United States District Court, E.D. California
MARY T. PARROTT, Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
ORDER ON PARTIES' CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT (ECF NOS. 13, 18)
KENDALL J. NEWMAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff
seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner
of Social Security denying her application for Disability
Insurance Benefits.[1] In her summary judgment motion, Plaintiff
contends the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
erred by failing to apply the proper standards when
evaluating fibromyalgia claims, as well as failing to
properly assess other medical and lay opinions. The
Commissioner opposed, and filed a cross-motion for summary
judgment.
After
considering the parties' written briefing, the record,
and the applicable law, the Court DENIES the
Commissioner's cross-motion for summary judgment, GRANTS
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and REMANDS the
case for further proceedings.
I.
BACKGROUND AND ALJ'S FIVE-STEP
ANALYSIS[2]
Plaintiff
stopped working in July of 2013, and applied for disability
insurance benefits on July 28, 2014. (Administrative
Transcript (“AT”) 268.) Plaintiff claimed the
following medical conditions: “Fibromyalgia,
Depression/anxiety, Lower back arthritis and stenosis, and
Chronic Fatigue.” (AT 291.) Plaintiff's application
was denied initially and again upon reconsideration. (AT 154;
164.) Plaintiff, aided by an attorney, sought review of these
denials with an ALJ. (AT 178-9.) At a September 22, 2016
hearing, Plaintiff testified about her conditions, and the
ALJ heard testimony from a vocational expert regarding
Plaintiff's ability to work. (AT 101-43.) The ALJ
conducted another hearing on July 11, 2017, where two (later
discredited) physicians and the same vocational expert
testified. (AT 37-102.)
On
August 24, 2017, the ALJ issued a decision determining that
Plaintiff was not disabled. (AT 17-32.) At step one, the ALJ
concluded Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since July 1, 2013, Plaintiff's alleged
disability onset date. (AT 19.) At step two, the ALJ found
Plaintiff to have the following severe impairments:
Fibromyalgia; Degenerative Disc Disease of the Lumbar Spine;
Depressive Disorder; Anxiety Disorder; and Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder. (AT 20.) However, the ALJ determined at step
three that these impairments did not meet or medically equal
the severity of a listed impairment. (Id.) (citing
20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1). Based on this
information, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light
work, with the following limitations:
The claimant [can] stand and/or walk for six hours of an
8-hour workday with normal breaks. She can sit for six hours
of an 8-hour workday, with normal breaks. The claimant can
occasionally crouch and crawl. She can frequently climb
ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, ramps and stairs, balance,
stoop, and kneel. The claimant can tolerate occasional
interaction with the public, co-workers, and supervisors.
(AT 22.) In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ stated he
compared Plaintiff's symptoms to the objective medical
evidence in the record, the opinion evidence given by
Plaintiff's physicians, and Plaintiff's expressed
symptoms. (AT 22-29.) Relevant here, the ALJ found that while
Plaintiff's “medically determinable impairments
could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms
[of fibromyalgia, her] statements concerning the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not
entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other
evidence in the record . . . .” (AT 23.) Ultimately,
the ALJ concluded at steps four and five that while Plaintiff
incapable of performing past relevant work, there were jobs
existing in significant numbers in the national economy that
Plaintiff could still perform given the restrictions detailed
in the RFC. (AT 29-30.)
On
August 10, 2018, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's
request for review. (AT 1-8.) Plaintiff then filed this
action within sixty days requesting judicial review of the
Commissioner's final decision; the parties filed
cross-motions for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 1, 13, 18, 19.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
The
Court reviews the Commissioner's decision de novo, and
should reverse “only if the ALJ's decision was not
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole or
if the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard.” Buck
v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2017).
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less
than a preponderance; i.e. “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d
1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). “The ALJ is responsible for
determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical
testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Id. The
court will uphold the ALJ's conclusion where “the
evidence is susceptible to more than one rational
interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533
F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008). Further, the court may not
reverse the ALJ's decision on account of harmless error.
Buck, 869 F.3d at 1048.
III.
ISSUES PRESENTED
Plaintiff
argues the ALJ failed to apply the proper standards when he
evaluated her claims--especially in light of the Ninth
Circuit's pronouncements regarding fibromyalgia claims.
(ECF No. 13.) Broadly speaking, Plaintiff contends the ALJ
selectively cited the record in crafting the RFC. Plaintiff
asserts the ALJ did so when he failed to offer the
appropriate rationale for rejecting Plaintiff's
subjective complaints, “provided legally insufficient
reasons for rejecting various [medical] opinions, ” and
improperly discounted Plaintiff's husband's
testimony. Plaintiff maintains that once this evidence is
credited as true, the court must remand for benefits.
Alternatively, Plaintiff seeks a remand for further
proceedings.
The
Commissioner argues that in finding Plaintiff's
fibromyalgia was not as disabling as Plaintiff complained,
the ALJ properly followed the Agency's
regulations--including Social Security Rule 12-2p
(“Evaluation of Fibromyalgia”). (ECF No. 18.) The
Commissioner contends the assessment of a claimant's RFC,
like any disability, requires the ALJ to consider all
evidence in the record--including a claimant's subjective
symptoms, the entirety of the medical evidence, and any lay
opinions. Here, the Commissioner argues the ALJ did in fact
consider the entire record, and crafted Plaintiff's RFC
to conform to her disabilities. Thus, the Commissioner
contends the RFC (and decision as a whole) is supported by
substantial evidence, which should result in the ALJ's
opinion being affirmed.
IV.
LEGAL STANDARDS
In
Revels v Berryhill, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the
standard for evaluating both medical opinions and a
claimant's testimony, noted the 2012
“sea-change” regarding fibromyalgia, and applied
the standards to fibromyalgia's “unique symptoms
and diagnostic methods.” 874 F.3d 648 (9th Cir. 2017).
In this case, in addition to reviewing the general standards
for social security cases, the Court quotes from
Revels at length below--finding it controlling. ///
A. Evaluation of a Claimant's Testimony and
Third-Party Reports In ...