United States District Court, N.D. California, Eureka Division
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT RE: DKT. NO. 51
ROBERT
M. ILLMAN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Now
pending before the court is Defendants' Motion (dkt. 51)
seeking dismissal of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint
(“SAC”) (dkt. 49) without further leave to amend.
Plaintiff has responded (dkt. 54), and Defendants have
replied (dkt. 55). For the reasons stated below,
Defendants' Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
Proceeding
pro se, Plaintiff, Carrie Capolupo, filed an
original complaint against two social workers, an attorney
for Humboldt County, and Humboldt County Child Protective
Services, for violating her rights to privacy and to the free
exercise of her religion. Compl. (dkt. 1). In lieu of an
Answer, Defendants moved to dismiss (dkt. 13), which was
followed by Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, naming
the same two social workers and county counsel, but replacing
Humboldt County Child Protective Services with Humboldt
County in the caption. First Amend. Compl.
(“FAC”) (dkt. 19) at 1. Defendants then moved to
dismiss the FAC (dkt. 21), which the court granted without
prejudice, allowing Plaintiff an opportunity to cure the lack
of adequate factual allegations to support the claims in the
FAC by way of another amendment (dkt. 48). The court
identified four issues for Plaintiff to cure with another
amended complaint. First, regarding Plaintiff's claim of
interference with her religious freedom and retaliation for
her religious practice, the court dismissed this claim with
leave to amend such that Plaintiff could cure the
insufficiency of alleging nothing more than a disagreement
with a court-ordered medical examination of Plaintiff's
minor child as part of a routine child welfare investigation
based on what Plaintiff believes was a baseless referral from
Plaintiff's own parents. See Order Dismissing
FAC (dkt. 48) at 11-12 (“In amending, rather than
relying on conclusory statements, Plaintiff must include
actual facts that explain precisely what happened, and why it
would constitute a violation of her religious beliefs and
form the basis of a constitutional claim.”). Second,
Plaintiff's FAC presented a Fourth Amendment claim, and
the court found all but one of its supporting allegations
were incapable of supporting any cognizable Fourth Amendment
claim; however, the court did note that “to the extent
that Plaintiff wishes to complain about the sheriff's
deputies [who accompanied the social workers and] reportedly
instructed her to sit on her couch and reportedly grabbed her
phone, the court notes again that Plaintiff has not named any
law enforcement officers in this action.” Id.
at 12-13. Third, the FAC presented a Due Process claim,
challenging the issuance and execution of the court order
requiring a medical examination of Plaintiff's child,
specifically, that there was a 1-day delay in the execution
of the order beyond its 72-hour limit; the court found that
Plaintiff had not alleged any prejudice stemming from the
delay, and accordingly Plaintiff was granted leave to amend
this claim as well. Id. at 13-14. Lastly, because
Plaintiff named Humboldt County as a Defendant in the FAC but
had not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim of
municipal liability, the court described the standards
governing claims against municipalities and granted leave to
amend this claim in order to provide sufficient allegations
of fact in line with those standards. Id. at 14-15.
Plaintiff's
Claims:
Thereafter,
Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint
(“SAC”) (dkt. 49) which is the subject of the
pending motion to dismiss. The SAC consists of an
introduction, a section about jurisdiction, a lengthy
preamble entitled, “Claim Against Public Entity County
of Humboldt, Humboldt County Department of Health Human
Services / Social Services” (id. at 2-19),
followed by eleven numbered claims for relief (id.
at 19-27), a request for an injunction, compensatory and
punitive damages, as well as attorneys' fees and costs
(id. at 27-28). In the preamble, Plaintiff mentions
two previously unnamed persons, Connie Beck and Yvonne
Winter, Humboldt County's Social Services Director and
Social Services Supervisor, respectively. Id. at 4.
Plaintiff denominates them as “defendants, ” but
she does not allege any specific facts pertaining to them nor
did she name them in any of the eleven numbered claims.
Id.
Plaintiff's
first five claims each expressly name the following
defendants - Humboldt County itself, an unspecified number of
unidentified Sheriff's Deputies, as well as individual
Defendants Deputy County Counsel Rory Kalin and social
workers Kristen Ellis, Kimberly Schneider, and Juan Carlos
Enriquez-Paredes. See id. at 19-22. In Claim-1,
Plaintiff contends that, through instituting and conducting
child welfare proceedings, Defendants collectively deprived
Plaintiff of her right to freely express her religious
beliefs and denied her right to privacy by subjecting her to
threats, using excessive force, and maliciously prosecuting
her to deter her from practicing her religion. Id.
at 19. In Claim-2, Plaintiff submits that Defendants violated
her right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Id. at 20. Claim-3 alleges that Defendants subjected
Plaintiff to excessive force. Id. at 21. In Claim-4,
Plaintiff argues that the institution of the child welfare
proceedings “constituted malicious prosecution in that
there was no basis for the Plaintiffs' (sic) seizure, yet
Defendants continued with the prosecutions, which were
resolved in Plaintiffs' (sic) favor.” Id.
at 21-22. In Claim-5, Plaintiff submits that Defendants
subjected her to a “deprivation of liberty without due
process of law.” Id. at 22.
In
Claim-6, alleging municipal liability, Plaintiff contends
that Defendant Humboldt County, acting through its Department
of Health and Human Services, “developed, implemented,
enforced, encouraged and sanctioned de facto policies,
practices, and/or customs exhibiting deliberate indifference
[to] the Plaintiffs' (sic) constitutional rights which
cause[d] the violation of such rights.” Id. at
23. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that these actions were
willfully done with the specific intent to deprive Plaintiff
of her rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution. Id. at 23-24. In
Claim-7, Plaintiff submits that Defendants violated Article
I, Section-4, of the California Constitution by
“discriminating against Plaintiff[']s religious
customs and in initiating [child welfare] proceeding[s]
[that] were racially motivated and done without lawful
justification or jurisdiction, and were designed to and did
cause specific and serious psychological [damage] and
suffering . . . .” Id. at 24-25. In Claim-8,
Plaintiff argues that Defendants violated Article I,
Section-13, of the California Constitution by subjecting
Plaintiff “to unlawful search and seizure, [such that
she was] coerced or forced out of her residence [which was]
done without reasonable suspicion or probable cause . . .
.” Id. at 25. In Claim-9, a malicious
prosecution claim under the common law of California,
Plaintiff submits that Defendants “maliciously
commenced [j]uvenile proceedings against Plaintiff[']s
children . . . falsely and without probable cause . . .
[that] were terminated/dismissed/unfound (sic) in
Plaintiff[']s favor.” Id. at 25-26. In
Claim-10, brought under the California Unruh Civil Rights
Act, Plaintiff contends that “[b]y conducting the
complained of search in the manner described herein,
[D]efendants interfered with [P]laintiff's federal and
state constitutional and statutory rights by means of
threats, intimidation, and/or coercion . . . .”
Id. at 26-27. Lastly, in Claim-11, Plaintiff submits
that “[b]y conducting the complained of search in the
manner described, ” Defendants Schneider,
Enriquez-Paredes, the unidentified Sheriff's Deputies,
and the County of Humboldt, violated § 4030 of the
California Penal Code. Id. at 27.
Plaintiff's
Factual Allegations:
By way
of facts, the SAC contains largely the same set of factual
allegations that were pleaded in the FAC. The SAC alleges
that the petition for an investigatory medical examination of
Plaintiff's child was taken before a judge without prior
notice to Plaintiff. SAC at 8. While the SAC offers more by
way of argument and less by way of a description of those
court proceedings, Plaintiff's Response to
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss relies upon and makes
repeated references to the records of those proceedings
(see Pl.'s Opp. (dkt. 54) at 8, 9, 17-18, 21),
which have been filed in this court, and of which this court
has already taken judicial notice. See Order (dkt.
48) at 7 n.3. Those court records constitute the application
for a warrant as well as the associated findings and orders
of Judge Hinrichs of the Humboldt County Superior Court,
Juvenile Division. See Defs.' Mot., Exh. A (dkt.
