United States District Court, S.D. California
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
[DOC. 147]
HON.
ROGER T. BENITEZ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Pending
before the Court is Plaintiff Hoyt Hart's motion for a
new trial. [Doc. 147.] The motion is DENIED.
I.
BACKGROUND
This
action arose out of an attorneys' fees dispute between
Plaintiff Hoyt Hart and Defendants Scott Larson and Scott
Larson, P.C.[1] In April 2013, Jo Ann Storm suffered a
brain injury while visiting the Welk Resort in Cathedral
City, California. Subsequently, the Storms hired their friend
and neighbor, Colorado attorney Larson, to sue Welk Resort
and its insurer. In August 2014, Larson invited Hoyt Hart to
act as California local counsel on the Storm case. Following
settlement of the Storm lawsuit, Plaintiff Hoyt Hart brought
a claim for fraud against Larson.[2] Hart alleged that Larson
misrepresented the state of settlement negotiations between
the Storms and the Storm defendants at the time that he and
Larson negotiated how the Storm contingency fee would be
split.
The
matter was tried by jury from August 13 to August 15, 2019. A
seven-person jury unanimously rendered a verdict for
Defendants, finding that Larson did not make a false
representation of fact to Hart. Doc. 133 at 2. On August 19,
2019, the Court entered judgment against Hart and for Larson
in accordance with the jury's verdict. Doc. 136,
Following the verdict on August 15, 2019, the Court ordered
that all post-trial motions be filed no later than September
4, 2019. See Doc. 127. Hart filed his motion for a
new trial on September 16, 2019, twelve days after the
deadline set by the Court.[3] For the reasons discussed below,
Hart's motion is DENIED.
II.
DISCUSSION
Hart
moves for a new trial based on two of the Court's
evidentiary rulings. Under Rule 59, a new trial may be
granted "only if the verdict is contrary to the clear
weight of the evidence, is based upon false or perjurious
evidence, or to prevent a miscarriage of justice."
Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods.,
212 F.3d 493, 510 n. 15 (9th Cir. 2000). A new trial may not
be granted "merely because [the court] might have come
to a different result from that reached by the jury."
Roy v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc.,
896 F.2d 1175, 1176 (9th Cir, 1990). In support of his
motion, Hart contends the Court erred in admitting two
categories of evidence: (1) evidence relating to a
disciplinary action brought against him by the State Bar of
California and (2) evidence that the IRS asserted tax liens
on his assets because of his failure to pay taxes.
A.
Evidence of Hart's False Statement to the State
Bar
Hart
argues the Court erred in admitting evidence that the State
Bar of California disciplined him for knowingly making a
false statement to a State Bar investigator. Hart contends
that evidence should have been excluded under both Federal
Rules of Evidence 403 and 608(b). The Court disagrees.
The
evidence Hart disputes is limited to a single question and
answer during defense counsel's cross-examination of Hart
Defense counsel asked, 'Ts it true or not, in 2002, you
admitted you made a misrepresentation to the California State
Bar, which under State Bar rules was an act of moral
turpitude?" Hart responded, "Yes, seventeen years
ago." The inquiry then ended, in compliance with the
Court's prior ruling.[4] No other questions were asked regarding
the issue, and no extrinsic evidence was admitted regarding
Hart's State Bar discipline.
1.
FRE 403
Hart
contends the Court should have excluded the question under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which provides that relevant
evidence may be excluded if "its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice," Fed, R. Evid. 403. Importantly, "Rule
403 ... is an extraordinary remedy to be used sparingly
because it permits the trial court to exclude otherwise
relevant evidence," United States v. Mende, 43
F.3d 1298, 1302 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Here, evidence of Hart's discipline by the
State Bar for an act of moral turpitude is highly probative
of his credibility as a witness because, as Larson argues, it
bears on his willingness to lie to advance his personal
interests. Moreover, contrary to Hart's position, his
credibility was very much at issue where (1) he
brought a fraud claim against Larson, (2) he took the stand
to offer his own testimony as evidence on each element of his
fraud claim, and (3) the merits of that claim came down to a
credibility determination: whether the jury believed his
version of events or Larson's. Thus, the Court again
finds that the evidence, limited to the fact of Hart's
State Bar misconduct, is and was highly probative of his
credibility.
The
Court also did not err by finding the high probative value of
Hart's misconduct outweighed the danger of unfair
prejudice. For evidence to be excluded under FRE 403,
"the danger of prejudice must not merely outweigh the
probative value of the evidence, but substantially
outweigh it." Mende, 34 F.3d at 1302. Further,
"[r]elevant evidence is inherently prejudicial,"
and thus, "it is only unfair prejudice,
substantially outweighing probative value, which permits
exclusion of relevant matter under Rule 403." United
States v. Hankey,203 F.3d 1160, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000)
(quoting 1972 Advisory Committee Notes to FRE 403) (emphasis
added). The fact that Hart made his false statement seventeen
years prior to trial does lower the evidence's probative
value to some degree but not so much so that it is outweighed
by a ...