United States District Court, S.D. California
ORDER (1) CONSTRUING TRUST ACCOUNT STATEMENT AS
MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS; (2) GRANTING MOTION TO
PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS; and (3) DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT
PREJUDICE AND WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
Michael M. Anello United States District Judge.
a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has submitted a Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
TRUST ACCOUNT STATEMENT AS A MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA
PAUPERIS AND GRANTING MOTION
has not filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, but has
submitted a trust account statement from the California
correctional institution in which he is presently confined.
The Court CONSTRUES the trust account
statement as a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Further,
because Petition has $0.00 in his account and therefore
cannot afford the $5.00 filing fee, the Court
GRANTS Petitioner's application to
proceed in forma pauperis, and allows Petitioner to prosecute
the above-referenced action without being required to prepay
fees or costs and without being required to post security.
The Clerk of the Court shall file the Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus without prepayment of the filing fee.
TO STATE GROUNDS FOR RELIEF IN PETITION
addition, Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases
states that the petition “shall set forth in summary
form the facts supporting each of the grounds . . . specified
[in the petition].” Rule 2(c), 28 U.S.C. foll. §
2254; see also Boehme v. Maxwell, 423 F.2d 1056,
1058 (9th Cir. 1970) (trial court's dismissal of federal
habeas proceeding affirmed where petitioner made conclusory
allegations instead of factual allegations showing that he
was entitled to relief). Here, Petitioner has violated Rule
2(c). Although Petitioner does not fail to state factual
allegations in the Petition, he does fail to state any
grounds for relief in the Petition.
courts should liberally interpret pro se pleadings with
leniency and understanding, this should not place on the
reviewing court the entire onus of ferreting out grounds for
relief. See Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020
(9th Cir. 2001). The Court finds that the Petition contains
allegations without any grounds for relief. This Court would
have to engage in a tenuous analysis in order to attempt to
identify and make sense of the Petition and its attachments.
In order to satisfy Rule 2(c), Petitioner must point to a
“real possibility of constitutional error.”
Cf. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.7
(1977) (internal quotation marks omitted). Facts must be
stated, in the petition, with sufficient detail to enable the
Court to determine, from the face of the petition, whether
further habeas corpus review is warranted. Adams v.
Armontrout, 897 F.2d 332, 334 (8th Cir. 1990). Moreover,
the allegations should be sufficiently specific to permit the
respondent to assert appropriate objections and defenses.
Harris v. Allen, 739 F.Supp. 564, 565 (W.D. Okla.
1989). Here, the lack of grounds for relief in the Petition
prevents the Respondent from being able to assert appropriate
objections and defenses.
TO ALLEGE EXHAUSTION OF STATE JUDICIAL REMEDIES
habeas petitioners who wish to challenge either their state
court conviction or the length of their confinement in state
prison, must first exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S.
129, 133-34 (1987). Ordinarily, to satisfy the exhaustion
requirement, a petitioner must “‘fairly
present' his federal claim to the highest state court
with jurisdiction to consider it, or . . . demonstrate that
no state remedy remains available.” Johnson v.
Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations
omitted). Moreover, to properly exhaust state court remedies
a petitioner must allege, in state court, how one or more of
his or her federal rights have been violated. For example,
“[i]f a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an
evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him [or her]
the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment, he [or she] must say so, not only in federal
court, but in state court.” See Duncan v.
Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995)(emphasis added).
not clear from the Petition that Petitioner has exhausted any
claims in the California Supreme Court. If Petitioner has
raised his claims in the California Supreme Court, he must so
the Court cautions Petitioner that under the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) a one-year
period of limitation applies to a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment
of a State court. The limitation period runs from the latest
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or