
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