United States District Court, C.D. California
ROBERTO A. MENDOZA, individually and on behalf of a class of other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff,
v.
PACIFIC THEATRES ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION; THE DECURION CORPORATION; and DOES 1 thru 10, inclusive, Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND [DKT.
21]
CORMAC
J. CARNEY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
I.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
On
September 17, 2019, Plaintiff Roberto A. Mendoza filed this
action in Los Angeles County Superior Court against
Defendants Pacific Theatres Entertainment Corporation and the
Decurion Corporation. (Dkt. 1-1 [Complaint, hereinafter
“Compl.”].) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
violated the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act
(“FACTA”)-an amendment to the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (“FCRA”)-which requires merchants
to print only limited credit and debit card information on
receipts. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges
that he received a receipt at a Pacific Theaters location
with the first six digits and the last four digits of his
debit card printed on it. (Id. ¶¶ 40-41.)
Defendants
removed to this Court on October 24, 2019, invoking federal
question jurisdiction. (Dkt. 1 [Notice of Removal].) On
November 19, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand the
action to Los Angeles County Superior Court, arguing that
this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction because
Plaintiff lacks Article III standing. (Dkt. 21, hereinafter
“Mot.”) For the following reasons,
Plaintiff's motion is
GRANTED.[1]
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
A
defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court to a
federal district court if the federal court would have had
original jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over cases
that (1) involve questions arising under federal law or (2)
are between diverse parties and involve an amount in
controversy that exceeds $75, 000. 28 U.S.C. §§
1331, 1332. Principles of federalism and judicial economy
require courts to “scrupulously confine their [removal]
jurisdiction to the precise limits which [Congress] has
defined.” See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 109 (1941). Indeed,
“[n]othing is to be more jealously guarded by a court
than its jurisdiction.” See United States v.
Ceja-Prado, 333 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003)
(internal quotations omitted). The defendant removing the
action to federal court bears the burden of establishing that
the district court has subject matter jurisdiction over the
action, and the removal statute is strictly construed against
removal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d
564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Federal jurisdiction must be
rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in
the first instance.”).
“A
suit brought by a plaintiff without Article III standing is
not a ‘case or controversy,' and an Article III
federal court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over the suit.” Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386
F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 101
(1998)). To satisfy Article III's standing requirement,
“a plaintiff must show (1) that it has suffered an
‘injury in fact' that is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.” Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 181 (2000). Defendants, as the party asserting
federal jurisdiction, bear the burden of establishing
Plaintiffs' Article III standing. Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
“[A]
removed case in which the plaintiff lacks Article III
standing must be remanded to state court under
§ 1447(c).” Polo v. Innoventions Int'l,
LLC, 833 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis
added); see Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889
F.3d 956, 970 n.6 (9th Cir. 2018) (“As a general rule,
if the district court is confronted with an Article III
standing problem in a removed case-whether the claims at
issue are state or federal-the proper course is to remand for
adjudication in state court.”); Envtl. Research
Ctr. v. Heartland Prod., 29 F.Supp.3d 1281, 1283 (C.D.
Cal. 2014) (remanding the action because the plaintiff lacked
a cognizable Article III injury). “Remand is the
correct remedy” when a district court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction, because “the
federal courts have no power to adjudicate the
matter, ” while “[s]tate courts are not bound by
the constraints of Article III.” Polo, 833
F.3d at 1196 (citing ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S.
605, 617 (1989)).
III.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff
argues that his complaint fails to establish Article III
standing because he alleges nothing more than a bare
procedural violation of the FACTA. Defendants oppose his
motion, arguing that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged
injury in fact. (Dkt. 26, hereinafter “Opp.”)
Specifically, Defendants cite the following alleged injury
from printing too many digits on the receipt:
1. “[H]eightened risk of identity theft, ”
(Compl. ¶ 80),
2. Disclosure of Plaintiff's private financial
information “to the world, including to persons who
might find the receipts in the trash or elsewhere, including
identity thieves who thrive in environments such as
Defendants' box office locations, ” and to those of
Defendants' employees who handled the receipt,
(id. ¶¶ 43, 52, 80), and
3. Being “forced . . . to take action to prevent
further disclosure of the private information displayed on
the receipt, ” (id. ¶ 80), including by
“tak[ing] steps to ...