23-1 *SEALED*) at 2-9. The facts contained within the SAC as
well as the records of the child welfare proceedings are as
follows.
On
August 1, 2017, child welfare officials received a referral
about Plaintiff's daughter I.A. (age 1 in
2017)[1] and Plaintiff's son B.M.K (age 4 in
2017) with another father. Id. at 8. During the time
period in question, the children resided in Manilla,
California, with Plaintiff and R.R.'s father, Derrick
Andrews. Id. Plaintiff and Mr. Andrews were reported
to practice a religion that involves certain purification
rituals. Id. According to the referral, “[t]he
baby is bathed daily by the mother, who boils water and pours
the boiling water onto the baby's pressure points and
artery-fed organs, including the genitals, bottom, belly
button, and over the heart and kidneys.” Id.
The referral added that Plaintiff believes that this process
“strengthen[ed] the child's organs.”
Id.
The
following day, Child Welfare Services (“CWS”)
dispatched social-worker Defendants Schneider and
Enriquez-Paredes to Plaintiff's home in Manilla,
accompanied by a number of Humboldt County Sheriff's
Office deputies. Id. Once there, Plaintiff and Mr.
Andrews would not allow the social workers or deputies to
enter the home or to see the children; at which point
Defendant Schneider told Plaintiff that if the parents would
not allow the social workers to see the children, a warrant
would be sought. Id. At this point, Plaintiff was
reported to have told Defendant Schneider that the
purification ritual in question involves boiling water with
tea, placing rags into the hot tea, and then wrapping her
infant daughter with those rags. Id. Plaintiff also
alleges that she “chose to explain the customs of
aborigines” to the social worker Defendants.
See SAC at 7-8. During this conversation, Mr.
Andrews was reported to have scaled a fence, climbed onto the
rooftop of his residence, shouted “that he was going to
climb a mountain to preach, ” bemoaned his displeasure
with the “social worker devils, ” and complained
more generally about “crimes committed against his
people.” Id. This apparently caused the social
workers and deputies to leave the residence. Id.
Later that day, two other social workers employed by CWS
conducted an interview with Robert Keating, the father of
Plaintiff's son B.M.K. Id. at 9. Mr. Keating
reported to CWS that he possessed audio recordings of
conversations between Plaintiff and Plaintiff's mother
wherein Plaintiff is heard saying that she has poured boiling
water on her infant daughter's reproductive organs in
order “to keep her from being promiscuous when she is
older.” Id. Mr. Keating also reported to CWS
that, while speaking on the phone with his son, he frequently
heard Mr. Andrews yelling in the background and threatening
to beat B.M.K. Id.
On
August 3, 2017, social worker Defendant Kristin Ellis
appeared before Judge Hinrichs to petition for a warrant.
Id. at 6, 8-9. Consequently, a case was opened in
the Juvenile Division of the Humboldt County Superior Court,
styled, In the matter of: I.A. and B.M.K.
Id. at 6. The petition was filed by Defendant Kalin
(acting in an official capacity as Deputy County Counsel),
seeking an order permitting entry into Plaintiff's home,
an interview with both of Plaintiff's children, and a
medical examination for Plaintiff's infant daughter.
Id. at 6, 9. Judge Hinrichs found that: (1) that
there was reasonable cause to believe that the children
involved come within the description of the California
Welfare and Institutions Code § 300 (bringing within the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court those matters where it can
be shown that a child has suffered, or there is a substantial
risk that the child will suffer, serious physical, emotional,
or other harm); (2) that the circumstances require a medical
examination of Plaintiff's daughter by a licensed medical
practitioner with specialized training in diagnosing and
treating child abuse in order to determine whether there has
been any such abuse; and (3) that entry into the
Plaintiff's home by CWS and or law enforcement
investigators was required pursuant to California Welfare and
Institutions Code § 328 for investigators to speak with
the children and to inspect the safety of the home in order
to determine whether further proceedings in juvenile court
may be warranted. Id. at 6-7. Based on these
findings, Judge Hinrichs issued an order authorizing CWS to
obtain a suitable medical examination for Plaintiff's
daughter in order to determine whether the child had been
abused or neglected, adding that the examination shall take
place within 72 hours unless the child were to need
protective custody, in which case it was to take place with
72 hours of the effectuation of the protective custody.
