United States District Court, C.D. California
MYNOR F. PORTILLO, Plaintiff,
v.
ICON HEALTH & FITNESS, INC., et al., Defendants.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT ICON HEALTH & FITNESS,
INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT UNDER RULE
12(b)(6) [11]
OTIS
D. WRIGHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I.
INTRODUCTION
This
matter comes before the Court on Defendant ICON Health &
Fitness, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint Under
Rule 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 11.) For the following reasons, the
Court DENIES Defendant's Motion.[1]
II.
BACKGROUND
On
February 26, 2019, Plaintiff Mynor F. Portillo filed a
putative class action against ICON and other unnamed
Defendants. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Portillo alleges a single
cause of action under California Penal Code
(“CPC”) section 632.7 (part of California's
Invasion of Privacy Act or “CIPA”), which
prohibits the recording of certain communications without the
consent of all parties involved. (Compl. ¶¶ 20-24.)
Portillo seeks to represent a class of “[a]ll persons
located in California whose wireless telephone conversations
with Defendant were intentionally recorded without disclosure
by Defendant at any time during the statute of limitations
period through the date of final judgment in this
action.” (Compl. ¶ 11.)
Portillo
alleges that he called ICON from a wireless telephone in
California sometime in April 2018. (Compl. ¶ 7.) He
spoke to an ICON representative who identified himself as
“Scott.” (Id.) Portillo alleges that
ICON recorded the call without his knowledge and
authorization. (Compl. ¶ 8.) He expected that the call
would be private given that ICON did not disclose that it
would be recorded or ask Portillo for his consent to record
it. (Compl. ¶ 10.) In fact, he alleges that ICON's
practice is to record all incoming calls without ever seeking
consent or informing callers of the recording. (Compl. ¶
9.)
III.
LEGAL STANDARD
Dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6) “can be based on the lack of a
cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts
alleged under a cognizable legal theory.”
Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d
696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). “To survive a motion to
dismiss . . . under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint generally must
satisfy only the minimal notice pleading requirements of Rule
8(a)(2)”-a short and plain statement of the claim.
Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003);
see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The “complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “A pleading that
offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.'” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555).
Whether
a complaint satisfies the plausibility standard is “a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Id. at 679 (citation omitted). A court is generally
limited to the pleadings and must construe “[a]ll
factual allegations set forth in the complaint . . . as true
and . . . in the light most favorable to [the
plaintiff].” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250
F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks
omitted). But a court need not blindly accept conclusory
allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable
inferences. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266
F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).
IV.
REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Although
a court is generally limited to the pleadings in ruling on a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it may consider documents incorporated
by reference in the complaint or properly subject to judicial
notice without converting the motion into one for summary
judgment. Lee, 250 F.3d at 688-89. Federal Rule of
Evidence 201 provides: “[t]he court may judicially
notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute
because it: (1) is generally known within the trial
court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be
accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed.R.Evid. 201(b).
Accordingly, courts may take judicial notice of court filings
and other matters of public record. Reyn's Pasta
Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th
Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
In
support of its Motion to Dismiss and Reply, ICON requests
that the Court take judicial notice of several court
documents from other cases, as well as some legislative
history materials. (See Reqs. for Judicial Notice
(“RJN”), ECF Nos. 12, 15.) Portillo objects to
ICON's requests for three main reasons. First, Portillo
argues that his involvement in other cases is irrelevant to
ICON's conduct in this action. (See Pl.'s
Written Objs. to Evid., ECF No. 13-1, at 2.). Second,
Portillo objects to judicial notice of the trial court order
in Granina v. Eddie Bauer, LLC, No. BC569111, 2015
WL 9855304 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 2, 2015), arguing that the
Court should not consider it at all. (See
Id. at 2-3.) Third, Portillo argues that legislative
history is irrelevant because the statute in question is
unambiguous. (See Id. at 3-5; Pl.'s
Objs. to Def.'s Suppl. RJN ISO Reply, ECF No. 16.)
Although
each the Exhibits is subject to judicial notice, the Court
agrees that most of them are irrelevant to the resolution of
the instant Motion to Dismiss. Exhibits A-H contribute
nothing to the analysis of the parties' substantive
claims for and against dismissal. Similarly, the legislative
history in Exhibits J and 1-3 is unnecessary where, as here,
the Court finds that the statute in question is unambiguous.
See Infra Part V.A; On-Line Power, Inc. v. Mazur,
149 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1085 (2007) (“Our primary purpose
is to determine the intent of the Legislature, and if the
words of a statute are unambiguous, there is no need for
construction.”). On the other hand, Portillo's
arguments against judicial notice of the trial court decision
in Granina v. Eddie Bauer, LLC are misplaced. The
Court can judicially notice the Granina order (Ex. I) and
consider its persuasive merits, if any, in deciding the
Motion. Accordingly, ICON's request for judicial notice
of Exhibit I is GRANTED. All other requests are DENIED.
V.
DISCUSSION
ICON
moves to dismiss Portillo's Complaint on the grounds that
Portillo: (1) cannot state a claim under CPC section 632.7;
(2) does not have standing to pursue his section 632.7 claim;
(3) failed to allege sufficient facts to support his claim
for attorneys' fees under California Code of Civil
Procedure ...