United States District Court, C.D. California
Present: The Honorable Fernando M. Olguin, United States
District Judge.
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Proceedings:
(In Chambers) Order Remanding Action
On
April 15, 2019, plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Los
Angeles County Superior Court against several defendants,
including removing defendant FedEx Custom Critical, Inc.
(“FedEx”). (See Notice of Removal
(“NOR”) at ¶ 1-12). On October 31, 2019,
FedEx removed that action on diversity jurisdiction grounds
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (See id.
at p. 1).
“Federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only
that power authorized by Constitution and statute[.]”
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.
375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 1675 (1994). The courts are
presumed to lack jurisdiction unless the contrary appears
affirmatively from the record. See DaimlerChrysler Corp.
v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n. 3, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 1861
(2006). Federal courts have a duty to examine jurisdiction
sua sponte before proceeding to the merits of a
case, see Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S.
574, 583, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 1569 (1999), “even in the
absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v.
Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 1244
(2006).
“The
right of removal is entirely a creature of statute and a suit
commenced in a state court must remain there until cause is
shown for its transfer under some act of Congress.”
Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S.
28, 32, 123 S.Ct. 366, 369 (2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Where Congress has acted to create a right of
removal, those statutes, unless otherwise stated, are
strictly construed against removal
jurisdiction.[1] See id. Unless otherwise
expressly provided by Congress, “any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by
the defendant or the defendants, to the district
court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see Dennis v.
Hart, 724 F.3d 1249, 1252 (9th Cir. 2013) (same). A
removing defendant bears the burden of establishing that
removal is proper. See Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem.
Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam) (noting the “longstanding, near-canonical
rule that the burden on removal rests with the removing
defendant”); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d
564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The strong presumption
against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always
has the burden of establishing that removal is
proper.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover,
if there is any doubt regarding the existence of subject
matter jurisdiction, the court must resolve those doubts in
favor of remanding the action to state court. See
Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (“Federal jurisdiction must
be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal
in the first instance.”).
“Under
the plain terms of § 1441(a), in order properly to
remove [an] action pursuant to that provision, [the removing
defendant] must demonstrate that original subject-matter
jurisdiction lies in the federal courts.” Syngenta
Crop Protection, 537 U.S. at 33, 123 S.Ct. at 370.
Failure to do so requires that the case be remanded, as
“[s]ubject matter jurisdiction may not be waived, and.
. . the district court must remand if it lacks
jurisdiction.” Kelton Arms Condo. Owners Ass'n,
Inc. v. Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th
Cir. 2003). Indeed, “[i]f at any time before final
judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c); see Emrich v. Touche Ross &
Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1194 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1988) (“It
is elementary that the subject matter jurisdiction of the
district court is not a waivable matter and may be raised at
anytime by one of the parties, by motion or in the responsive
pleadings, or sua sponte by the trial or reviewing
court.”); Washington v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 2009 WL 1519894, *1 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (a district
court may remand an action where the court finds that it
lacks subject matter jurisdiction either by motion or sua
sponte).
The
court's review of the NOR and the attached Complaint
makes clear that this court does not have subject matter
jurisdiction over the instant matter. In other words,
plaintiff could not have originally brought this action in
federal court, as plaintiff does not competently allege facts
supplying diversity jurisdiction.[2] Therefore, removal was
improper. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a);
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107
S.Ct. 2425, 2429 (1987) (“Only state-court actions that
originally could have been filed in federal court may be
removed to federal court by the defendant.”) (footnote
omitted).
Defendant
bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the amount in controversy meets the
jurisdictional threshold. See Valdez v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004); Matheson
v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090
(9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“Where it is not
facially evident from the complaint that more than $75, 000
is in controversy, the removing party must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy
meets the jurisdictional threshold. Where doubt regarding the
right to removal exists, a case should be remanded to state
court.”) (footnotes omitted). Here, there is no basis
for diversity jurisdiction because the amount in controversy
does not appear to exceed the diversity jurisdiction
threshold of $75, 000. See 28 U.S.C. §
1332.[3]
As an
initial matter, the amount of damages plaintiff seeks cannot
be determined from the Complaint, as the Complaint does not
set forth a specific amount. (See,
generally, Dkt. 1, Exh. 1, Complaint). Moreover,
FedEx fails to set forth an amount in controversy in its NOR.
(See, generally, Dkt. 1, NOR). In other
words, FedEx has failed to satisfy the amount in controversy
requirement of § 1332(a). See Gaus, 980 F.2d at
567 (remanding for lack of diversity jurisdiction where
defendant “offered no facts whatsoever . . . [to]
overcome[ ] the strong presumption against removal
jurisdiction, [and did not] satisf[y] [defendant's]
burden of setting forth . . . the underlying facts
supporting its assertion that the amount in controversy
exceeds [$75, 000].”) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (emphasis in original).
In sum,
given that any doubt regarding the existence of subject
matter jurisdiction must be resolved in favor of remanding
the action, see Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566, the court is
not persuaded, under the circumstances here, that FedEx has
met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that the amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional
threshold. See Matheson, 319 F.3d at 1090
(“Where it is not facially evident from the complaint
that more than $75, 000 is in controversy, the removing party
must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold.
Where doubt regarding the right to removal exists, a case
should be remanded to state court.”) (footnotes
omitted); Valdez, 372 F.3d at 1117.
This
order is not intended . Nor is it intended to be included in
or submitted to any online service such as Westlaw or
Lexis.
CONCLUSION
Based
on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that:
1. The
above-captioned action shall be remanded to
the Superior Court of the State of California for the County
of Los Angeles, 111 N. Hill St., Los Angeles, CA 90012, for
lack of subject ...