United States District Court, N.D. California
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
WILLIAM ALSUP, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
INTRODUCTION
In this
civil rights action, plaintiff moves for summary judgment on
defendants' affirmative defense. For the reasons below,
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is
Denied.
STATEMENT
In June
2017, plaintiff Nicholas Jacobson entered Sutter Health
Memorial Hospital with a lumbar spinal fracture following a
car accident. He left the hospital for the Martinez Detention
Facility (MDF) as a pretrial detainee between June 21 and
July 5, 2017. Plaintiff then transferred to a series of
hospitals for treatment. In January 2018, he returned to MDF
from the hospital. In April 2019, plaintiff filed this
action, alleging that at MDF from June 21, 2017, through July
5, 2017, defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment, the
ADA, the Rehabilitation Action, and standards of care. He
alleges that he received inadequate medical care during his
detainment in 2017 at MDF (Dkt. No. 25 at 2-3).
Plaintiff
now moves for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 on
defendants' affirmative defense that plaintiff failed to
exhaust administrative remedies. Defendants oppose and ask
the court for judgment in their favor. This order
follows full briefing and oral argument (Dkt. Nos. 25, 30,
35).
ANALYSIS
Summary
judgment is granted under Rule 56 when “the pleadings,
the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” A district court must determine,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, whether there is any genuine issue of
material fact. Giles v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 494 F.3d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 2007). A fact is
“material” only if it could affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986).
The
Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that “[n]o action
shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42
U.S.C. § 1983], or any other [f]ederal law, by a
prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional
facility until such administrative remedies as are available
are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Although
once within the discretion of the district court, exhaustion
in prisoner cases covered by § 1997e(a) is now
mandatory. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524
(2002). The exhaustion requirement requires “proper
exhaustion.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93
(2006). “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an
agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules
because no adjudicative system can function effectively
without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its
proceedings.” Id. at 90-91 (footnote omitted).
1.
Grievance Procedure.
This
order holds that genuine issues of material facts exist as to
defendants' affirmative defense that plaintiff did not
exhaust his administrative remedies. Defendants bear the
burden to “prove that there was an available
administrative remedy, and that prisoner did not exhaust that
available remedy.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d
1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014). Once defendants meet that burden,
the inmate has the burden of production to show that
“there is something in his particular case that made
the existing and generally available administrative remedies
effectively unavailable to him.” Ibid. The
Custody Services Bureau, a division of Contra Costa County,
governs MDF's policy and facilities. Defendants rely on
those policies constituting five to six pages of
administrative remedies, which include the grievance and
appeals procedures. Defendants allege that plaintiff failed
to exhaust the administrative remedies laid out in MDF's
policy as they were available to him. Plaintiff, however,
argues that MDF did not make those remedies
“available” to him.
A
genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether MDF
notified plaintiff about the grievance procedure. The PLRA
applicability turns on this disputed fact. Plaintiff contends
that MDF failed to notify him of the grievance procedure
because MDF did not provide him a copy of its policies for
grievances and appeals. Defendants counter that MDF made its
policy and procedure for grievances and appeals known to all
inmates - including plaintiff. Defendants point to the fact
that when MDF admits inmates, MDF requires them to watch an
orientation video which provides an overview of MDF's
policies and procedures, including a briefing of the
grievance policy and where to obtain information regarding
the policies. Based on the record, a jury could go either
way. Therefore, there is a fact question.
A
material fact also exists as to whether MDF made the
administrative remedies “available” to plaintiff
within the meaning of MDF's policy. The grievance policy
states that formal grievances must be submitted “within
48 hours of the date of the incident or condition”
(Katon Decl. Exhs. A-C). Plaintiff claims that he did not
have the capacity to exhaust his administrative remedies
during his detainment in 2017 due to his injuries. Plaintiff
could have filed his grievances when he returned to MDF in
2018, defendants reply, instead plaintiff delayed the process
until February 2019. It remains disputed as to whether MDF
made the administrative remedies “available” to
plaintiff after the 48-hour period. Therefore, a factual
question exists, and the motion for summary judgment is
denied.
2.
...