Gilbert v. Allison

          ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE TO THIS CASE, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDING THE ACTION PROCEED ONLY ON PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO PROTECT CLAIM [ECF NO. 8]

         Plaintiff Charles Trayzon Gilbert is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.

         Currently before the Court is Plaintiff's first amended complaint, filed on December 2, 2019.

         I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

         The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious, ” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted, ” or that “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

         A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff's rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

         Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

         II. COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

         The Court accepts Plaintiff's allegations in the complaint as true only for the purpose of the sua sponte screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

         Plaintiff names Kathleen Allison, Michael Sexton, C. Pfeiffer, E. Gonzalez, V. Gonzalez. And M. Woods, as Defendants.

         In 2018, while housed at California Men's Colony State Prison, Plaintiff had an interview with Psychologist H. Switzer, who informed Plaintiff that the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) does not allow the mental health department to treat his exhibitionistic disorder. Plaintiff interpreted Dr. Switzer's reference to mean that Defendant Kathleen Allison (Director of CDCR) is solely responsible for the policy. Dr. Switzer stated that according to policy, Plaintiff must be issued a Rules Violation Report (RVR) for either sexual disorderly conduct or indecent exposure for him to be sent to California State Prison, Corcoran's indecent exposure program. Both Dr. Switzer and Allison knew that if Plaintiff is left untreated, his delusional based disorder will intensify, and his subsequent symptoms will immediately land him inside administrative segregation where he would be prevented from participating in rehabilitative programing. Plaintiff would also suffer the stigmatization of the sex offender label and the threat of physical harm created by Allison's regulation. Plaintiff was issued several RVRs resulting from being symptomatic and was sent to the indecent exposure program which did not offer treatment for his disorder. Aside from anti-psychotic medication, coupled with one on one counseling with a licensed clinical social worker or licensed psychologist and group therapy, Plaintiff is unaware of any other treatment deemed necessary.

         Defendant Allison has authorized for use and without any penological interest, Department of Operations Manual (DOM) article 25 section 52100.4 to label Plaintiff as a sex offender making him a target for violence at the hands of other inmates. Section 42100.4 directs custody staff to over Plaintiff's cell windows and door with yellow placards and force him to wear an “exposure control suit” whenever Plaintiff becomes symptomatic. As the Director of CDCR, Allison had the option not to enforce the policy on Plaintiff but opted otherwise.

         In 2016, while housed at California State Prison, Corcoran administrative segregation, Defendant Sexton knowingly subjected Plaintiff to section 52100.4 knowing it to be an illegal policy that would label Plaintiff as a sex offender, affixed with an “R” suffix to Plaintiff's central file even though Plaintiff does not have any convictions for sexual offenses which made him a target for physical violence.

         On March 5, 2018, while housed at Kern Valley State Prison in general population, Defendant Pfeiffer knowingly subjected Plaintiff to section 52100.4 knowing it to be an illegal policy that would label Plaintiff as a sex offender and subject him to violence at the hands of other inmates.

         On April 12, 2018, as Plaintiff returned to his assigned housing unit, he was accosted from behind by a group of Hispanic gang members and called a “fucking rapist.” Plaintiff was sliced across his back with a sharp weapon. Plaintiff ran away and alerted Defendants E. Gonzalez and V. Gonzalez of the attack. After taking note of Plaintiff's injuries, the two Defendants placed Plaintiff inside one of the stand-up cages to be examined by medical staff who treated and documented his injury. Defendant M. Wood arrived and advised Plaintiff that he had been “cleared” to return to his cell. Plaintiff pleaded with Defendants E. Gonzalez, V. Gonzalez, and M. Wood to be removed from the assigned housing unit and rehoused in a safe environment. However, E. ...