Id. at 7. Judge Hinrichs's order further
provided that “[t]he child's parent, guardian, or
caretaker shall immediately permit Child Welfare Services
and/or Law Enforcement investigators to enter the child's
home so they can see and speak with the child and inspect the
safety of the home in order to determine whether child
welfare services should be offered to the family and to
determine whether juvenile court proceedings should be
commenced.” Id.
In any
event, the SAC goes on to contend that, because
Plaintiff's daughter is named R.R. rather than I.A.,
Defendants' “intrusive behavior” violated
Plaintiff's right to privacy, which once asserted, caused
Defendants to retaliate. See SAC (dkt. 49) at 8.
Plaintiff then goes on to enumerate a list of reasons as to
why, in Plaintiff's view, Judge Hinrichs's order was
invalid. See id. at 8-9. First, Plaintiff argues
that order was invalid because it identified Plaintiff's
daughter as I.A. rather than R.R. Id. at 8. Second,
Plaintiff submits that, before the case was taken to Judge
Hinrich, Plaintiff told Defendants Schneider and
Enriquez-Paredes the following: that her children have
conventional doctors; that Mr. Andrews is not hostile; that
the source or sources of the original referral harbored
racial animosity towards Plaintiff or Mr. Andrews; and, that
Plaintiff and Mr. Andrews “are members/initiate of a
federal[ly] recognized international non-profit organization
called The Earth Center of Mannu (sic), inc, who[se] mission
is to inspire, research and support education into the
original ancestor culture of humanity for the health [and]
well-being of all people.” Id. at 8-9.
Plaintiff also alleges that she told the social-worker
Defendants on August 2, 2017 that the customs of this
organization do not injure or damage her infant daughter in
any way, that “the customs of the Healing Baths [] stop
when the child begins to walk, ” and that her daughter
had been walking since April of 2017. Id. at 9. In
addition to arguing that these alleged statements rendered
Judge Hinrichs's order invalid, Plaintiff also contends
that, based on her refusal to permit the social workers to
see her infant daughter on August 2, 2017, the social workers
and deputies “retaliated by returning to [] [her]
residence on August 7, 2017 with an investigative warrant due
to [] [Plaintiff] establishing her right to privacy . . . on
August 2, 2017.” Id. at 9.
The SAC
then alleges that when the above-mentioned Defendants visited
Plaintiff on August 7, 2019, to effectuate Judge
Hinrichs's order for a medical examination, insisting
that Plaintiff and her children accompany them to the
emergency room, that “[P]laintiff was coerced into
going to the emergency room by being prevented from engaging
in her religious customs such as Healing showers followed by
chants, ” as well as from breast-feeding her daughter.
Id. at 10. The SAC goes on to allege that upon
examination of Plaintiff's children, medical staff at the
emergency room were unable to identify any signs of abuse or
neglect. Id. at 22.
With
one exception, the remainder of the contents of the SAC
constitute either argument or conclusory statements rather
than allegations of fact. For example, the SAC complains that
the original referrals that triggered the child welfare
investigation and proceedings were rooted in
“harassment and discriminatory allegations by
Plaintiff's ex-boyfriend and parents who believe
themselves to be White Christians.” Id. at 9.
Likewise, the SAC argues, at length, that the provisions of
California law that govern child welfare proceedings were
unconstitutional as applied to her but without any
comprehensible explanation as to why or how. Id. at
11-14. Other portions of the SAC are both repetitive and
difficult to understand, such as Plaintiff's contention
to the following effect: “The investigative warrant was
invalid. The investigative as applied gave
Leverage/discretion” to social-worker Defendants
Schneider and Enriquez-Paredes “to subject plaintiff to
threats, duress, and coercion to have a medical exam since
probable cause for the removal was absent.”
