United States District Court, S.D. California
ORDER: 1) DENYING MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 65(B) [ECF NO. 2] AND 2)
DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(B)
Hon.
Larry Alan Burns Chief United States District Judge.
I.
Procedural Background
Plaintiff
Robert Snyder, currently incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan
Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego,
California, is proceeding pro se in this civil
action filed on September 9, 2019, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. See ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”).
Unlike most prisoners, Snyder did not file a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”)
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) together with his
Complaint, and instead remitted the $400 filing fee required
by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) to commence a civil action a week
later on September 18, 2019. See ECF No. 4, Receipt
No. CAS115493. Snyder has also filed a Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order (“TRO”) (ECF No. 2), and has
since submitted his own separate “Declaration of
Details” (“Pl.'s Decl.”) and the
declaration of a fellow prisoner in support. (See
ECF Nos. 6, 8.) But the docket has yet to show that Snyder
has requested that the Clerk issue a summons,
“present[ed] a summons to the clerk for signature and
seal” pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(b), or has yet
executed service of either his Complaint or TRO upon any of
the named Defendants. See Boudette v. Barnette, 923
F.2d 754, 757 (9th Cir. 1991) (absent a specific request and
court order that the U.S. Marshal effect service on their
behalf pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(3), persons who prepay
civil filing fees “remain[] responsible for timely
service.”); Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf
Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987) (“Before
a . . . court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
defendant, the procedural requirement of service of summons
must be satisfied.”).
II.
Plaintiff's Allegations
In both
his Complaint, Motion for TRO, and Declaration, Snyder
challenges the constitutional sufficiency of the
“make-shift ‘library'” at RJD and the
“craftily arranged moveable barriers” California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(“CDCR”) and RJD officials have constructed to
“thwart” his access to the courts and
“research[] claims” in the “3-5 active
cases” he has pending. See Compl. at 4-6, TRO
at 7-8; Pl.'s Decl. at 4-9.
In his
Complaint, Snyder contends Kathleen Allison, an
Undersecretary employed by the CDCR, A. Mondet, a supervisor
of RJD's Education Department, and Chloe Tiscornia,
RJD's Facility A Librarian, have all interfered with his
ability to litigate his “numerous complaints” by
generally impeding his access to computers, providing a
“sparse collection of law books” in a small,
poorly ventilated and overcrowded space, and by planning to
“remove [R]D's] A-Facilit[y's] library &
only allow A-Facility inmates access 1 day a week at the
Central Library.” Compl. at 4-6.
In his
Declaration, Snyder's allegations are both broader and
more narrow. For example, Snyder broadly claims “[t]he
amount of deceit invested in keeping inmates from educating
themselves in the law (inside CDCR prisons) is staggering,
” and complains that RJD librarians “pass the
buck” and blame their supervisors for “numerous
overly-restrictive customs, ” designed to
“cheat[] inmates out of any real chance at obtaining
relief.” Pl.'s Decl. at 2, 9, 13, 15. But more
specifically, Snyder complains that the Facility A library
has no bathroom or water fountain, id. at 13, does
not provide “paper clips, tape or white-out, ”
id. at 12, and is often closed due to staff
“shortages” and “meetings” which are
announced via “cursory memos.” Id. at
4-5, 14.[1] As a result, Snyder claims inmates with
“quickly approaching legal deadline[s]” are
required to pre- arrange “ducat pass[es], ”
id. at 5, and must use a “worthless”
library paging service when the institution is
“supposedly experiencing some sort of security
concern” and which permits photocopying, but no access
to the “Lexis Nexis© Interactive Database.”
Id. at 7. In sum, Snyder avers these impositions
result in insufficient “time inside the library”
and access to legal materials that are “either outdated
or too non[-]user friendly.” Id. at 15.
In
terms of relief, Snyder seeks an emergency injunction
“via a temporary command mechanism to resolve library
restrictions, ” “permanent injunctive relief via
decree to ensure daily library access, ” and an
unspecified amount of monetary damages. Compl. at 8. In his
TRO, Snyder more specifically asks that Defendants be
“restrained and enjoined from destroying
Facility-A's library program at [R]D].” TRO at 14.
III.
Screening of Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A
A.
Standard of Review As a preliminary matter, the
Court must conduct an initial review of Snyder's
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, because he is a
prisoner and seeks “redress from a governmental entity
or officer or employee of a governmental entity.”
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Section 1915A
“mandates early review-‘before docketing [] or []
as soon as practicable after docketing'-for all
complaints ‘in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental
entity.'” Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d
1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2016). The mandatory screening
provisions of § 1915A apply to all prisoners, no matter
their fee status, who bring suit against a governmental
entity, officer, or employee. See, e.g. Resnick v.
Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446-47 (9th Cir. 2000). “On
review, the court shall … dismiss the complaint, or
any portion of the complaint, ” if it “(1) is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief.” Olivas
v. Nevada ex rel. Dept. of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1283
(9th Cir. 2017) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
B.
Access to the Courts
As
summarized above, Snyder contends Defendants are
“intentionally hampering” his First Amendment
right to access to the courts “by causing physical law
library/law materials access to be reduced and restricted
down to nearly nothing.” Compl. at 4.
Prisoners
have a constitutional right of access to the courts.
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996); Bounds
v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977), limited in part
on other grounds by Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354. Because
states must ensure indigent prisoners meaningful access to
the courts, Bounds held that prison officials were
required to provide either: (1) adequate law libraries, or
(2) adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.
Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828. Bounds was
interpreted to establish “core requirements, ”
and a prisoner alleging deprivation of those core
requirements was not required to also allege actual
injury in order to a state constitutional claim. See
e.g., Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir.
1989).
However,
Lewis abolished that approach in 1996; and ever
since, in order to state a claim of a denial of the right to
access the courts, a prisoner must establish that he has
suffered “actual injury, ” a jurisdictional
requirement derived from the standing doctrine.
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349. An “actual
injury” is “actual prejudice with respect to
contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to
meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.”
Id. at 348 (citation and internal quotations
omitted). The right of access does not require the
State to “enable the prisoner to discover grievances,
” or even to “litigate effectively once in
court.” Id. at ...