United States District Court, N.D. California
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT RE: DKT.
GONZALEZ ROGERS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Rachel Lepkowski brings this action against defendants
CamelBak Products, LLC and CamelBak International LLC
(collectively, “CamelBak”). Lepkowski brings an
amended class action complaint concerning all CamelBak eddy
water bottles, and alleges violations of various consumer
protection laws as to the bottles'
“spill-proof” claims. (Dkt. No. 16 at 2.)
Specifically, Lepkowski brings nine claims including: (i)
violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §
2301; (ii) breach of express warranty; (iii) breach of the
warranty of merchantability; (iv) unjust enrichment; (v)
violation of California's Legal Remedies Act
(“CLRA”), Cal. Civil Code §§ 1750,
et seq.; (vi) violation of California's Unfair
Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof.
Code §§ 172000, et seq.; (vii) violation
of California's False Advertising Law
(“FAL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§
17500, et seq., (viii) negligent misrepresentation;
and (ix) fraud.
before the Court is CamelBak's motion to dismiss
Lepkowski's first amended class action complaint. Having
carefully reviewed the pleadings, the papers submitted on
each motion, the parties' oral arguments at the hearing
held on December 10, 2019, and for the reasons set forth more
fully below, the Court concludes that the Lepkowski lacks
Article III standing to pursue the claims in this matter.
Accordingly, the Court Grants CamelBak's
motion to dismiss Lepkowski's first amended class action
Court limits the following summary to the facts relevant in
deciding the disposition of this motion.
16, 2019, counsel for CamelBak, Todd Maiden, sent a letter in
response to a prior letter sent by Lepkowski on April 18,
2019. (Dkt. No. 18-1 at 13-14 (Maiden Decl., Ex. B).) In this
letter, Maiden writes that CamelBak has
“unconditionally sent Ms. Lepkowski . . . a new 25
ounce Camelbak Eddy Water Bottle as a free replacement for
Ms. Lepkowski's Water Bottle (attached).”
(Id.) Further, “also enclosed with th[e]
letter [was] an unconditional refund check made payable to
Ms. Lepkowski in the amount of $20.00, which [was] intended
to be more than she paid for her water bottle at Sports
Basement, ” and which estimate was based on a webpage
showing a price of $14.00 for the product, and adding an
additional $6.00 to conservatively cover additional sales tax
or price variation. (Id.; see also Dkt. No.
18-1 at 15 (check), 16 (shipping label).)
August 5, 2019, counsel for Lepkowski, Neal Deckant,
responded stating that he “discussed [CamelBak's]
settlement offer with Ms. Lepkowski and she has decided to
reject it.” (Dkt. No. 18-1 at 18 (Maiden Decl., Ex.
C).) Deckant indicated that he would be returning the 25
ounce CamelBak Eddy water bottle and the $20.00 check, and
that a complaint would be filed.
August 22, 2019, Maiden reiterated that the replacement
bottle and the $20.00 check were sent “unconditionally
to Ms. Lepkowski.” (Dkt. No. 18-1 at 20 (Maiden Decl.,
Ex. D).) Maiden's letter stated that “[n]o
settlement offer was ever made to Ms. Lepkowski and CamelBak
has requested no agreement of any kind or any consideration
from Ms. Lepkowski.” (Id.) The check and water
bottle were sent back to Lepkowski and Maiden indicated that
Lepkowski was “free to enjoy them or do whatever she
wants with them if she does not want to keep them
herself.” (Id.; see also Id. at 21-22
(check and shipping label).)
August 8, 2019, Lepkowski commenced this lawsuit by filing
her initial class action complaint. (Dkt. No. 1.) The
operative first amended class action complaint was filed on
October 21, 2019. (Dkt. No. 16.) CamelBak moved to dismiss
this operative complaint on November 4, 2019. (Dkt. No. 18.)
12(b)(1) provides that an action may be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Federal courts are of
“limited jurisdiction” and plaintiff bears the
burden to prove the requisite federal subject matter
jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Of Am.,
511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A challenge pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1) may be facial or factual. See White v. Lee,
227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). A facial 12(b)(1) motion
involves an inquiry confined to the allegations in the
complaint, whereas a factual 12(b)(1) motion permits the
court to look beyond the complaint to extrinsic evidence.
Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th
Cir.2004). Thus, in a factual 12(b)(1) motion, the
Court may consider evidence outside the complaint to resolve
factual disputes in the process of determining the existence
of subject matter jurisdiction. McCarthy v. United
States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988). Courts
consequently need not presume the truthfulness of a
plaintiff's allegations in such instances. Safe Air
for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.
2004) (citing White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION
moves to dismiss Lepkowski's complaint under Rules
12(b)(1) and (b)(6). Because the Court concludes that
Lepkowski lacks standing under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court
limits its discussion and analysis to Rule 12(b)(1), and
declines to address CamelBak's remaining arguments under
III of the United States Constitution provides that federal
courts may only adjudicate “cases” and
“controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
The constitutional standing inquiry “focuses on whether
the plaintiff is the proper party to bring this suit.”
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997). To
establish standing under Article III, “[t]he plaintiff
must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly
traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3)
that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, ____ U.S.
____, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016), citing
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