United States District Court, N.D. California
ORDER DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO
DISMISS RE: DKT. NO. 51
ILLSTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court is a motion by defendant Altezza Condo LLC
(“Altezza”) to dismiss the second amended
complaint in its entirety (“Motion to Dismiss”).
This motion is scheduled for hearing on December 6, 2019.
Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds this
matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument and
hereby VACATES the hearing.
considered the papers submitted and for good cause shown, the
Court DENIES defendant's motion to dismiss in part and
GRANTS defendant's motion to dismiss in part.
Additionally, the Court GRANTS defendant's request for
judicial notice in its entirety.
forth in this Court's Order Granting Plaintiff's
Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, this lawsuit
arises from Mr. Alcaraz's assertion that, on account of
his race, color, and/or national origin, defendants have
refused to sell him the residence that he occupies. Dkt. No.
38 (“TRO”). Mr. Alcaraz alleges that defendant
KMF Oakland LLC (“KMF”) owned the 33-unit
residential complex in Oakland where he and his family have
resided since August 2010. Dkt. No. 23 (“SAC”)
¶¶ 28, 34-35. He states that in mid-2015 tensions
arose between himself and a new property manager on account
of Mr. Alcaraz's Mexican citizenship and that his rent
checks began to be refused. SAC ¶¶ 38-48. In March
2016, KMF initiated unlawful detainer proceedings against Mr.
Alcaraz in state court (“UD Action”).
Id. ¶ 49; see also Dkt. No. 50
(“RJN”) Exhibit 1 (UD Complaint, Case No.
RG16807351). While those proceedings were pending, in June
2016, KMF sold the building where Mr. Alcaraz resides to
defendant Altezza. SAC ¶ 50. Plaintiff states that he
made his July 2016 rent payment to the company designated by
Altezza. Id. ¶¶ 53-55. Plaintiff alleges
that he also inquired with personnel at this same company and
was assured no trial would take place in the UD Action.
Id. ¶¶ 57-59.
Alcaraz states that, based on this representation, he
traveled internationally on business. Id. ¶ 60.
Mr. Alcaraz alleges that KMF proceeded with the UD Action
knowing he would not be present at trial. Id. ¶
61. On August 1, 2016, in the unlawful detainer action, KMF
secured a judgment of possession of the unit where Mr.
Alcaraz resides. SAC ¶ 62; RJN Ex. 3 (UD Action
Judgment). The judgment was affirmed on appeal. RJN Ex. 4 (UD
Action Ruling on Appeal).
Alcaraz alleges that in late 2016, the units in the building
where he resides began to be sold as condominiums but that
“not one unit of the 33 units was sold to a buyer of
Hispanic and/or Mexican origin.” SAC ¶ 70. Mr.
Alcaraz further states that in August and September 2016 he
communicated with a firm representing Altezza and they
offered Mr. Alcaraz the opportunity to buy his unit at the
sales price of $630, 000 and that Mr. Alcaraz accepted.
Id. ¶¶ 76-78. The sale did not take place,
and in January, 2018 Mr. Alcaraz sued Altezza in state court
for breach of contract and promissory estoppel
(“Contract Action”). Id. ¶ 83;
see also RJN Ex. 2 (Contract Action Complaint, Case
No. RG18890767). In the Contract Action, Mr. Alcaraz did not
allege that defendants refused to complete the sale on
account of his race, color, and/or national origin.
Id.; see also Dkt. No. 51-1 at
(“Motion to Dismiss”).
March 2019, Altezza prevailed in the Contract Action on a
motion for summary judgment. SAC ¶ 85; RJN at 29-30 (Ex.
5 - Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment). In granting
summary judgment, the Alameda Superior Court noted that
plaintiff did not file an opposition to Altezza's motion
or identify contrary evidence. RJN at 29-30 (Ex. 5 - Order
Granting Motion for Summary Judgment). Mr. Alcaraz's
failure to oppose Altezza's summary judgment motion
served as grounds to grant it. Id. Mr. Alcaraz
appealed the dismissal of his case. Dkt. No. 60
(“Plaintiff's Opp'n”) at 1; dkt. no. 60-1
(Notice of Appeal).
11, 2018, Mr. Alcaraz, acting pro se, filed the
present lawsuit in this Court against defendant KMF. Dkt. No.
1. On November 21, 2018, Mr. Alcaraz filed a first amended
complaint, adding claims against KMF for intentional
interference with prospective economic relations, negligence,
and injunctive relief. Dkt. No. 9. On July 22, 2019, with the
Court's permission, Mr. Alcaraz filed a second amended
complaint, adding Altezza as a defendant, and removing the
claims for intentional interference with prospective economic
relations and negligence. See generally SAC. The
remaining claims are for violation of the federal Fair
Housing Act (First Claim for Relief), violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process (Second Claim for
Relief), and injunctive relief (Third Claim for Relief).
Id. Altezza filed an answer to the second amended
complaint on October 4, 2019. See generally Answer.
November 1, 2019, with the Court's permission, Altezza
filed a motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint and a
Request for Judicial Notice. Dkt. Nos. 51 (Motion to
Dismiss), 50 (RJN).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court
must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). This “facial plausibility”
standard requires the plaintiff to allege facts that add up
to “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009). Although courts do not require
“heightened fact pleading of specifics, ”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544, a plaintiff must provide
“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Id. at 555. The plaintiff must allege
facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Id.
deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim, the Court
must assume that the plaintiff's allegations are true and
must draw all reasonable inferences in his or her favor.
Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th
Cir. 1987). However, the court is not required to accept as
true “allegations that are merely conclusory,
unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable
inferences.” St. Clare v. Gilead Scis., Inc.,
536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). Moreover, “the
tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Court dismisses a complaint, it must decide whether to grant
leave to amend. The Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly held
that a district court should grant leave to amend even if no
request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines
that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the
allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith,
203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
res judicata and collateral estoppel are affirmative
defenses, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is an appropriate motion in
which to raise these defenses when the defenses raise no
disputed issues of ...