United States District Court, N.D. California
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
RE: DKT. NO. 16
YVONNE
GONZALEZ ROGERS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Plaintiffs
Janice Wood, Anthony Alfaro, and Aaron Dietrich bring this
putative class action against defendant Marathon Refining
Logistics Services LLC, alleging that defendant's standby
shift practices violate the reporting time pay provisions of
Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC”) Wage Order
1-2001. Now before the Court is defendant's motion to
dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) on the grounds that (i) plaintiffs'
claims are preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. section 185(a);
and (ii) plaintiffs fail to state a claim for reporting time
pay.
Having
carefully considered the papers submitted and the pleadings
in this action, and for the reasons set forth below, the
Court hereby Grants defendant's motion
With Leave To Amend.
I.
Background
As
alleged in the complaint, plaintiffs bring this action for
violations of Wage Order 1-2001, the California Labor Code,
and California Unfair Competition Law, on behalf of
themselves and other operators and maintenance workers
employed at defendant's refinery in Martinez, California.
Specifically, plaintiffs challenge defendant's alleged
practice of scheduling employees for mandatory standby shifts
without paying required reporting time pay. Plaintiffs allege
that during standby shifts, and in the case of operators,
before, after, and during standby shifts, employees must be
available to receive a call from defendant. If the employees
cannot be reached, they allegedly are considered absent
without leave and subject to disciplinary action. If they
receive a call, they allegedly must report for duty at the
refinery within a designated or reasonable amount of time. If
they do not receive a call during a standby shift, the
employees allegedly are not compensated. Plaintiffs allege
that these standby shifts impose a significant cost on
employees, precluding them from committing to jobs, classes,
caring for family members, social plans, out-of-town travel,
and travel to areas without cell reception, while working
standby shifts.
II.
Legal Standard
Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court
must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. To survive a motion to dismiss,
the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). This “facial plausibility” standard
requires the plaintiff to allege facts that add up to
“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009). In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated
a claim, a court must assume that plaintiff's allegations
are true and draw all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff's favor. Usher v. City of L.A., 828
F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). However, the court is not
required to accept as true “allegations that are merely
conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable
inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig.,
536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
III.
Discussion
The
Court begins by addressing the issue of whether
plaintiffs' claims are preempted by section 301 of the
LMRA in light of the collective bargaining agreements
(“CBAs”) into which defendant and the United
Steel Workers union entered, as well as related
guidelines.[1]
A.
Preemption Under the Labor Management Relations Act
Section
301 of the LMRA provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees in an industry
affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any
such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a). By enacting this statute, Congress
charged federal courts with a “mandate . . . to fashion
a body of federal common law to be used to address disputes
arising out of labor contracts.” Allis-Chalmers
Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209 (1985); see also
Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95,
104 (1962) (explaining that “in enacting [section] 301
Congress intended doctrines of federal labor law uniformly to
prevail over inconsistent local rules”); Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448,
456 (1957) (concluding that “the substantive law to
apply in suits under [section] 301(a) is federal law, which
the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor
laws”). As a result of this broad federal mandate, the
Supreme Court has explained, the “preemptive force of
[section] 301 is so powerful as to displace entirely any
state cause of action for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization.” Franchise Tax
Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23
(1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).
To
determine whether a claim is preempted by section 301, the
Court must first consider “whether the asserted cause
of action involves a right conferred upon an employee by
virtue of state law, not by a CBA.” Burnside v.
Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007).
If the right exists solely as a result of a CBA, the claim is
preempted and the court's analysis ends. Id. If,
however, the right exists independently of a CBA, the court
must consider “whether it is nevertheless
‘substantially dependent on analysis of a
collective-bargaining agreement.'” Id.
(quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S.
386, 394 (1987)). If such analysis is required, the claim is
preempted. Id. at 1059-60. This is true even where
plaintiffs have not alleged a breach of contract in ...