United States District Court, C.D. California
PRESENT: HONORABLE JOSEPHINE L. STATON, UNITED STATES
DISTRICT JUDGE
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
PROCEEDINGS:
(IN CHAMBERS) ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR CONFIRMATION OF
ARBITRATION AWARD (Doc. 1)
Before
the Court is Petitioner Miguel Ibarra's Petition for
Confirmation of Arbitration Award. (Petition, Doc. 1.)
Respondent Navient Solutions, LCC filed an opposition and
“counter-petition to vacate the arbitration
awards.” (Doc. 7.) Ibarra replied. (Doc. 8.) The Court
finds this matter appropriate for decision without oral
argument, and the hearing set for December 6, 2019, at 10:30
a.m. is VACATED. Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b); C.D. Cal. R. 7-15. For
the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Petition for
Confirmation of Arbitration Award and CONFIRMS the
Arbitration Award. Additionally, the Court AWARDS Ibarra
$3658.20 in attorneys' fees.
I.
BACKGROUND
On June
15, 2006, Ibarra filled out a “Full Sail Signature
Student Loan Application and Promissory Note” with
Sallie Mae Education Trust for the amount of $12, 000.
(Petition ¶ 10; Loan Agreement, Petition Ex. 1, Doc.
1-1.) Under the Loan Agreement, Sallie Mae assigned certain
rights to Navient. (See Arbitration Award at 1,
Lueck Decl. Ex. E., Doc. 7-1.) The Loan Agreement
incorporates an arbitration agreement which states that
“either party may elect to arbitrate - and require the
other party to arbitrate - any Claim.” (Loan Agreement
at 6, § Q.) It further provides, in pertinent part:
The arbitrator's award will be final and binding except
for: (A) any appeal right under the Federal Arbitration Act,
9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (the
“FAA”), and (B) Claims involving more than $50,
000. For Claims involving more than $50, 000, any party may
appeal the award to a three-arbitrator panel appointed by the
Administrator, which will reconsider de novo any aspect of
the initial award that is appealed. The panel's decision
will be final and binding, except for any appeal right under
the FAA. Except as provided above under the caption
“Location and Costs, ” the appealing party will
pay the Administrator's and arbitrator's costs of the
appeal.
(Id. at 6, § Q(7).)
On
February 1, 2017, Ibarra filed an arbitration demand with the
American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) seeking
damages under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
(“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227, et. seq.
and California's Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act, California Civil Code § 1788.11(d), (e). (Petition
¶ 12.) His claims arose “from 154 alleged
telephone calls[1] from [Navient] to Ibarra that were made
between January 11, 2016, and September 14, 2016.”
(Id.) On March 15, 2017, Navient filed its answer
and asserted a counterclaim for breach of contract to recover
$19, 688.67 from Ibarra. (Id. ¶ 13.) On
November 21, 2017, the parties attended an evidentiary
hearing in front of arbitrator Peter K. Rundle. (Id.
¶ 15; Opp. at 3.) On February 26, 2018, Rundle handed
down an arbitration award in favor of Ibarra, finding that
Navient made 226 phone calls to Ibarra that constituted
“knowing and willful violations of the TCPA.”
(Arbitration Award ¶ 55.) Rundle awarded Ibarra $228,
513.52, equivalent to $249, 125 in damages and fees under the
TCPA and Rosenthal Act less Ibarra's student loan
liability of $20, 611.48. (Id. ¶ 61.)
On
March 28, 2018, Navient appealed the award under the
above-quoted language of the arbitration agreement. (Petition
¶ 17; Opp. at 3.) In a June 19, 2019 Interim Award and
August 23, 2019 Final Award, the three-arbitrator appellate
panel upheld Rundle's ruling, modifying only the amount
of reasonable attorney's fees granted pursuant to the
Rosenthal Act and applying interest at a rate of “5%
per annum.” (Petition ¶¶ 20-24; Opp. at 3-4;
Interim Award, Petition Ex. 2, Doc. 1-2; Final Award,
Petition Ex. 3, Doc. 1-3.) In conducting the appeal, the
panel construed the “de novo” language in the
arbitration agreement as follows:
The Tribunal construes the arbitration agreement to
contemplate an appellate proceeding rather than a trial de
novo. It therefore declines to allow a re-hearing of all the
testimonial evidence, even if limited to the issues raised in
the Notice of Appeal. To the extent that factual
determinations are essential to a decision on those issues,
the Tribunal will either subject to more searching review the
factual findings made by the arbitrator below, or make those
determinations anew based on the documentary record.
(Order on Appeal Procedure ¶ 2, Lueck Decl. Ex. K., Doc.
7-1.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under
the Federal Arbitration Act, when a party to an arbitration
applies for confirmation of the arbitration award, the
“court must grant such an order unless the award is
vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10
and 11 of [the Arbitration Act].” 9 U.S.C. § 9;
Lagstein v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's,
London, 607 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 2010). The party
seeking to vacate an award bears the burden of establishing
the grounds for vacatur. U.S. Life Ins. v. Super.
Nat'l Ins. Co., 591 F.3d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir. 2010).
And this burden is a heavy one. A court may vacate an award
only where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
undue means; the arbitrator was partial or corrupt; the
arbitrator's misconduct prejudiced the rights of a party;
or the arbitrator exceeds his or her powers. 9 U.S.C. §
10; Schoenduve Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 442
F.3d 727, 731-32 (9th Cir. 2006); Kyocera Corp. v.
Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 997
(9th Cir. 2003). “Under the statute, confirmation is
required even in the face of erroneous findings of fact or
misinterpretations of law.” Kyocera, 341 F.3d
at 997.
III.
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