United States District Court, N.D. California
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS Re:
Dkt. No. 12
KANDIS
A. WESTMORE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff
Gary Price Thomas filed the instant action against Defendants
Vulcan Material Company, Inc. (“Vulcan”), Jeff
Nehmens, and Phil Miller (collectively, “Vulcan
Defendants”), as well as Teamsters Union Local 665
(“Local 665”), Teamsters Union Local 853
(“Local 853”), Mike Yates, Mark Gleason, and
Rodney Smith (collectively, “Union Defendants”).
Plaintiff alleges various causes of action based on his
February 22, 2018 termination. (See Compl. ¶ 1,
Dkt. No. 1-1.)
Pending
before the Court is the Union Defendants' motion to
dismiss. (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 12.) The Court
deems the matter suitable for disposition without hearing
pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), and VACATES the December
5, 2019 hearing. Having reviewed the parties' filings and
the relevant legal authority, the Court GRANTS the Union
Defendants' motion to dismiss.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
was an employee of Shamrock Materials, whose parent company
is Defendant Vulcan. (Compl. ¶¶ 1-2.) On February
7, 2018, Plaintiff attended a meeting, where earthquake
safety was discussed. (Compl. ¶¶ 15-17, 19.) During
the meeting, complained that the “worksite was an
earthquake deathtrap and Plaintiff [had] been denied
documentation, acknowledgment of the danger.” (Compl.
¶ 18.) On February 9, 2018, Supervisor Tyler Cagros
submitted an employee corrective action letter against
Plaintiff under “Group C Work Rules, ” based on
the events of the February 7, 2018 meeting. (Compl. ¶
19.)
Plaintiff
reported the incident to Defendant Yates, the president of
Defendant Local 665. (Compl. ¶¶ 6, 20.) On February
21, 2018, Plaintiff filed a grievance with Defendant Local
665 against Defendant Vulcan. (Compl. ¶ 23.) Shortly
thereafter, Plaintiff received a call from a union
representative regarding a February 22, 2018 meeting with
Defendant Vulcan. (Compl. ¶ 23.) On February 22, 2018,
Plaintiff met with Defendants Vulcan and Local 665, and
learned he was being terminated for violation of “Group
C Rules.” (Compl. ¶ 24.)
Plaintiff
alleges that in June 2019, Plaintiff “discovered”
that the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”)
between Defendants Local 665 and Vulcan “was void
before it began as a matter of law because it denied parties
to the agreement the right to the protection of life.”
(Compl. ¶ 25.)
On
November 29, 2018, Plaintiff received a Board of Adjustment
Grievance meeting letter of confirmation from Defendant
Gleason. (Compl. ¶ 26.) On December 19, 2018, the
meeting was held. (Compl. ¶ 26.) Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants Local 665, Vulcan, and Local 853 “conspired
and staged a fraudulent Board of Adjustment grievance
procedure, ” as the CBA was void. (Compl. ¶¶
27, 29.) Plaintiff further alleges that he was terminated
under the Group C Work Rules, but that those Rules are for
non-union member employees, further evidencing that the CBA
was void. (Compl. ¶ 29.)
On
August 26, 2019, Plaintiff filed the instant action in the
County of Marin Superior Court. (Compl. at 1.) Plaintiff
asserted claims for: (1) whistleblower protection per Labor
Code § 1102.5, (2) violation of California Code of
Regulations § 1509(a), (3) wrongful constructive
termination of employment in violation of Labor Code §
1102.5 and the Fair Employment Housing Act
(“FEHA”), (4) conspiracy, (5) fraud, (6)
violation of Labor Code § 1102.5, and (7) intentional
infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”).
(Compl. at 7-14.) On September 25, 2019, Defendants removed
the case to federal court. (Not. of Removal, Dkt. No. 1.)
On
October 2, 2019, the Union Defendants filed the instant
motion to dismiss.[1] On October 25, 2019, Plaintiff filed a
late opposition to the motion. (Pl.'s Opp'n, Dkt. No.
21.) The Union Defendants did not file a reply.[2]
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may file a
motion to dismiss based on the failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. A motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted
in the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729,
732 (9th Cir. 2001).
In
considering such a motion, a court must “accept as true
all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,
” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(per curiam) (citation omitted), and may dismiss the case or
a claim “only where there is no cognizable legal
theory” or there is an absence of “sufficient
factual matter to state a facially plausible claim to
relief.” Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs.,
Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009);
Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
A claim
is plausible on its face when a plaintiff “pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation
omitted). In other words, the facts alleged must demonstrate
“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the ...