Jacobs v. CDCR

          FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO DISMISS ACTION

          JENNIFER L. THURSTON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

         George E. Jacobs alleges that the defendants failed to provide adequate medical care and subjected him to excessive force. (Doc. 23). In two screening orders, the Court cautioned Plaintiff that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 prohibits him from bringing unrelated claims against unrelated parties in a single action.^[1] (Doc. 14 at 4-5; Doc. 19 at 3, 5-6.) The Court further warned Plaintiff that his first amended complaint (FAC) was excessively long and violated Rule 8 and instructed him to make his second amended complaint (SAC) “as concise as possible.” (Doc. 19 at 4.) The Court provided Plaintiff with the pleading requirements and legal standards for his alleged claims and granted him leave to amend. (Id.)

         Despite the Court's instructions and two opportunities to amend, Plaintiff again violates Rules 8 and 20 in his SAC. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff is unable to cure the deficiencies in his pleading, see Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012), and recommends that this action be DISMISSED.

         I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

         The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The Court should dismiss a complaint if it lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

         II. PLEADING REQUIREMENTS

         A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

         “Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited exceptions.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

         Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Factual allegations are accepted as true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

         The Court construes pleadings of pro se prisoners liberally and affords them the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). However, “the liberal pleading standard … applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations, ” not his legal theories. Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). Furthermore, “a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled, ” Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient to state a cognizable claim, and “facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability” fall short. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

         Violations of Rule 8, at both ends of the spectrum, warrant dismissal. A violation occurs when a pleading says too little, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and when it says too much, see Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011) (“we have never held-and we know of no authority supporting the proposition-that a pleading may be of unlimited length and opacity”); see also McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-80 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal under Rule 8 for a complaint that was “argumentative, prolix, replete with redundancy, and largely irrelevant”), and Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409, 415 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirming dismissal when complaints “exceeded 70 pages in length, were confusing and conclusory and not in compliance with Rule 8”).

         B. Linkage and Causation

         Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of constitutional or other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show a causal connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 373-75 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted).

         C. Federal Rules of Civil ...