Id. at 14. First, Plaintiff has not alleged that her
child was ever “removed” from her custody;
second, since Judge Hinrichs had ordered the medical
examination of Plaintiff's daughter, it appears that
Plaintiff is once again imputing the coercive nature of a
court order onto the child welfare officers tasked with
effectuating that order. See Order Dismissing FAC
(dkt. 48) at 13 (“Plaintiff found the choice [between
complying with Judge Hinrichs's order or facing further
proceedings] to be coercive - however, such is the nature of
court orders, compliance is not optional.”). Otherwise,
the SAC presents a great many conclusory statements, such as
the statement that Defendants acted “for purposes not
related to the health, safety, and welfare” of her
children, but with “malicious intent, gross
recklessness, and deliberate indifference to
[Plaintiff's] familial rights.” Id. at 6.
However,
the court will note that while shy on details, Plaintiff has
also alleged that during the execution of Judge
Hinrichs's order deputies “seized” Plaintiff
and forced her to sit on a couch in her residence.
Id. at 10. Plaintiff had included slightly greater
detail in the First Amended Complaint, alleging that during
the execution of Judge Hinrichs's order, in addition to
being “commanded to sit on the couch . . . one sheriff
grabbed her phone out of her hand and said Plaintiff could
not use her phone.” See FAC (dkt. 19) at 12.
The omission of the alleged seizure of Plaintiff's phone
aside, the Second Amended Complaint goes no further by way of
factual allegation in this regard than to simply say that
Plaintiff was seized by one or more deputies and forced to
sit on a couch for an unspecified amount of time while social
workers spoke with her children in another room. See
generally SAC (dkt. 49) at 1-28. Additionally, it also
appears that Plaintiff may be alleging that she considered
herself to have been seized at the emergency room as well due
to someone reportedly asking her not to leave while her child
was being examined. Id. at 11-12.
By way
of relief, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that Defendants'
conduct violated her rights under the provisions enumerated
in her eleven claims. Id. at 27. An injunction
requiring “that Defendants DHHS possessing any
information arising from the actions complained of herein
shall collect and deliver to the Plaintiff[] all such records
and expunge or delete all such information from their
records.” Id. at 28. Plaintiff also seeks an
injunction prohibiting Defendants from interfering in
Plaintiff's constitutionally protected activities,
especially when it involves “reports from
Plaintiff[']s [p]arents or relatives and ex boyfriends
from again [causing] similar discriminatory
harassment.” Id. Additionally, Plaintiff seeks
compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees,
costs of suit, as well as any other relief the court may deem
appropriate. Id.
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
A
plaintiff may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to
redress violations of “rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and [federal] laws,
” that were perpetrated by a person or entity,
including a municipality, acting under the color of state
law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Monell v. Dep't
of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-95 (1978). In the
present context, in order to survive a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a
plaintiff must allege facts that “raise a right to
relief above the speculative level, ” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); thus, the
“complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While “all well-pleaded
allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed
in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, ”
Wyler Summit Partnership v. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc.,
135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998), the court is not required
to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory,
unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.
Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988
(9th Cir. 2001). Thus, mere recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, are
insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Further,
because Plaintiff is unrepresented, this court will construe
her pleadings and arguments liberally, interpreting them to
raise the strongest arguments they suggest. See Bernhardt
v. Los Angeles County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003)
(“[c]ourts have a duty to construe pro se
pleadings liberally, including pro se
motions”); cf. Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S.
249, 251 (1971) (per curiam) (habeas corpus petition
that presents claims cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
should be construed to that extent as a complaint under
§ 1983); with, Franklin v. State of
Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1347-48 & n.13 (9th Cir.
1981) (courts should construe pro se pleadings
liberally; construing § 1983 complaint as a habeas
corpus petition).
Dismissal
for failure to state a claim is appropriate only where it
appears, beyond doubt, that the plaintiff can prove no set of
pleaded facts that would entitle her or him to relief.
Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999).
In short, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the
non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences
from that content, must plausibly suggest a ...