United States District Court, E.D. California
ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN A
DISTRICT JUDGE TO THIS CASE, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDING THE ACTION PROCEED ONLY ON PLAINTIFF'S
FAILURE TO PROTECT CLAIM [ECF NO. 8]
Charles Trayzon Gilbert is appearing pro se and
in forma pauperis in this civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter was referred
to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.
before the Court is Plaintiff's first amended complaint,
filed on December 2, 2019.
Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the
prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous
or malicious, ” that “fail to state a claim on
which relief may be granted, ” or that “seek
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . .
.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations
are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant
personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff's
rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th
proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to
have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any
doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman,
680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To
survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially
plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow
the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d
962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and
“facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a
defendant's liability” falls short of satisfying
the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;
Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
Court accepts Plaintiff's allegations in the complaint as
true only for the purpose of the sua sponte
screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
names Kathleen Allison, Michael Sexton, C. Pfeiffer, E.
Gonzalez, V. Gonzalez. And M. Woods, as Defendants.
2018, while housed at California Men's Colony State
Prison, Plaintiff had an interview with Psychologist H.
Switzer, who informed Plaintiff that the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) does not
allow the mental health department to treat his
exhibitionistic disorder. Plaintiff interpreted Dr.
Switzer's reference to mean that Defendant Kathleen
Allison (Director of CDCR) is solely responsible for the
policy. Dr. Switzer stated that according to policy,
Plaintiff must be issued a Rules Violation Report (RVR) for
either sexual disorderly conduct or indecent exposure for him
to be sent to California State Prison, Corcoran's
indecent exposure program. Both Dr. Switzer and Allison knew
that if Plaintiff is left untreated, his delusional based
disorder will intensify, and his subsequent symptoms will
immediately land him inside administrative segregation where
he would be prevented from participating in rehabilitative
programing. Plaintiff would also suffer the stigmatization of
the sex offender label and the threat of physical harm
created by Allison's regulation. Plaintiff was issued
several RVRs resulting from being symptomatic and was sent to
the indecent exposure program which did not offer treatment
for his disorder. Aside from anti-psychotic medication,
coupled with one on one counseling with a licensed clinical
social worker or licensed psychologist and group therapy,
Plaintiff is unaware of any other treatment deemed necessary.
Allison has authorized for use and without any penological
interest, Department of Operations Manual (DOM) article 25
section 52100.4 to label Plaintiff as a sex offender making
him a target for violence at the hands of other inmates.
Section 42100.4 directs custody staff to over Plaintiff's
cell windows and door with yellow placards and force him to
wear an “exposure control suit” whenever
Plaintiff becomes symptomatic. As the Director of CDCR,
Allison had the option not to enforce the policy on Plaintiff
but opted otherwise.
2016, while housed at California State Prison, Corcoran
administrative segregation, Defendant Sexton knowingly
subjected Plaintiff to section 52100.4 knowing it to be an
illegal policy that would label Plaintiff as a sex offender,
affixed with an “R” suffix to Plaintiff's
central file even though Plaintiff does not have any
convictions for sexual offenses which made him a target for
March 5, 2018, while housed at Kern Valley State Prison in
general population, Defendant Pfeiffer knowingly subjected
Plaintiff to section 52100.4 knowing it to be an illegal
policy that would label Plaintiff as a sex offender and
subject him to violence at the hands of other inmates.
April 12, 2018, as Plaintiff returned to his assigned housing
unit, he was accosted from behind by a group of Hispanic gang
members and called a “fucking rapist.” Plaintiff
was sliced across his back with a sharp weapon. Plaintiff ran
away and alerted Defendants E. Gonzalez and V. Gonzalez of
the attack. After taking note of Plaintiff's injuries,
the two Defendants placed Plaintiff inside one of the
stand-up cages to be examined by medical staff who treated
and documented his injury. Defendant M. Wood arrived and
advised Plaintiff that he had been “cleared” to
return to his cell. Plaintiff pleaded with Defendants E.
Gonzalez, V. Gonzalez, and M. Wood to be removed from the
assigned housing unit and rehoused in a safe environment.
However, E. ...