United States District Court, S.D. California
ERICA D. HAYWOOD, Booking #19750859, Plaintiff,
U.C. SAN DIEGO, et al., Defendants.
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AS
BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(G); [DOC.
NO. 2] DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION FOR FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE
REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(A)
MICHAEL M. ANELLO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Erica D. Haywood, while in custody at the San Diego County
Sheriff Department's Las Colinas Detention & Reentry
Facility, has a civil rights Complaint (“Compl.”)
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Compl., Doc.
No. 1. Haywood seeks $18 million in general and punitive
damages from several municipalities, a non-profit agency, the
University of California Medical Center in San Diego, the
U.S. Postal Service, JCPenney, and the Fashion Valley Mall,
based on what appear to be unrelated incidents of alleged
harassment, entrapment, stalking, mail theft, false
reporting, and negligent medical and mental health care
treatment. Id. at 3‒8, 16‒19, 21.
Haywood did not pay the civil filing fee required by 28
U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the time she filed her Complaint;
instead, she filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma
Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a). See Doc. No. 2.
Motion to Proceed IFP
Standard of Review
persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.”
Moore v. Maricopa County Sheriff's Office, 657
F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like Haywood,
however, “face an additional hurdle.”
addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount
of a filing fee, ” in “monthly
installments” or “increments” as provided
by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)(b), the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to
preclude the privilege to proceed IFP in cases where the
. . . has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated
or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a
court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds
that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is
under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly
known as the ‘three strikes' provision.”
Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir.
2005). “Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with
three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.”
Id.; see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493
F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter
“Cervantes”) (under the PLRA,
“[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful
suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three
strikes rule[.]”). The objective of the PLRA is to
further “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous
prisoner litigation in federal court.” Tierney v.
Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997).
are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a
prisoner, which were dismissed on the ground that they were
frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim, ”
Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations
omitted), “even if the district court styles such
dismissal as a denial of the prisoner's application to
file the action without prepayment of the full filing
fee.” O'Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153
(9th Cir. 2008). When courts “review a dismissal to
determine whether it counts as a strike, the style of the
dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead,
the central question is whether the dismissal ‘rang the
PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a
claim.'” El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d
1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakely v.
Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)).
prisoner has accumulated three strikes, section 1915(g)
prohibits her pursuit of any subsequent IFP civil action or
appeal in federal court unless she faces “imminent
danger of serious physical injury.” See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 F.3d at
1051-52 (noting § 1915(g)'s exception for IFP
complaints which “make a plausible allegation that
the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical
injury' at the time of filing.”).
does not clearly allege any basis for § 1983 liability,
let alone assert “plausible allegations” to
suggest she “faced ‘imminent danger of serious
physical injury' at the time of filing.”
Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g)). Instead, as best the Court can decipher,
Haywood seeks to sue various governmental and private
entities for having stalked, harassed, entrapped,
“banned, ” defrauded, and
“exasperated” her, both before and during her
current term of detention. See Compl. at 3‒4,
16‒19; Sierra v. Woodford, 2010 WL 1657493, at
*3 (E.D. Cal. April 23, 2010) (finding “long,
narrative, rambling stat[e]ments regarding a cycle of
violence, and vague references to motives to harm”
insufficient to show “ongoing danger” as required
by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and Cervantes.),
aff'd sub nom. Sierra v. Woodford, Dir. of
Corr., 505 Fed.Appx. 641 (9th Cir. 2013).
while Defendants typically carry the initial burden to
produce evidence demonstrating a prisoner is not entitled to
proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “in
some instances, the district court docket may be sufficient
to show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one on the
criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a
strike.” Id. at 1120. That is the case here.
may take judicial notice of its own records, see Molus v.
Swan, Civil Case No. 3:05-cv-00452-MMA-WMc, 2009 WL
160937, *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (citing United
States v. Author Services, 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir.
1986)); Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. Entm't Inc.,
112 F.Supp.3d 1011, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2015), and
“‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts,
both within and without the federal judicial system, if those
proceedings have a direct relation to matters at
issue.'” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212,
1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic,