United States District Court, C.D. California
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 
D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter comes before the Court on Defendant Four Sisters Inns,
Inc., d/b/a Channel Road Inn (“Defendant') Motion
to Dismiss (“Motion”). (Mot. to Dismiss
(“Mot.”), ECF No. 6.) Plaintiff opposes the
Motion. (Opp'n to Mot. (“Opp'n”), ECF No.
9.) For the reasons that follow, the Court
GRANTS Defendant's Motion.
Strojnik (“Plaintiff”) is legally disabled due to
a “right-sided neural foraminal stenosis with symptoms
of femoral neuropathy, prostate cancer and renal cancer, and
a degenerative right knee.” (Compl. ¶ 3, ECF No.
1.) Due to his disability, “Plaintiff requires an
[American with Disabilities Act (‘ADA')] compliant
lodging facility particularly applicable to his mobility,
both ambulatory and wheelchair assisted.” (Compl.
owns or leases a hotel located at 95065 219 West Channell
Road Santa Monica, California 90402 (“Hotel”).
(Compl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff alleges he intended to visit the
Santa Monica area on an unspecified date, and reviewed
third-party hotel booking websites and Defendant's
first-party website to find lodging. (Compl. ¶¶ 15,
19.) Plaintiff alleges that the websites “failed to
identify and describe mobility related accessibility features
and guest rooms offered through its reservations service in
enough detail to reasonably permit Plaintiff to assess
independently whether Defendant's Hotel meets his
accessibility needs.” (Compl. ¶¶ 17, 19.)
Plaintiff also alleges that the websites “failed to
make reservations for accessible guest rooms available in the
same manner as individuals who do not need accessible
rooms.” (Compl. ¶¶ 18, 20.)
submits an Addendum that includes photographs from the
websites, which Plaintiff alleges discloses architectural
barriers at the Hotel. (Compl. ¶ 22 (citing Addendum
A).) For each of the alleged barriers, Plaintiff states:
The manner in which the barriers denied Plaintiff
full and equal use of access, and which deter Plaintiff from
visiting the hotel: Barrier denied Plaintiff full
and equal access by failing to identify and describe
accessible features in the hotel and guest rooms in enough
detail to reasonably permit Plaintiff to assess independently
whether the hotel or guest room meet his accessibility needs.
(Compl., Addendum A at 11-33) (emphasis in original).
Plaintiff alleges that “the ADA violations described in
Addendum A relate to Plaintiff's disability and interfere
with Plaintiff's full and complete enjoyment of the
Hotel.” (Compl. ¶ 24.) As a result, Plaintiff did
not book a room at Defendant's hotel and booked a room
elsewhere. (Compl. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff alleges he is
deterred from visiting the Hotel because the Hotel is not ADA
or State Law compliant, but intends to visit the Hotel at a
“specific time” after Defendant cures the alleged
ADA violations. (Compl. ¶¶ 11, 12.)
brings this action against Defendant asserting claims for
violation of the ADA, the Unruh Civil Rights Act, the
California Disabled Persons Act, and for negligence.
(See Compl. ¶ 1.) Defendant moves to dismiss
for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. (Mot.
Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(1) allows
a defendant to seek dismissal of a complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. A defendant may bring a Rule
12(b)(1) motion to dismiss based on a lack of standing.
See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir.
2000) (“Because standing . . . pertain[s] to a federal
court's subject-matter jurisdiction under Article III,
[it is] properly raised in a motion to dismiss under [Rule]
12(b)(1), not Rule 12(b)(6).”). “A Rule 12(b)(1)
jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual.”
Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039
(9th Cir. 2004) (citing White, 227 F.3d at 1242). A
facial attack is based on the challenger's assertion that
allegations in the complaint are “insufficient on their
face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. A
factual attack disputes the validity of allegations that, if
true, would invoke federal jurisdiction. Id.
12(b)(6) allows an attack on the pleadings for failure to
state a claim on which relief can be granted. “[W]hen
ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must
accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in
the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, a court is “not
bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.'” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (alteration in original).
A complaint must “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. This means that the complaint must plead “factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. There must
be “sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give
fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself
effectively . . . [and] factual allegations that are taken as
true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such
that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be
subjected to the expense of discovery and continued
litigation.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202,
1216 (9th Cir. 2011).
determination of whether a complaint satisfies the
plausibility standard is a “context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679. “But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit
the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not